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Cert. ~o Sup.Ct.Conn. 
(opin. by Grillor-<Partial 
dissent by Shea) 
State/Civil Timely (w/ ext.) 
1. SUMMARY: Petr challenges a state-court decision holding 
that a state statute that protects religious observers against 
being compelled to work on their Sabbath violates the 
Establishment Clause. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: When petr's decedent, a 
Presbyterian who observed Sunday as his Sabbath, accepted 
employment as a manager with resp in 1975, resp's Connecticut 
stores were closed on Sundays pursuant to the state's Sunday-
closing law. That law was revised in 1976 after state courts 
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struck it down to authorize certain businesses to remain open on 
Sunday. The new law specified that no employee could be required 
to work more than 6 days in a calendar week. It also provided, 
in §53-303e (b), that: 
"No person who states that a particular day 
of the week is observed as his Sabbath may be 
required by his employer to work on such day. An 
employee's refusal to work on his Sabbath shall 
not constitute grounds for his dismissal." 
Resp then opened its stores on Sunday and demanded that its 
employees be available for work. Petr's decedent initially 
acquiesced and worked 31 Sundays between 1977 and 1979. In late 
1979, however, he submitted a written request that he be excused 
from work on Sundays because he observed that day as his Sabbath. 
Resp refused to honor his request, but offered to transfer him to 
an out-of-state store or a lower-paying position. Petr's 
decedent rejected the transfer and was informed that he would be 
demoted; he then ceased coming to work and filed a grievance with 
the State Board of Mediation. 
The Board held a hearing and concluded that resp had 
discharged petr's decedent as a management employee for refusing 
to work on Sunday, his day of Sabbath. The Board refused to 
consider resp's challenge to the constitutionality of §53-303e(b) 
because, as a quasi-judicial body, it had no authority to pass on 
the constitutionality of state law. The Board thus sustained the 
grievance and ordered resp to reinstate petr's decedent and to 
reimburse him for lost pay and fringe benefits. Resp then sought 
to vacate the award in state court. Its application was denied 
on the ground that the primary effect of the state law was "to 
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limit the number of days which an employee may be compelled to 
work to six per week." In the TC's view, it was permissible for 
the state to provide for an individually selected day of rest 
rather than for one common day. The TC also affirmed the Board's 
conclusion that resp had discharged petr's decedent. 
The Su .Ct.Conn. reversed. It first concluded that petr's 
decedent had been discharged and held that the Board had 
correctly construed its own authority in refusing to pass on the 
constitutional question. It then turned to the merits of the 
Establishment Clause issue. Applying the three-part test of 
~emon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602, 612-613 (1971), the court held 
§53-303e(b) unconstitutional on its face. It first considered 
whether the statute reflected a "clear secular purpose." In so 
doing, the court rejected the contention that §53-303e(b) merely 
provided a "day of rest" without any religious overtones. 
Section 53-303e(a), which limits the number of days in a week 
that an employee can be required to work, adequately addresses 
the valid secular purpose of forbidding uninterrupted labor. By 
authorizing each employee to designate his own observance of the 
Sabbath, §53-303e(b) evinced the "unmistakable purpose" of 
"allow[ing] those persons who wish to worship on a particular day 
the freedom to do so." Accordingly, §53-303e(b) could not pass 
the "clear secular purpose" test of Establishment Clause 
scrutiny. 
The court then found that §53-303e(b) 's primary effect was 
to advance religion; it conferred a "benefit" on an explicitly 
religious basis since only those employees who designate a 
t 
/ 
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Sabbath are entitled not to work on that particular day. 
Finally, the court considered whether §53-303e{b) would lead to 
excessive governmental entanglement with religion. The statute 
empowered the Board to resolve disputes arising in its 
administration, and the Board would be required to decide which 
religious activities may be labeled "observance of Sabbath" in 
order to assess employees' sincerity. This analysis would be 
"exactly the type of 'comprehensive, discriminating, and 
continuing state surveillance' which creates excessive 
governmental entanglements between church and state." {quoting 
Lemon, supra, at 619) 
The partial dissent agreed with the majority on the 
Establishment Clause issue, but believed that the Board should 
have reached the issue. 
3. CONTENTIONS: {a) PETR argues that the Sup.Ct.Conn. 
should not have applied the Lemon test when deciding whether a 
legislative accommodation for individual religious liberties is 
constitutionally permissible. As the recent decision in~arsh v. 
Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 {1983), indicates, the three-part test 
does not control all Establishment Clause questions. When 
individual rights of conscience conflict with seemingly neutral 
obligations imposed by government, the Free Exercise Clause 
frequently requires gover~to make an exception for the 
religious observer. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 u.s. 398 
{1963). Under the reasoning of the Sup.Ct.Conn., however, such 
accommodations would violate the Establishment Clause because 
they would be viewed as having plainly religious purposes, having 
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the primary effect of advancing religion, and entangling 
government with religion. Legislation designed to safeguard 
individual religious observance and accommodate individual 
religious interests need not be judged under the three-part test. 
See TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 u.s. 63 (1977). The correct 
constitutional standard by which a statute that protects 
religious observers against private discrimination is the 
rationality standard under which laws prohibiting other forms of 
discrimination are tested. 
Petr also contends that, if the Lemon test is applied, the 
Sup.Ct.Conn. 's decision conflicts with federal decisions that 
have upheld the Sabbath-observer protections of §70l(j) of Title 
VII and with state decisions upholding local laws prohibiting 
private discrimination on account of religious observance. CA6, 
CA7, and CA9 and state courts in Kentucky and Wisconsin have 
rejected Establishment Clause challenges to §70l(j). That 
result, in fact, may be compelled by this Court's DFWSFQ in 
Rankins v. Comm'n on Professional Competence, 444 u.s. 986 
(1980), where the Calif.Sup.Ct. had held that a provision of the 
state constitution barring religious discrimination prohibited 
disqualifications based on religious practices. 
(b) ~P argues that the decision below does not question 
Hardison, the principles of accommodation, or the EEOC's 
Religious Discrimination Guidelines. This is not an 
accommodation case. Hardison left open the question whether a 
state can require employers to grant privileges to religious 
observers as part of the accommodation process, 432 u.s., at 91 
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(MARSHALL, J., dissenting), but that question is not presented 
here since the statute does not provide for any "accommodation 
process." The real question presented by this case is "whether a 
law consistent with the First Amendment can grant a right to all 
Lutherans to celebrate a holiday in honor of Martin Luther's 
birthday, a holiday to all Catholics for celebrating Pope John's 
birthday, etc.?" Resp also contends that there are no special or 
important reasons why the Court should consider §53-303e(b): 
"This odd statute and odd factual situation is [sic] designed for 
consideration by moot courts and not by the Supreme Court of the 
United States." 
(c) ~rgues that the decision below will prompt 
~ ~ challenges to §§70l(j) and 703(a) (1) of Title VII; other federal 
interests also are implicated. Title VII does not create an 
absolute right to observance of the Sabbath; §53-303e(b) goes 
further. The constitutionality of the religious accommodation 
requirements of Title VII has not been decided by this Court. 
Although the three CAs that have considered the question have 
. -
sustained Title VII against constitutional challenge, contrary 
decisions continue to appear. Despite the differences between 
Title VII and §53-303e(b), it ~an be argued that the statutes do 
not differ with respect to the factors deemed dispo~itive of the 
Establishment Clause issue by the Sup.Ct.Conn.; the challenged 
1 
decision thus conflicts in material respects with decisions of 
CA6, CA7, and CA9 upholding Title VII and presents an opportunity 
to resolve the constitutional question not reached in Hardison. 
An authoritative determination of the constitutionality of laws 
. 
' 
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requiring religious accommodation in the workplace will remove 
impediments to voluntary compliance with Title VII, reverse a 
possible tendency of some courts toward an unduly narrow 
interpretation of Title VII, and resolve questions concerning the 
validity of comparable statutes enacted by a number of states. 
The SG also believes that the Sup.Ct.Conn. misapplied the 
Lemon test and adopted a view of the Establishment Clause that is 
inconsistent with the very principle of religious accommodation. 
In his view, the decision below conflicts with Sherbert, which 
held that extension of unemployment benefits to persons who leave 
their jobs because they otherwise would be required to work on 
their Sabbath does not violate the Establishment Clause. The 
decision also cannot be reconciled with this Court's decisions on 
Sunday closing laws. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 
(1961). These decisions establish that there is no 
constitutional bar to state laws permitting individuals the 
privilege of selecting their day off on religious grounds, even 
though persons with equally strong--though nonreligious--
preferences are accorded no such privilege. The Sup.Ct.Conn.'s 
decision renders virtually every form of religious accommodation 
constitutionally suspect. 
(d) CONNECTICUT moves to intervene as of right under 28 
u.s.c. S2403(b) and This Court's Rule 28.4(c). On the merits, it 
argues: (1) The decision below conflicts with state and federal 
decisions upholding statutes imposing on employers a duty to 
accommodate employees' religious beliefs. (2) The Sup.Ct.Conn. 
misapplied the three-part test. Section 53-303e has a clearly 
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secular purpose--to eliminate discriminatory employment 
practices. The statute also does not have the primary effect of 
advancing the interests of religionists over nonreligionists or 
the beliefs of one sect over those of another; it does not confer 
a benefit on those accommodated, but relieves individuals of a 
burden others do not suffer by permitting them to fulfill their 
employment obligations without violating their religion. The 
benefit to religion is as incidental as the benefit conferred by 
the Sunday closing laws upheld in McGowan. Section 53-303e, 
moreover, poses no danger of excessive entanglement; the 
government is required to ascertain only whether the day in 
question is the employee's Sabbath. In most cases, the issue 
will not be in dispute. (3) The decision conflicts with Sherbert 
v. Verner since §53-303e does nothing more than extend to the 
private sector the neutrality preserved in the public sector by 
Sherbert. If it is not an "establishment of religion" for the 
state to accommodate Sabbath observers as part of its 
unemployment compendation program, it cannot be an establishment 
for the state to require private employers to make the same 
accommodation. (4) The case provides an opportunity for the 
Court to consider the legitimacy of federal and state efforts to 
accommodate religious interests of employees. 
(e) AMICUS COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS argues that the 
Sup.Ct.Conn.'s decision precludes states from exercising their 
longstanding power to guarantee that citizens have equal rights 
regardless of religious differences. It also repeats some of the 
arguments summarized above. 
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4. DISCUSSION: This looks like a grant to me. Although 
the SG may overemphasize the effect of the decision, it seems 
clear that its potential sweep is quite broad. 
As Connecticut argues, the Sup.Ct.Conn. 's application of the 
three-part test is suspect. There is no basis for concluding 
I that the statute represents "a purposeful or surreptitious effort 
\ to express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a 
particular religious message." Lynch v. Donnelly, draft opin. at 
10. Although a general intent to advance religion over 
nonreligion might be d~scerned in the statute, the primary 
purpose of the statute seems to be to relieve individuals of the 
burden of choosing between their jobs and their religious 
convictions. This arguably represents a valid secular purpose. 
Whether the primary effect of §53-303e(b) is to advance religion 
is a closer question, but I would find it difficult to conclude 
that the challenged statute is more of an endorsement of religion 
that the Sunday closing laws upheld in McGowan. The 
Sup.Ct.Conn. 's conclusion concerning entanglement is somewhat 
puzzling. I see no reason to believe that an inquiry into what 
types of activities constitute proper observance of the Sabbath 
would be required in actions brought under the statute. 
Connecticut's arguments on entanglement make sense, and I am not 
persuaded that §53-303e(b) will produce either administrative 
entanglement between state and religion or political 
divisiveness. 
~· 
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I do not think that petr's argument that the three-part test 
should not be applied here gets them very far. They offer no 
real reason why the test should not be used in this context. 
As the SG recognizes, the reasonable accommodation statutes 
are potentially distinguishable from §53-303e(b), which affords 
employees greater protection than, for example, §70l(j) of Title 
VII. But there are sufficient similarities to justify the 
conclusion that the Sup.Ct.Conn. 's decision conflicts with 
decisions upholding reasonable accommodation statutes against 
Establishment Clause challenges. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend a GRANT. Connecticut's 
motion to intervene as of right should be granted. 
There is a response. Connecticut has filed a motion to 
intervene. The u.s. and the Council of State Govts. have filed 
amicus briefs. 
February 21, 1984 Werder Opin in petn. 
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SUMMARY: The State of Connecticut seeks leave to intervene in support of 
pett in this private litigation in which the Conn. S.Ct. struck down a state 
statute. The Court granted cert on Feb. 27, 1984 but may have overlooked 
Connecticut' s motion to intervene. 
<X>NTENTI.CNS: Connecticut notes that the litigation is between private 
parties and that there is no state statute or court rule requiring private 
litigants in state court to notify the Attorney General that the 
constitutionality of a state statute is being challenged. 'llius, Connecticut 
did not know of this litigation until the Connecticut S. Ct. declared the 
statute unconstitutional. 
Title 28 Section 2403(b) provides a state may intervene in private 
litigation in "a court of the United States" when the constitutionality of one 
&,.~·~_,_ 
])~v,·,( 
of the state's statutef; is in issue. Supreme Court Rule 28(c) recognizes 
§2403(c) ani requires that the state's Attorney General be notified ~n a 
petn for cert coocerns the constitutionality of a state statute. 
Connecticut concludes that under 28 U.S.C. §2403(b) ani Rule 28 (c) it 
has a right to intervene, citing R. Stern and E. Gressman, Supreme Court 
Practice, 437-38 (5th ed. 1978) and J. 1-bore, Federal Practice (Supreme Court 
Volume) Par. 828.06 (1982). 
DISCUSSICN: Whether Connecticut's intervention is marx:latory or 
permissive' it srould be granted. Connecticut moved within 30 days of the 
filing of the petn for cert. This is the state's first q>portunity to 
participate in the litigation ani, obviously, Connecticut has a substantial 
interest in the constitutionality of its statute. 
The motion to intervene smuld be granted. 
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No. 83-1158, Thorton v. Caldor, Inc. 
Memorandum for the File 
This is a summary memorandum on the basis of a 
preliminary reading of the briefs. 
This case involves the validity of §53-303(e) and (a) and 
(b), a Connecticut statute that permits certain classes of 
businesses to remain open on Sunday, but (i) guarantees all 
employees at least one day off per week, and (ii) guarantees 
the right of any employee who "states that a particular day 
of the week is observed as his Sabbath" not to work on that 
day. The employer is prohibited from dismissing any employee 
because of his ''refusal to work on his Sabbath." 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut, reversing a decision 
by the trial court, held this statute invalid as violating 
the Establishment Clause. The facts of the case are simple. 
Petitioner, a Presbyterian, was employed as a department 
manager for respondent, a multi-state chain of department 
stores. It operated on Sunday. Under a rotation system, 
petitioner was required to work one in four Sundays. When 
he declined to do so, respondent offered him alternatives 
that were unsatisfactory. Petitioner left his job, filed 
a grievance with the State Board of Mediation claiming a 
violation of the above mentioned statute . 
No. 83-1158 2. 
The board, and subsequently the trial court, held 
that petitioner was discharged unlawfully, and ordered 
reinstatement with back pay. The Board declined to consider 
the store's claim that the statute violated the Estab-
lishment Clause. But the trial court upheld the statute 
as protective of an individual's right to practice the 
religion of his or her choice. As noted above, the 
Connecticut court reversed. It a~plied the three part 
test of Lemon v. Kurtzmann, and concluded that the statute 
failed to pass each of the three tests. It was found to 
lack a secular purpose, to confer its benefit explicitly 
on a religious basis, and that the statute would result in 
excessive government entanglement. 
Petitioner's brief, prepared by Nathan Lewin (Counsel 
of Record) of Miller, Cassidy, Larroca and Lewin, is well 
written and persuasive. Its basic argument is that this 
Court's prior decisions teach that a law that protects 
Sabbath observers against adverse employment consequences 
"is a means of perserving and protecting the 'free exercise' 
of religion." This is said to be "an objective which is at 
least equal in value and stature to the goal of preventing 
government establishment of religion." 
No. 83-1158 3. 
The respondent's brief is not available to me, and 
it may not have been filed. I do have the brief of the 
U.S. as amicus curiae urging us to grant this case. 
This brief, although not as full an argument as the SG 
probably will file, sufficiently indicates the federal 
government's position. The interest of the U.S. centers 
on the effect of the decision in this case on Title VII, 
and other federal statutes. In this connection, the SG 
notes that this case involves the facial validity of the 
Connecticut statute, and therefore our decision may be of 
considerable importance to the enforcement of federal law. 
Title VII does not create an absolute right to 
observance of the Sabbath. It merely requires the employer 
reasonably to accommodate the employee's Sabbath observance 
if it can do so without "undue hardship.'' Connecticut's 
statute, therefore, goes somewhat further in that it confers 
a legal right to refrain from working on the employee's 
Sabbath. 
'r" .... 
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The SG states that the Connecticut decision "con-
flicts with two lines of decisions by this Court". 
P. 15. He particularly relies on Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398, recently affirmed in Thomas v. Review Board, 
450 U.S. 707. See also Rankins v. Commission on Profes-
sional Competency, 444 U.S. 986 (dismissing for want of 
a substantial federal question an Establishment Clause 
challenge to a state law interpreted to require employers 
to make reasonable accommodation to employee's religious 
observances." The SG discusses these cases briefly at 
P. 15 - 17 of his brief, emphasizing that the purpose 
of the Connecticut statute is fully consistent with the 
"spirit of the Free Exercise clause and the Establish-
ment Clause." 
The SG also states that the Connecticut decision 
''conflicts in material respect with the decisions of 
three federal appellate courts" cited by him. See pp. 9-12. 
I will of course wish to see the brief of respondent, 
and perhaps other amici briefs will be filed. My tentative 
view is that the SG is right. 
LFP 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
No. 83-1158 
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. 
October 31, 1984 
Question Presented 
Whether a state statute that prohibits an employer 
from requiring employees to work on their designated day of 
Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. 
! J 
· . 
• 
I 
I. 
I. Background 
A. Statutory Background. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. §53-303e(b) provides: 
who states that a particular day 
of 1 o erve as h is Sabbath may- be 
req uirea 6y fi! s employer t o work on such a a ay. 
An) e~ployee's refusal to woR on his Sabbath shall 
not constitute grounds for his dismissal." 
' '~ 
. ' 
B. Factual Background. 
In 1975, Donald Thornton began working as a de-
partment store manager for Caldor, which operates a chain 
of retail department stores in Conn., Mass., and N.Y. In 
1977, Caldor began opening for business on Sundays in 
Conn., thereby requiring Thornton and other department man-
agers to work one out of every four Sundays. Although 
Thornton worked 31 Sundays between 1977 and 1979, in Novem-
ber 1979 he informed management that he would no longer 
work on Sunday as that day was his Sabbath. 
Thornton met several times with Caldor executives 
in an attempt to resolve the problem. Caldor offered him 
two choices: (i) to continue in a supervisory capacity at a 
Mass. store, which did not require Sunday employment, or 
(ii) to remain at his current location in a nonsupervisory 
capacity as a member of the employee union, whose contract 
provided for nonattendance of work on the Sabbath. Thorn-
ton rejected both alternatives because of the distance and 
hardship involved in commuting or moving to Mass. and be-
cause remaining in Conn. as a union member would have meant 
a substantial pay cut. When Calder informed him on March 
6, 1980 that there was "no alternative other than to revert 
you back to a rank and file at $3.50 an hour" beginning on 
March 10, Thornton resigned from his job. His last day of 
work was March 8, 1980. 
C. Proceedings Below. 
On May 6, 1980, Thornton challenged Calder's ac-
tions before the Conn. state board of mediation and arbi-
tration. He alleged wrongful discharge under Conn. Gen. 
Stat. §53-303e in that as a department manager he was 
unable to observe his Sabbath. Calder answered that Thorn-
ton had not been "discharged" within the meaning of the 
,.. 
statute and further that the statute ' itself was unconstitu-
tional. The boar~ decided that it did not have authority 
to decide the consti tut:ional issue and therefore assumed 
-that the statute was valid. It then determined that Calder 
had indeed "discharged" Thornton and issued an award in his 
favor. 
On Nov. 18, 1980, Calder sought to vacate the ar-
bitration award, alleging the award to be illegal and be-
yond the power of the arbitrators in that Thornton was not 
.( 
"discharged" and the statute violated the Establishment 
V' r,.-
Clause. The TC found the statute constitutional. The cor-
rect test, it believed, was the three-factor test this 
Court employed in Committee for Public Education & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756, 772-773 (1973): 
"[T)o pass muster under the Establishment Clause 
the law in question, first, must reflect a clear-
ly secular legislative purpose, second, must have 
a primary effect that neither advances nor inhib-
its religion, and, third, must avoid excessive 
governmental entanglement with religion." 
If the statute fails any one part of this test, it must 
fall. Stone v. Graham, 449 u.s. 39, 40-41 ( 1980) (per 
~ 
McGowa.:'v. 9 curiam) . Citing the Sunday closing law case, 
Maryland, 366 u.s. 420 (1961), the TC found that the stat-
-z:::-
ute "reflects a clearly secular legislative purpose," pre-
sumably "to protect all persons from the physical and moral 
debasement which comes from uninterrupted labor." App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 2la, quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 u.s., 
,-:a, 
at 436. It next found that the primary effect of the stat-
ute was "to limit the number of days which an employee may 
-------------------------------be compelled to work to six per week." App. to Pet. for 
Cert. 2la. Allowing an employee to designate his own Sab-
bath, the TC held, did not violate the constitution because 
"the Establishment Clause does not ban federal or state 
regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens 
to coincide with the tenets of some or all religions." 
Ibid., quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 u.s., at 442. Fi-
nally, the TC found that the statute did not represent an 
. ' 
< 
"excessive entanglement with religion" because "the statute 
avoids forcing all employees to conform to Sunday as a day 
of rest when their own religion may observe a different day 
as Sabbath." Id., at 22a. By then affirming the arbitra-
tion award the TC implicitly decided that Thornton's resig-
nation constituted a "d/ arge" under the statute. 
On appeal, the Conn. s. Ct. upheld the TC's find-~ 
• ;;="" 
ing of a statutory discharge ~t [E- v!,rse~ on Establishment S/Lr 
Clause grounds. It applied the same three-part test bu~
d f h . . . h rc:. faun none o t e factors sat1sf 1ed. F1rst, t e Conn. 1 
.Cj_~ 
S.Ct. found that the statute had no "clear secular purpose"~
because "the unmistakable purpose of [the] provision is t~ 
allow those persons who wish to worship on a particular day~ 
the freedom to do so." Id., at 14a. "The day that is~ 
alloted pursuant to §53-303e (b) come'S with religious
strings attached." Id., at I3a. Second, the Conn. s. Ct. 
believed that the statute had the primary effect of advanc-
ing religion because --- ........... -
"it confers its 'benefit' on an explicitly reli-
gious basis. Only those employees who designate 
a Sabbath are entitled not to work on that par-
ticular day, and may not be penalized for so do-
ing. Workers who do not 'observe a Sabbath' may 
not avail themselves of the benefit provided by 
the subsection, and are not entitled to take a 
specific day off with impunity." Id., at 15a. 
v:: ' Ill ~ 
Third, the Conn. S. Ct. found excessive entanglement be-
~ 
cause it believed that under the statute the board would in 
every case have to determine "the scope of religious activ-
ities which may fairly be labelled 'observance of 
Sabbath. '" Id., at 15a-16a. 
~:·rtOf,~; 
' ' . ' 
This Court granted cert on March 5, 1984 limited 
to the Establishment Clause question. 
II. Discussion 
The first issue in deciding the constitutionality 
of the Conn. provision is determining what Establishment 
Clause test to apply. The parties, the intervenor, and the 
-----------------
amici propose at least three different tests: (i) whether 
--------------------
the statute rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose; 
(ii) whether the statute "establishes a religion or reli-
gious faith, or tends to do so," Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 
s.ct. 1355, 1361 (1984); and (iii) whether the statute sat-
isf ies all three prongs of the Lemon test, which is the 
same as the Nyquist test described above. 
The ....._Court should reject th~ a rational ~ 
relationship test identical to the equal protection minimal ~-­
scrutiny standard, because it would gut the Establishment~ 
I --
I 
Clause. Because of the inherent tension between the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses, once this Court recog-
nizes protecting religious freedom as a legitimate state 
goal nearly all discrimination favoring religion over non-
religion (as opposed to discrimination favoring one brand 
of religion over another) would be constitutionally permis-
sible under this test. 
The ~~~~, which finds support in some of 
this Court's most recent Establishment Clause cases, ~, 
. '. 
·r,.l 
~ 
Lynch v. Donnelly, supra; Marsh v. Chambers, 103 s.ct. 3330 
(1983), is really no test at all. The Court has applied it 
in only a few narrow situations to legitimate activities 
for which there isv s~ence the Framers would have 
approved. Ws more an appeal to history and original 
A' 
intent than a test to be generally applied. There is also 
little evidence in the cases which have employed it that 
this Court intended it to supplant the traditional Lemon 
inquiry. Furthermore, the Court could not seriously apply 
it to general Establishment Clause cases without giving it 
more content and precision. And, unless the Court were 
entirely to abandon inquiry into "religious purpose," any 
"tendency to establish religion" test would have to come to 
resemble the Lemon test in application. Thus, I believe 
the Lemon test retains its vitality and is the correct test 
to apply. In any event, the result in the present case~ 
would ~e under any of these tests. 
equires that the statute satisfy 
three that it serve a clearly secular pur-
pose, (ii) that its primary effect be neither to advance 
nor inhibit religion, and (iii) that it avoid excessive 
government entanglement with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 u.s. 602, 612-613 (1971). The Conn. statute satisfies 
all three. First, under the "secuiar purpose" prong, this 
Court has required a showing of ~ secular purpose, not of 
an exclusive secular purpose. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 
s.ct.,at 1363 n.6. "The Court has invalidated legislation 
'' 
" 
.. 
,, 
' 
. 
<' 
or governmental action on the ground that a secular purpose 
was lacking only when it has concluded there was no 
question that the statute or activity was motivated wholly 
by religious considerations." !d., at 1362 (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). Resp cannot claim that no sec-~ 1/1...-
ular purpose supports the Conn. statute. One of its aims -~ 
~ 
is to provide employment opportunities to persons who hold 
relig1ous convictions equal to those opportunities provided~ 
others. This is not a wholly religious purpose. See, 
e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 u.s. 63, 90 
(1977) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting on other grounds) ("The 
purpose and primary effect of requiring [exemptions of re-
ligious observers from work rules] is the wholly secular 
one of securing equal economic opportunity to members of 
minority religions.). Such anti-discrimination provisions 
have at least a secular component. 
Second, the primary effect of the Conn. statute is 
"'7 ...___-=-- - --..::::::. 
~ neither to advance nor inhibit religion. It does not di-
rectly promote the interests of religionists over 
nonreligionists or those of one church over another. In 
fact, it confers no direct benefit on those it accomodates 
but rather relieves them of a special burden that others do 
not suffer by permitting them to work without violating 
their religious beliefs. Furthermore, the statute implies 
no approval of certain religions or religious practices. 
Any benefit the statute gives to religion comes only 
I through the private decisions of individual employees. The 
I ' 
mediating role of individual choice means that "no imprima-
tur of State approval ••• can be deemed to have been con-
ferred on religion or religious practice." Mueller v. Al-
len, 103 s. Ct. 3062, 3069 ( 1983) • Nor does the fact that 
the law authorizes Sabbath-observers but not others to se-
lect a particular day off mean that religion impermissibly 
benefits. If this were the case, several schemes that this 
Court has upheld (or required on Free Exercise grounds) 
would have violated the Establishment Clause. Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 u.s. 205 (1972) (exemption from compulsory high 
school attendance): Gillette v. United States, 401 u.s. 437 
(1971) (exemption from compulsory military service): Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 u.s. 398 (1963) (access to unemployment 
benefits). 
~0he 
tanglem~~he .........____ _____ _ 
found this the "mos 
Conn. statute creates no excessive en------ - ·::::-:. 
state in religion. The Conn. S. Ct. 
of the Lemon test 
because it believed the statute required the arbitration 
board to inquire into the "particular religious practices 
and ••• [make] a decision concerning the scope of religious 
activities which may fairly be labelled 'observance of Sab-
bath.'" App. to Pet. for Cert. 15a-16a. This type of in-
quiry, however, which considers both the sincerity with 
which particular beliefs are held and whether they qualify 
as "religious," is not unknown to the law. Courts and 
agencies must undertake it whenever they consider whether 
.• 
,' 
,. 
··. 
any religious exemption applies. Furthermore, it is a dif-
ferent sort of "excessive entanglement" that this Court has 
found troubling before. It has worried about "comprehen-
sive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" of 
religious institutions, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s., at 
619, not of inquiries into the legitimacy of individual 
religious beliefs. 1'~'""' 
 
A line of several pre-Lemon cases further supports ~
the constitutionality of the Conn. statute. In ~erbert v. ~ 
Verner, 374 u.s. 398 (1963), a Sabbatarian was fired be-~ 
cause she conscientiously refused to work on Saturdays when 
her company, which was closed on Sundays pursuant to State 
law, expanded its work-week from five to six days and re-
quired Saturday labor. Unable to find another job that 
would not require her to violate the Sabbath, she filed a 
claim for unemployment compensation. The State denied her 
request on the ground that she refused to work for "person-
al reasons." This Court held, however, that the State's 
denial of benefits impermissibly burdened her free exercise 
of religion. It expressly rejected the State's claim that 
the Establishment Clause foreclosed benefits to individuals 
who refuse to work on their Sabbath: 
"In holding as we do, plainly we are not 
fostering the 'establishment' of the Seventh-Day 
Adventist religion in South Carolina, for the 
extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatari-
ans in common with Sunday worshippers reflects 
nothing more than the government obligation of 
neutrality in the face of religious differences, 
and does not represent that involvement of reli-
gious with secular institutions which it is the 
0/ 
object of the Establishment Clause to forestall." 
374 U~-t 409. 
In Gillette v. United States, 401 u.s. 437 (1971), 
the Court considered a federal statute which granted con-
scientious objector status to individuals firmly opposed to 
all wars because of "religious training and belief." The 
Court upheld it against Establishment Clause challenge 
largely because it was intended to spare conscientious ob-
jectors the hard choice between obeying their religious 
beliefs or fulfilling their legal obligation to their coun-
try. The Court stated: 
"apart from •.• whether the Free Exercise Clause 
might require some sort of exemption, it is hard-
ly impermissible for Congress to attempt to ac-
commodate free exercise values, in line with 'our 
happy tradition' of 'avoiding unnecessary clashes 
with the dictates of conscience. '" Id., at 453 
(footnote omit ted) • --
The fact that the policy avoided religious, but not nonre-
ligious, "clashes" made no difference. 
In most respects, the Conn. statute tries to 
achieve a similar accomodation. It does not directly priv-
ilege religious beliefs over others but rather relieves 
them of a burden they would otherwise bear. In the words 
of Sherbert v. Verner, it tries to enforce "neutrality in 
the face of religious differences." Selectively unburden-
ing the practice of individual b~lief can, of course, be 
seen as discriminating in favor of religion. As long as 
the state does not affirmatively advance religion, however, 
this Court's precedents indicate that there is no Estab-
lishment Clause difficulty. Furthermore, the statute's 
l.,. .. 
possible failure to recoginize a hardship exception makes 
no difference. The Conn. courts may imply such an excep-
tion when the issue is raised, and, in any case, any fail-
ure might pose due process difficulties but none, as far as 
the cases indicate, under the Establishment Clause. Resp's 
final argument--that Title VII preempts the Conn. statute--
also appears to be raised for the first time before this 
Court and has little merit. Although Title VII places an 
affirmative obligation on employers to accommodate individ-
ual religious practices unless accommodating them would 
cause undue hardship, it nowhere implies that further ac-
commodation of the sort here is impermissible. 
III. Summary 
The Lemon test retains its vitality and is the 
correct test to apply in the circumstances here. Under it, --the Conn. statute passes constitutional muster. The stat-
ute ha~ "clear secular purpose," as that term has been 
interpreted by this Cour~does not have the primary effect 
of encouraging religion; a~oes not create "excessive 
entanglement" between Church and State. Furthermore, this 
Court's pre-Lemon cases further support the statute's va-
lidity. Like the ~sidered in them, the Conn. 
statute does not affirmatively favor religion but only 
tries to achieve a kind of "neutrality." 
" Having said all this, I must admit I am very trou-
bled by this case. Given the case law, I do not think the 
case is even close. I do worry, however, about the course 
--:1 
this Court's past cases have taken. Although the Lemon 
test appears on its face to protect against "establish-
ments," this Court's past cases have steadily eroded _it to 
~---- - -
the point where I am not sure it presents any obstacle to 
"establishments" of religion over nonreligion as opposed to -.:::-
"establishments" of one sect over another. I mention this 
not to argue for affirmance, but rather to put my technical 
legal analysis in some sort of perspective. Perhaps in 
deciding the other Establishment Clause cases this Term, if 
not in deciding this one, the Court could consider puttin 
more teeth in this doctrine. 
Recommendation 
I recommend reversing the judgment of the Conn. s. 
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MEMORANDUM 
To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Dan 
Re: Possible Implications of the Procedural Posture of Thornton 
v. Caldor, Inc., No. 83-1158. 
I have further researched and thought about the implica-
tions arising from the fact that this case carne from an arbitra-
tion. Under Connecticut law, it is indeed the case that in unre-
stricted arbitration submissions--and this case was one, App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 5a-7a--the state courts do not review arbitration 
findings of law or fact. Thornton, in fact, presents the perfect 
illustration of how far Conn. courts will defer to arbitration 
f ~d~of law. Caldor originally challenged the arbitration 
award against it on two grounds: ( i} that the law violated the 
Establishment Clause and (ii} that there was no "discharge" as 
the statute requires. The arbitration board found against Caldor 
on the discharge issue and the state TC upheld it on the ground 
that Thornton's resignation constituted a statutory "discharge" 
in the circumstances of this case. 
The Conn. S. Ct. upheld the arbitration board's ruling 
on other grounds. It found that the state courts had no power to 
review the arbitration board's legal conclusion that Thornton's 
resignation was a "discharge." It stated: 
' 
the submission is unrestricted, the award is ••• 
final and binding and cannot be reviewed for errors of 
I5:w"' or fact :---Milford Employees Assn. v. Milford, 179 
Conn. 678, 683, 427 A.2d 859 (1980). Carroll v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co., 189 Conn. 16, 19, 453 A.2d 1158 
(1983). Where the submission does not otherwise state, 
the arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and 
legal questions and an award cannot be vacated on the 
grounds that the construction placed upon the facts or 
the interpretation of the agreement by the arbitrators 
was erroneous. Courts will not review evidence nor, 
where the submission is unrestricted, will they re~ 
the arbitrators' decision of the legal questions in-
volved. Meyers v. Lakeridge Develpment Co., 173 Conn. 
133, 135, 376 A.2d 1105 (1977). Waterbury v. Waterbury 
Police Union, 176 Conn. 401, 404, 407 A.2d 1013 (1979); 
Bic Pen Corp. v. Local No. 134, United Rubber, Cork, 
Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, 183 Conn. 579, 
584, 440 A.2d 774 (1981) ." App. to Pet. for Cert. Sa-
Ga. 
Furthermore, the Conn. S.Ct. found that §53-303e(c), which per-
mits "any employee, who believes that his discharge was in viola-
tion of subsection (a) or (b) of this section [to] appeal such 
discharge to the state board of mediation and arbitration .•. ," 
"[c]learly ••• empowers the board to resolve all issues arising 
under subsections (a) or (b), the operative provisions of §53-
303e." App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a (emphasis added). Subsection 
(b) is the Sabbath provision at issue in this case. 
Finding such limited scope for review, the Conn. s. Ct. 
upheld the arbitration board's determination that the resignation 
constituted a "discharge" without approving of that finding as a 
matter of state law. In fact, the Conn. S. Ct. stated that it 
.,, . 
.. .. ·, 
had been error for the state TC to review the correctness of the 
board's legal decision: 
"Because of our conclusion concerning the scope of the 
submission, we agree with the defendant's contention 
that the trial court erred in reviewing the board's 
conclusion and agreeing that the defendant had indeed 
been discharged with the meaning of §53-303e. This 
error, however, is harmless, since the court ultimately 
reached the correct conclusion •••• " App. to Pet. for 
Cert. 7a. 
In other words, the TC should have accepted the arbitration 
board's legal conclusions as long as they were within the scope 
of the submission. 
In the present case, the question of whether the statute 
requires an absolute rather than a reasonable accommodation was 
also decided by the arbitration panel. The transcript before the 
arbitration board reveals that Caldor argued that the statute was 
absolute: 
"According to the employees' counsel, [the statute 
gives] an absolute preference to which there is simply 
no defense. We say that such a state statute is 
unconstitutional on its face. As a matter of fact, I 
would call attention to the very recent decision, sum-
marizing cases under the Civil Rights Act and which of 
course Connecticut's version is the Connecticut FAir 
Employment Practices Act, which indicates that even 
accommodation statutes are highly suspect, and in the 
most recent case it holds that even Title VII accommo-
dation provisions are unconstitutional even though they 
contain provisions which provide that the employer does 
not have to give preference which will cause any hard-
ship ••••• Here we have a statute which provides abso-
lutely no defense for the employer, and it says that he 
must absolutely give preference to an employee who sim-
ply claims that he claims Sunday is his Sabbath. We 
say that such a statute would be unconstitutional." 
Jt. App. 30a-3la (emphasis added). 
In fact, as the above passage indicates, Caldor expressly con-
~
trasted the Connecticut statute to a reasonable accommodation 
statute like Title VII. The arbitration board's opinion provides 
, ... ( ·: 
further evidence that the board considered the statute to be ab-
solute for purposes of the submission. The board stated: 
"If a discharge for refusal to work Sunday hours oc-
curred and Sunday was the Grievant's Sabbath, said act 
violated Section 53-303e •••. In the opinion of 
the majority of the panel, Calder discharged Mr. Thorn-
ton as a management employee for refusing to work Sun-
days, which day was Mr. Thornton's day of Sabbath. 
Therefore, Calder violated Section 53-303e •••• " Id., 
at lla-12a. 
As a matter of state law, then, this Court appears to be 
bound to consider the law in this case as an absolute accommoda-
tion statute. This would allow the Court to affirm the judgment 
of the Conn. s. Ct. while making it clear that it does so under 
the arbitration board's interpretation of the law. Such a posi-
tion would permit it to invalidate (I previously would have said 
"strike down") the provision in this case without invalidating 
the law in general. The effect, in other words, would be to in-
validate the Sabbath law as applied to Mr. Thornton without de-
ciding whether the statute could be constitutional in other 
situations--particularly when another arbi tr at ion board or the 
state courts construe it to require only reasonable accommoda-
tion. This question would be left to another day. 
' l 
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The Chief Justice ]) I (; ~u+:li) 
~ s/~r ~ ~ ~~ '.' 
:5~ ~ 1 ~ ,.-:z44 h~rJ...f • 
~t~ 1.-R~ rt.,t~J.,-:v-~r 
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at~ 64-~-c.-«•·~ I ~ l.o ~ ~ 
Justice Brennan lJ / ~ {' ~ ~ ~, 
Justice Marshall ~ ~ ~ ]) / c;;, 
Justice Blackmun c::::1f'f ~ 
Justice Powell 
~~~Y?U/~ 
~
~<~~;?IV~~ 
{ 
Justice Rehnquist ~. 
4t; ~ ]) I 6- -~ ~ ~ I 
M~ tLtJ, ~~~ ~ 
Apr i 1 2 2, 19 8 5 
83-1158 FstatP of ~horton, et al v. ~aldor, Inc. 
near ~IJi.ef": 
Tn c~eckinq t'le statu~ of ci.rculat(!>r1 opinions that 
I have not acte~ on, I find there ha~ b@en no movement since 
your draft of March ll. A~ there have hPen no ioins, I as-
sume there will he another draft. 
I aqree with your ~ecision that the Connecticut 
statute violates the Fstahlishment r1ause. 1 am concern0~, 
however hv ~·7hat can he rt>a{i as vour rejc.ct ion of the r.emon 
test, an~ the aoParPnt adoption of ~ "coercion" test in-
stead. Althouqh we have never aonlied vour Lemnn test lit-
erally in all situations, it h~s b~en viewe~ hv this ~ourt 
and the lo•1er courts as f:l test aoplicab1e in most cases. 
I am afraid we will further fragment the Court, 
and confuse Jo•r1er courts, if lw'.7e are too C'ritic::t1 of IJemon. 
Nor ~oul~ T like to see us a~opt a "coercion" test, the con-
tours of which would be 1ifficult to ~Pfine anA m~v ~e at 
odds with Lemon. 
In sum, ~hiPf, although I will ioin your iudqm~nt, 
I hone you will considAr mv concerns when vou circulate ~ 
second riraft. 
Sincerelv, 
The Chief Justice 
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CHAMB E RS OF" 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
. \ r..·~ 
April 30, 1985 
No. 83-1158 Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. 
Dear Chief, 
I find myself in considerable doubt whether 
the Court should adopt the view of the circulating 
draft opinion and simply hold outright that the 
statute violates the Establishment Clause. One 
recurrent thought I have had is that we should vacate 
the judgment below and remand it in light of Wallace 
v. Jaffree, No. 83-812. 
It seems to me that the Connecticut statute 
may have the valid secular purpose of preventing 
discrimination on the basis of a particular religious 
practice, i.e., observance of the Sabbath. Whether 
the statute has an illegitimate purpose, and whether 
it has an impermissible effect within the meaning of 
the Establishment Clause, turn in my view on whether 
it was intended to convey or would objectively be 
viewed as conveying a message of endorsement of the 
Sabbath observance. Before conclusively deciding that 
issue, I would prefer to let the state courts consider 
it in the context of the legislative history and the 
implementation of the statute. 
The remand might also enable the Connecticut 
Supreme Court to clarify an issue on which there is 
some disagreement in the briefs. It is possible to 
read the Connecticut Supreme Court's opinion as 
agreeing with the Arbitration Board that S53-303e{b) 
confers an "absolute" right not to work on one's 
Sabbath. As I read the record, however, the situation 
is somewhat more complex. The Arbitration Board 
apparently assumed that the statute imposed an 
absolute accommodation requirement. J.A. at 12a. In 
part because it thought itself required to defer to 
the statutory interpretation of the Arbitration Board, 
and in part because the parties submitted to the 
·~ 
- 2 -
factual and legal determinations of the arbitrators 
without restriction, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
considered itself bound as a matter of state law by 
the Arbitration Board's interpretation of the statute. 
484 A.2d 785, 790 (1983). The Connecticut Supreme 
Court then struck down the statute, not on the grounds 
that it imposed an "absolute" accommodation 
requirement, but because it apparently viewed any 
accommodation of Sabbath observances as violating all 
three prongs of the Lemon test. 
As a result of this peculiar procedural 
posture, the Connecticut Supreme Court has never held 
that S53-303e(b) in fact imposes an absolute 
accommodation requirement, but has rather held only 
that these parties cannot challenge the Arbitration 
Board's legal conclusion to that effect. It remains 
possible, although perhaps unlikely, that the 
Connecticut Supreme Court, when faced with a 
restricted submission to the Arbitration Board in a 
case where reasonable accommodation is infeasible, 
would interpret the statute as requiring only 
reasonable accommodation. 
In my view, whether the statute is 
"absolute" is relevant to whether an objective 
observer would perceive it as conveying a message of 
endorsement of the Sabbath. I would let the 
Connecticut Supreme Court address this issue in the 
first instance as it applies the proper Establishment 
Clause test on remand. 
As presently disposed, I think my preference 
is to suggest that the judgment should be vacated and 
the case remanded for reconsideration in light of 
Wallace v. Jaffree, No. 83-812, in the hope that the 
statute might ultimately be upheld. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMISERS 01' 
,ju.prtmt Ofonrl of tqt ~b ,jlattg 
Jfufringhtn. ~.Of. 2Ubi~~ 
THE cHIEF JUSTICE May 1, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1158 -Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. 
Dear Sandra, 
I see no principled reason for remanding this case for 
reconsideration in light of the impending decision in Wallace v. 
Jaffrey, No. 83-812. We can hardly expect the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut to apply the "proper Establishment Clause test" when we 
now expand the confusion on that issue. Surely the court would be 
puzzled by a GVR given its "faithful" application of the Lemon test 
-- the very test applied by the Wallace plurality. The courts look 
to us for guidance, and we do not help them by sending obscure and 
puzzling signals to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. 
As I recall, the Conference considered whether Section 53-
303e(b) may correctly be read as giving Sabbath-observers an 
absolute right not to work on a designated day. The Draft Opinion, 
p. 10 & n. 13, expresses what I consider to be a proper reading of 
the statute, in light of applicable State law, and one that 
followed the discussion at Conference. 
I plan to circulate a new draft in due course. As always, I 
welcome comments and suggestions. 
Regards, 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
dro 05/14/85 
MEMORANDUM 
To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Dan 
Re: THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S Second Draft of Thornton v. Caldor, 
Inc., No. 83-1158. 
Lynda and I have gone over the THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S sec-
ond draft and share qualms about it. In answer to your letter, 
the Chief has dropped some of his criticism of the Lemon test, 
although he still denigrates it when he states: 
"the Court has referred to Lemon for a converiient 
shorthand of 'the cumulative criteria developed by the 
Court over many years.' 403 u.s., at 612. However, 
the Court has repeatedly rejected the concept that 'any 
single est or 1 er 1on prov1 es e ouc stone f"a"r 
resolving sta 1shment Clause cases •••• Courts must 
look beyond the rhetoric of any single approach to de-
termine whether the values protected by the Religion 
Clauses have been offended." Slip op. 8-9. 
His criticism is a bit puzzling since he purports at one point to 
apply the effects prong of the Lemon test to decide the case. 
See id., at 13. The greatest change from the Chief's first draft 
is that he now appears to incorporate his coercion analysis and __ .:.;.---------=------ -- - -
JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S "endorsement" analysis under the effects prong 
-.....____-~~~~-~~ - --
Lemon. This represents a significant improvement, but unfor tu-
nately the draft is so disjoi~ted and rambling that it is unclear 
whether lower courts would understand what he is doing. 
·' 
,••. 
!, 
Lynda and I have two 1!19jor __ J2roblems with the draft as it 
now stands. ~ it is so disjointed and structureless that it 
is unclear what effects it will have in the future. As it now 
cite it as authority for adopting an stands, a lower court could 
G) , 
effects test, a coerc1on test, 
co 
an endorsement test, or a very 
loose~commodation approach. The relationship among the many 
concepts the Chief puts forward is simply too unclear to say how 
courts will read the opinion. Furthermore, he lays out some of 
. ---- . these concepts, particularly the coercion test and accommodation ----v 
doctrine, without ever specifying their content. The draft, I am 
~ 
afraid, might thus confuse Establishment Clause doctrine more 
than it would clarify it. This would be a particularly unfortu-
nate result considering the guidelines the Court has managed to 
draw after great difficulty in the other Establishment Clause 
cases this term. 
Second, the draft unnecessarily relies on the accommoda-~ 
t~ d~ct:;!~ · The case could easily be decided under the Estab--- -- . .....__ 
lishment Clause, but the Chief continually invokes the Free Exer-,___ _ , --- ---· -· --·---~ 
cise Clause without ever making clear how it affects his analy-
sis. All that can safely be said is that he appears to employ 
some sort of balancing test by weighing the interests of the 
State against those of the employer. It would, I think, be bet-
( l ter to view this case as one involving just the Establishment 
~ c_~ As far as I know, this Court has never found the Free 
' 1 Exercise Clause implicated in a case where the State tries to 
~alleviate religious burdens created by private parties. The 
Chief's ~ttempt to introduce Free Exercise analysis into situa-
tions lacking nstate actionn may have unforeseen consequences and 
might make application of the accommodation doctrine practically 
limitless. 
Finally, the Chief invalidates the Conn. statute on its 1 
face rather than as applied. As you noted in your annotations to 
the first draft, this is unnecessary. Because this case arose 
from arbitration, the Conn. courts had to take the law as it was 
settled by the arbitration panel--whether this was correct or 
not. Thus, it would be very easy to say that this case involves 
only an attack on the statute as applied and to leave the Conn. 
--~--~----~~--------~· -L~,·-----~~ 
courts free to reinterpret the statute as requiring only a flexi----------...... ~ .. '-
ble accommodation. ----------..... 
... 
JUSTICE BRENNAN apparently will be circulating a draft 
concurrence in this case later this week or early next. The word 
is that he plans to rely on the Lemon test. At this point, I 
would recommend that you wait to see what he writes. A simple 
Lemon approach seems more consistent with the views you outlined 
in your concurrences in the other religion cases. If you prefer 
not to wait for JUSTICE BRENNAN, I would suggest that you consid-
er writing a concurrence in the judgment to the Chief's opinion. 
If you agree with my concerns, your concurrence could make clear 
(i) that the case involves only the Establishment Clause, (ii) 
that Lemon defines the proper inquiry, and (iii) that you believe 
that the Chief's endorsement and coercion analyses really repre-
sent application of the first two prongs of Lemon. If you would 
like, you could also discuss how the statute should be invalidat-
ed only as ap__glied, rather than on its face. Lynda and 
\~ 
I both 
feel that joining the Chief's opinion or concurring in it would 
not only add authority to a confused and doctrinally destablizing 
position but would also u~dercut th~ew~)you _: xpress~ in your 
concurrences in Wallace v. Jaffree and Aguilar v. Felton. 
lgs May 18, 1985 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: Justice Brennan's concurrence in Thornton v. Caldor, No. 83-
1158 
Dan · and I have both read Justice Brennan's opinion and 
agree with you that there is much unnece~sary lan~uage included. 
In particular, Part II discussing the "purpose" prong of the -
Lemon test is completely superfluous since at the end of that 
- ---·- --:--
section, the opinion declines to decide whether that prong has 
been satisfied. Instead, it "finds it more profitable to examine 
respondent's argument under the effects test." 1st Draft, at 9. 
Especially in light of footnote 7, see p. 12, one wonders why the 
opinion goes on at such length about something that it neither 
decides, nor is necessary to decide the case. 
The other thing to be wary of is the closing sentence 
on p. 13. Although the opinion has applied the Lemon test, the 
opinion ends by stating that because the s atute "places the 
imprimatur of governmental endorsement and encouragement on a 
particular religious practice, it is a state law 'respecting the 
establishment of religion,' and thus invalid under the First 
---- ...::> , ... 
I' j- _j Amendment." This could be read as approving of an endorsement 'f-0p----
\ 
•. , 
test similar to that proposed elsewhere by Justice O'Connor. 
Although on pp. 11-12, the opinion seems to include the 
endorsement idea within the "effects" prong, which is fine, the 
emphasis on endorsement alone in the final sentence could be 
quoted out of context in the future and used as support for 
weakening the force of the Lemon test. 
Dan suggested that you might want to consider joining 
Parts I, III, and IV, if you could persuade Justice Brennan to 
rewrite the last sentence of Part IV. I agree that no good can 
come of joining Part II's discursive inquiry relating to the 
"P~· As to Parts I and III, I could have wished that 
they were a little more concisely written. While I don't see 
anything in there with which I disagree, it's hard to foretell 
y far the safest course would be 
to concur separately in a few lines, as I suggested yesterday. 
You could state that you concur in the judgment and that you 
agree with Justice Brennan that Lemon and our Establishment 
Clause cases provide the proper framework for analysis of this 
case, rather than the Free Exercise cases. 
Perhaps the ideal solution would be for the Chief to do 
a third draft using a simpler Lemon analysis than that in which 
Justice Brennan engaged. I don't know how likely it is that he 
would do that at this point; he certainly did not heed your 
previous request to use a Lemon analysis. Perhaps he might be 
persuaded if he thought he might lose his Court. 
If you would like for me to do further work on this, or 
to draft something for you, please let me know. 
CHAMIS!:RS 01'" 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~tlttt C!Iourt .n tlf.t ~b J»tatt• 
·u~ !J. <II- 211.?-"~ 
/ 
May 20, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1158, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your opinion concurring in the 
judgme.nt. 
Sincerely, 
--------
Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
.inprtnu <!}tturl ttf t4t ~b .Statts 
'llasltinghtn. ~. <!}. 211~)1.~ 
CHAMI!IERS Of' 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
May 22, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1158-Thornton v. Calder 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your concurring opinion. 
Sincerely, 
T.M. 
Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
-·~··. 
CHAMI!IE R S Of' 
JUSTIC E JOHN PAUL STEVEN S 
.-upunu <!fanrlaf tlrt :J{nittb .Jtatt• 
Jh•Jrhtgt&tn. ~. Cl}. 2llp~~ 
May 22, 1985 
Re: 83-1158 - Thornton v. Caldor 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your opinion concurring in the 
judgment. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMeERS 01" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.fUFmtt <!fourl of tJtt~b .itatte 
Jfaelfinghm. ~. <!f. 20.;;,.~ 
PERSONAL 
May 23, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1158 - Estate of Donald E. Thornton & 
Connecticut v. Calder 
MEMORANDUM TO: Justice White 
Justice Powell 
Justice Rehnquist 
Justice O'Connor 
Four are concurring in the judgment. Let me know 
wha~ problems you have and I will try to deal with them. 
Regards, 
81-1158 Thornton v. ~al~n~ 
Dear Chlef: 
As I cannot ioin either vour second ~raft nr Bill 
Brf'nnan's 4=ir-:;t draft of a concurring oni.ni.on, I will sirnplv 
join the i~~qment as in~icated in the ~raft I am circulatinq 
today. 
I ;::~qrr->e witr Bi.lJ th~t th~ r.~?rnon test that will be 
reaffirmed in Gra.nd RanL~s an~ Aguilar, anolios t.o an~ 0is-
pones of this case. f.l.y -Hfficultv witl-t Bi 11 's opinion is 
that it includes a substantial amount of rHcta that is 
irreJevant. 
As you know from my letter of April 22 commenti'l"lg 
on your first 1raft, I was puzz1ed that vou dj0 not simplv 
apply Lemon. Subseqnent t0 that letter, I rnr.~<~e n rather 
careful examination of all of nur ~ecisions since vou enun-
ciated the thr.ee-Par:t test in Lemon. It- ~1as relien on in 
every Establishment Clause case excePt Marsh v. rhamhers. 
I v-1as with you in ~1arsh and also in r .. ynch. These 
cases were based upon the accePtance over the entire historv 
of this countrv of an opening orav~r in a legislature and of 
the re 1 ationship of Christmas to religion. In neith~r of 
these cases was there anv legislative enactment. ThPse wete 
s imp1 v accented pract tees of the peoPle. Yet even in Lync11 
you anplied the Lemon test. This haR been the onlv analyti-
cal ~ramework a maioritv of the C0urt has ever anprove~ for 
these cases. 
In vour nresent oraft vou proPer1v concluC'e that 
the Connecticut statute violates the Establishment Clause, 
but you mention I,emon on1v twice anrl inr9eet1 re4ect it as tl,e 
generally accepte0 test. As you out it: 
. .
' t ,. 
"T~e Court has reoeate~lv rejected the con-
cept that 'any single test or criterion' pro-
vt1es the touchstone for resolving Bqtahlish-
ment Clause cases • • • ", p. 8-9. 
' . 
It is not clear to me exactly w~at stAn~ar~ vou! 
draft woul~ ann,v. You rplv a goo~ ~Pa~ on "accommo~ation" 
language t~at has be~n used primarilv in "free exercise" 
cases, see p~. 6 , 8, 9, 11, 12 of your draft, and you aone~r 
to anont a "bolancing" teRt (op. 8-9, 12-1.5) . Thi.s is a 
maior ~eoarture from Lemon t~at woul~ le~d to qre~t uncer-
taintv because of the a~ hoc wefghfnq of interests th~t 
~'lou 1"1 hr.> recp.1 i_ t'<""~ in everv Esta~l i s~meflt Clause case . 
In suT'!'I, Chief, t cannot ioi'l"' an opinion alonq t""e 
lines of vour. present ci~culation . Your opinion is at or!ds 
witlo) th~=> rea~oninq in Nallace , Granc Raoi.ns and Aguilar. anti 
mv concurring oninions in these cases. 
S i. ncere lv, 
The Chief Justi.ce 
lfo/ss 
cc: The Conference 
2. 
~1av '2 3, 1.9 8 r:; 
83-1158 Thornton v. ~al~nr 
Dear Bill: 
I am circulati.nq this aftet"noon a !Jrief ornn1on 
concurring in the iu~g~ent. This is to in~icate why T ~o 
not feel comfortAh1e with vour concurring opinion, even 
though I aqree ~,odth vour reliance on r.emon. 
I admire the Uterary quali.tv of your opinion, hut 
I mu~t sav that a qood deal of it Peems to go well beyond 
'"hat needs to be said i.n this case. For examplE>, Part II 
discusses thP "nut"POEe" prong of the Lemon test hut does not 
decide whether that orong has been satisfied. You then de-
cide the case under the effects test. I see no reason for 
Part II at all. 
As your views and mine ~o not alwavs coincide in 
thPse religious cases (e.g., r.tars~, v. ~hamhE-rs, an<'! Lvnch), 
I do ~ot feel comfort~ble with some of the rather broad lan-
quaqe in Parts I and III. In mv view, this case coul•.:l 11e 
~isposed of quite ~riefly by deci~ing that the statute - at 
leaqt as anolio~ - clearly violates the effects test. 
In '' i.ew of mv reference to your on i. n ion in mv 1. it-
tle concurrence, the sum of O'.H two onjnions will be a 
stronq reaffi. rmation of Lemon- consistent with w;at von 
have written so well in Granf' Rnoid~:.. ann Aquilar. 
Justi.ce Brennan 
lfo/ss 
. " 
··-
... 
' ' .. 
~ 
. . ' 
SincereJy, 
T. 
CHAMI!IERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u.prtmt C!fouri of tltt~b ~tzdts 
.uJringhtn. ~. C!f. 20~,.~ 
May 23, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1158 - Thornton v. Caldor 
Dear Lewis: 
I do not agree fully with you on your memo of today on this 
case: but the duty of each of us is to execute an assignment as a 
majority vote. I will try to do that. 
It is unimportant whether we agree fully when Lemon should 
be used. A Court majority more than once, you included, made the 
point that Lemon did not provide a "test" for all Religion Clause 
cases. That aside, I will try to meet your oints with a new 
draft. ,....----. 
I suspect it is the time of the year that makes it very 
difficult for me to see how Bill Brennan's opinion and mine are 
at great odds except that believes Lemon is "the test for all 
seasons." 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
• 
• 
May 28, 1985 
CJ43 GINA-POW 
83-1158 Estate of Thornton and Connecticut v. Caldor, 
Inc. 
Dear Chief: 
I have read with interest your third draft, and make 
the following suggestions. 
You explicitly apply the Lemon test, and this meets 
my primary concern about prior drafts. On p. 7, however, 
you state that Lemon provides "no rigid, fixed formula 
applicable to all Establishment Clause cases II . . . . I 
would agree that the test is not a "fixed formula" in the 
sense this term normally is used. But Lemon does provide 
the only analytical framework for our consideration of 
Establishment Clause cases. The Lemon test itself is 
firmly "fixed" by the numerous Establishment Clause cases 
that followed your Lemon decision. The application of the 
test or formula of course requires a consideration in each 
case of the relevant statutes and facts. 
I can join your opinion if this sentence on p. 7 is 
clarified. 
Sincerely, 
. ~ .• •::-,. 
.. 
'· 
2. 
Note to Linda and Dan 
On the basis of a quick reading, it seems to me that 
the Chief has pretty well come around to our view. His 
third draft contains a substantial amount of unnecessary 
dicta, but - unless 1 have missed something - 1 do not 
believe any of it wold be troublesome in the future except 
the "fixed formula" sentence that to some extent undercuts 
Lemon. 
1 still prefer a more straight forward opinion in the 
case, but if 1 have read the Chief's draft correctly 1 owe 
him deference as the member of the Court assigned to write 
the opinion. 1 will be quite interested in your views. 
LFP, JR. 
' . .. 
' 
CHAMBERS 0 F" 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.fu;tfmtt <!fouri of tlft ~ .ftaft.e' 
Jla.gfringtttn. ~. <If. 2ll~'l-~ 
May 28, 1985 
/ 
83-1158- Estate,of Donald E. Thornton 
and Connecticut v. Caldor, Inc. 
Dear Chief, 
Although I would not be averse to modifying the 
Lemon test, I do not read your circulating draft as 
doing so. On page 13, citing Lemon, you say the issue 
is whether the statute has the primary effect of 
advancing religion. You conclude that -it does, and I 
agree. I therefore join your opinion. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to ·the Conference 
dro/lgs May 29, 1985 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda and Dan 
Re: Thornton v. Calder 
Although the Chief has made a stab at applying 
Lemon, we still have some doubts about whether you should 
join the opinion as it now stands. As you note, the Chief 
still disparages the Lemon test directly on p. 7. In addi-
tion, however, it appears to us that he has also disparaged 
it subtlely in several places. 
~ 
For example, on p. 7, in 
the last paragraph, the Chief attempts to define Lemon in 
terms of his coercion theory by stating the inquiry in the 
2. 
following way: "The government is neither to coerce nor 
induce adherence to any religion, nor is it to compel con-
duct conforming to any particular religious creed or prac-
tice; the Lemon criteria themselves are designed generally 
to determine whether government has respected this Constitu-
tional tenet." Lemon has never been focused in this way, 
but this opinion would give the Chief the first step toward 
implementing his coercion theory, in place of the now-
settled Lemon criteria, in future cases. 
Similarly, on p. 12, the Chief liberally mixes in 
"accommodation," 11 endorsement, .. and 11 Coercion 11 language in 
r-------" ------ ~
stating the conclusion that the Connecticut statute has the 
impermissible effect of advancing religion. While this lan-
guage may seem tolerable now, we are afraid it will help 
muddy the now-clear Lemon analysis for the future. The ref-
erence on p. 14 in the last paragraph to the State's 11 coer-
cive 11 conduct helps cement coercion as a primary factor in 
the analysis of this case, as does the Chief's statement on 
pages 5 and 6 that "the Establishment Clause was intended to 
foreclose governmental compulsion of some of the people to 
support and facilitate the religious activities of others ... 
All of these references combined appear to make the Lemon 
test at most a surrogate for a compulsion test. 
We are also generally concerned about the lengthy 
discussion early in Part II about the history of the Reli-
gion Clauses and their root in 11 [t]he Framers' fear of gov-
ernmental coercion, .. and how the government must guard 
3. 
against ucompellingu citizens to act in the name of a par-
ticular religion. See p. 6. While this all may be true in 
part, its effect is to give a relatively narrow view of the 
historical significance of the Religion Clauses that could 
be cited as precedent in the future for a narrower reading 
of those Clauses than you might prefer. 
Part IV of the opinion also poses serious diffi-
~ 
culties. In this part, the Chief describes why Sherbert and -----Thomas v. Review Board do not require a different holding in 
this case. In those cases, the Court held that the Free --Exercise Clause required the State to extend unemployment 
~
benefits to religious employees who had lost their jobs as a 
result of their refusal to compromise their religious prac-
tices at the workplace. These cases are irrelevant to the 
present case because they concern burdens on religion creat-
ed by the State, whereas the Conn. case concerns burdens 
created by private parties. The Chief, however, does not 
make this difference clear. Rather, he distinguishes these 
two cases on the ground that uthe State is reaching out into 
the private sector to compel absolute deference to a certain 
religious practice--this goes beyond accommodation and con-
stitutes an impermissible advancement of a particular reli-
gious practice.u Draft at 14. By failing to distinguish 
this case from Sherbert and Thomas on the proper ground, 
Part IV of the Chief's opinion could be cited for the propo-
sition that the Free Exercise Clause applies to burdens ere-
ated by private parties. This is a remarkable proposition, 
especially considering that Part IV is unnecessary to the 
disposition of the case. 
We propose one approach for your consideration. 
Since the most dangerous parts of the opinion are unneces-
sary for disposing of the case, you might think of joining 
only the other parts and suggesting that the Chief revise 
~
4. 
minor parts of them. In particular, you could join Parts I, 
III, and V of his opinion--the facts, application of the 
effects prong of Lemon, and the conclusion, respectively--
and request that he revise two sentences on page 12. The 
first troubling sentence states: "This is not the 
'accommodation' envisioned by the Religion Clauses; §53-
303e(b), by compelling others to conform their conduct to 
the Sabbath observers', virtually 'confer[s] [an] imprimatur 
of state approval on [particular] religious .•• practices,' 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 u.s. 263, 274 (1981)." This sentence 
appears to balance free exercise against establishment con-
cerns in an "endorsement" calculus that is not clearly tied 
to the Lemon effects test, as this endorsement language was 
in your Widmar opinion. We would suggest that you propose 
something like the following sentence in its place: "By 
'confer[ring] a[n] imprimatur of state approval on religious 
sects or practices,' §53-303e(b) 'violate[s] the prohibition 
against the "primary advancement" of religion.' Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 u.s. 263, 273-274 (1981), quoting Committee for 
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756,771 (1973) ." 
' . \. 
The second troubling sentence, which begins the 
bottom paragraph on page 12 states: 
"Given its absolutist terms, which auto-
matically subordinate the treatment of all 
secular concerns to those of the Sabbath ob-
servers, §53-303e(b), by coercing conduct on 
behalf of particular religious adherents, 
see, ~, Abington School District, supra: 
Engle v. Vitale, supra, has the primary ef-
fect of advancing a particular religious te-
net." 
Like the other sentence, it appears to make "coercion" the 
focus of the effects test. Together with the Chief's dis-
cussion of Sabbatarianism and non-Sabbatarianism earlier on 
this page, this sentence also has the effect of suggesting 
that the case is being decided on the ground that the Conn. 
statute discriminated among religions, not because it dis-
criminated between religion and non-religion more generally. 
Because this gloss on a coercion test would particularly 
restrict the Establishment Clause, we suggest that you con-
sider the following sentence as a replacement: 
"Given its absolutist terms, which auto-
matically subordinate the treatment of secu-
lar concerns to those of the Sabbath observ-
ers, §53-303e(b) has the primary effect of 
advancing religion." 
Finally, two small points. First, the opinion 
still does not limit its holding to an "as applied" ruling. 
We're not sure that this is terribly important, but we want-
ed to bring it to your attention. Second, the Chief's clerk 
says that he has become very accommodating about this opin-
5. 
·~ • 
ion and is particularly interested in your vote. Thus, he 
feels confident that the Chief would follow any reasonable 
suggestion of yours. 
6. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.inprtw ~DUri .ltf t4t 1lttittb .itatt.&' 
'Jht#Jriqtott, ~. ~· 2llc?'l&' 
May 29, 1985 
/ 
No. 83-1158 Estate of Donald E. Thornton 
and - Co~necticut v. Calder, Inc. 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me in Parts I and III of your 
opinion circulated May 23 and in the judgment. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
' .. '.(, 
'.J.' 
. ' 
May 30, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1158 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor 
\ 
Dear Chief: 
I have read with interest your third draft. You 
explicitly apply the Lemon test, and this meets my primary 
concern about prior drafts. I continue to have reservations 
about much of the opinion, however, and conclude that I can-
not join Parts II and IV, as I do not agree with much of the 
analysis contained therein, and I view those parts as en-
tirely unnecessary to the disposition of the case. In par-
ticular, on p. 7 you continue to deemphasize the importance 
of the Lemon test, and attempt to define its contours in 
terms of your own coercion theory that dominated your prior 
~
drafts. 
I could join Parts I, III, and V of your opinion if 
you would be willing to make a couple of minor changes in 
Part III. First, on p. 12, in the last sentence of the 
r~ 
you state thW'" [t] his is first full paragraph on that page, 
2. 
not the 'accommodation' envisioned by the Religion Clauses; 
§53-303e(b), by compelling others to conform their conduct 
to the Sabbath observers', virtually 'confer [s] [an] impri-
matur of state approval on [particular] religious ••• 
practices,' Widmar v. Vincent, 454 u.s. 263, 274 (1981)." 
Like Sandra, I do not agree with your use of "accommodation" 
analysis in the opini~, and, as noted above, I object to 
to define Lemon in terms of "coercion" or "com-the attempt 
...____,. .A ....____ 
pulsion." Perhaps you could substitute something like the 
following for the above-quoted sentence: 
~/ ' "By 'confer[ring] a[n] imprimatur of state 
approval on religious sects or practices,' 
§53-303e(b) 'violate[s] the prohibition 
against the "primary advancement" of reli-
gion.' Widmar v. Vincent, 454 u.s. 263 , 273-
274 (1981), quoting Committee for Public Edu- \\ 
cation v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756, 771 (1973) ." ~ 
I) .~ 
~ Second, on the carryover sentence on pp. 12-13, you 
state: "Given its absolutist terms, which automatically 
subordinate the treatment of all secular concerns to those 
of the Sabbath observers, §53-303e(b), by coercing conduct 
on behalf of particular religious adherents, see, e.g., 
Abingdon School District, supra; Engle v. Vitale, supra, has 
the primary effect of advancing a particular religious te-
net." This sentence also appears to make "coercion" the 
focus of the "effects" test. would you consider replacing 
the sentence with something like the following? 
"Given its absolutist terms, which automati-
cally subordinate the treatment of secular 
'• 
•' 
concerns to those of the Sabbath observers, 
§53-303e(b) has the primary effect of advanc-
ing religion ... 
If you would be willing to make these changes, I 
would be happy to join Parts I, III, and V and to withdraw 
my separate concurring opinion. 
Sincerely \\ .Z..., 
L. • , Jr. 
I 
cc: The Conference 
3. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.iu.prnnt <!Jmttt af tltt ~tb .itabs 
jirasftingt1t1t. ~. <If. 20.;;~~ 
June 3, 1985 
Re: 83-1158 - Thornton v. Caldor 
Dear Chief: 
Please add at the end of your opinion, "JUSTICE 
REHNQUIST dissents." 
Sincerely, 
t'AJrv-
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
' '· 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, ..JR. 
;%uvrttttt <!fouri llf tlft 'Jii'ttitth ;%ta.tts 
~asfrington. ~. <!f. 2'll~J.1~ 
June 3, 1985 
83-1158 Estate of Thornton v. Calder 
Dear Chief: 
Your third draft relies explicitly on the Lemon 
test, and this meets one of my primary concerns about prior 
drafts. 
I am still troubled by other portions of your 
opinion. I suppose the truth is our views as to the Estab-
lishment Clause have diverged since I followd Lemon in my 
Nyquist opinion. Our differences are evidenced in the Wal-
lace, Grand Rapids and Aguilar cases. See my concurring 
opinions. 
I am inclined, therefore, to stay with 
opinion in this case concurring in the judgment. 
have the responsibility of trying to put a Court 
and have invited further discourse, I write this 
my brief 
But as you 
together 
letter. 
In light of my views elsewhere expressed, I cannot 
JOln Parts II and IV of your opinion. Much of what is writ-
ten in these Parts is unnecessary to the disposition of the 
case, and the analysis is not consistent with my joins in 
the three cases mentioned above in which you are dissenting. 
An example of what troubles me is your deemphasizing the 
importance of the Lemon test {see p. 7) and defining its 
contours in terms of a "coercion" theory that - so far as I 
know - the Court has never adopted in an Establishment 
Clause case. 
I could JOln Parts I, III and V if you are agree-
able to a couple of changes that I now suggest. On p. 12, 
in the last sentence of the first full paragraph on that 
page, you rely on an "accommodation" theory. And you also 
describe Lemon in terms of "coercion" or "compulsion" - a 
theory I do not understand. Perhaps you would be willing to 
substitute something like the following: 
"By 'confer[ring] a[n] imprimatur of state 
approval on religious sects or practices,' 
§53-303e{b) 'violate[s] the prohibition 
against the "primary advancement" of reli-
gion.' Widmar v. Vincent, 454 u.s. 263 , 273-
274 (1981), quoting Committee for Public Edu-
cation v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756, 771 (1973) ." 
Second, on the carryover sentence on pp. 12-13, you 
state: "Given its absolutist terms, which automatically 
subordinate the treatment of all secular concerns to those 
of the Sabbath observers, §53-303e(b), by coercing conduct 
on behalf of particular religious adherents, see, e.g., 
Abingdon School District, supra~ Engle v. Vitale, supra, has 
the primary effect of advancing a particular religious te-
net." This sentence also appears to make "coercion" the 
focus of the "effects" test. Would you consider replacing 
the sentence with the following? 
"Given its absolutist terms, that automati-
cally subordinate the treatment of secular 
concerns to those of the Sabbath observers, 
§53-303e(b) has the primary effect of advanc-
ing religion." 
If you would be willing to make these changes, I 
would be happy to join the judgment and Parts I, III, and v. 
I would then withdraw my separate concurring opinion. I 
will understand, of course, if you find these changes unac-
ceptable. Also we both have other cases to work on. 
Sincerely 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
, .. ' 
2. 
~- .. 
1gs June 4, 1985 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: No. 83-1158 Thornton v. Calder 
You asked me to look at Justice Brennan's draft to 
see what changes would have to be made for you to join it. 
First, I think that he could easily omit the last 
half of Part I, beginning with the first full paragraph on 
p. 3 and continuing to the end of that part on p. 5. These 
pages discuss the Free Exercise Clause and why it is not 
applicable here. This is no longer necessary, it seems to 
me, since the Chief has applied the Lemon test to decide the 
case. I don't see anything objectionable in the remaining 
first half of Part I. 
2. 
Second, Part II should be omitted entirely. As we 
discussed before, this is the superfluous discussion of the 
·~urpose" prong of the Lemon test. As you may recall, Jus-
tice Brennan ultimately does not rely on this part to decide 
the case, but concludes instead that the case should be de-
cided on the "effects" prong in Part III. Thus, there is no 
point to having Part II. This would also eliminate the dis-
crimination language you found objectionable. 
Third, you should ask Justice Brennan to change 
the last sentence of Part IV on p. 13 to read something like 
the following: 
"Because the heavy-handed approach adopted by 
§53-303e(b) places the imprimatur of govern-
mental endorsement and encouragement on a 
particular religious practice, with the pri-
mary effect of advancing religion, it is a 
state law 'respecting the establishment of 
religion,' and thus invalid under the First 
Amendment." 
This change will ensure that the final sentence may not be 
quoted as support for some separate endorsement test, but 
rather reaffirms the draft's inclusion on pp. 11-12 of "en-
dorsement" and "imprimatur~ language as part of the effects 
test. 
If Justice Brennan is not willing to make all of 
these changes, it is possible that you could join parts of 
his opinion, making a majority for his application of the 
effects prong of the Lemon test, but not associating your-
self with the more extraneous parts of his opinion. 
Dear Ch1..... 
In view t... . ced by Sandra and 
Bill Rehnquist's request thaL .y be recorded as 
t:Ltss.e.""'-i.. ~ _, 
)eiRiR9 t~~d9meR~~ it is clear that there can be no 
Court for your opinion~ therefore am inclined to stay 
with my brief opinion concurring in the judgment~our 
third draft does rely on the Lemon test, and this meets 
one of my primary concerns. I still would have difficulty 
joining Parts II and IV of your opinion. It seems to me 
that a good deal of what is written in these Parts is 
' unnecessary to the dispo~on of the case. More 
importantly, some of the analysis is not consistent with 
my joins - and my concurring opinions in Wallace, Grand 
2. 
Rapids and Aguilar. For example, you continue to 
deemphasize the importance of Lemon (see p. 7), and define 
its contours in terms of a "coercion" theory that 1 do not 
recall we have ever adopted in an Establishment Clause 
case. Also, your draft continues to rely on an 
"accommodation" theory in conjunction with coercion that I 
do not fully understand. 
I suppose the truth is that our views as to 
Establishment Clause analysis have diverged since I 
followed Lemon in my Nyquist opinion, a~ Bill 
Brennan's concurring opinion in this case is closer to my 
views - although Bill has included a ood deal of 
unnecessary language. 
In sum, Chief, while there will be ~~t~ 
m~~ UUGR11w:loEmt> e~on - 'for the 
judgment, 
We both have other cases to work on, in which I trust that 
~ 
you and I will be together - ~ we usually are. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
June 7, 1985 
83-1158 Thornton v. Calder 
Dear Chief: 
Before I received your today's memo to the Confer-
ence {with your postcript to me), I had written you - and 
was about to send - the encloset'! letter ln which I suggested 
that we had spent more than enough time on this case (your 
first draft was circulated March 13), that it is a case of 
little importance, and that I am prepared to rest on my lit-
tle concurring opinion and let the chips fall. 
Your postcript on today's note asks if I can "pin-
point" changes in your third draft that would b~ acceptable. 
It is not easy for me to "pinpoint" because I think you and 
aill Brennan both have written a great deal more than is 
necessary in a fairly simple case in which a straightforward 
application of the Lemon test - in a brief opinion would 
suffice. 
I could not join Parts II and IV of your third 
draft as presently drafted. Much of both parts is unneces-
sary to the disposition of the case, and the analysis is not 
consistent with my joins in the other three Establishment 
Clause cases in which you and I disagree. An example of 
what troubles me i.s your continued deemphas:f.s of the impor-
tance of Lemon (seep. 7). I do not understand your contin-
ued use of language related to your "coercion" theory - a 
theory so far as I know that has never been adopted in an 
Establishment Clause case. Nor do I understand your contin-
ued reliance on "accommodation". 
As indicated in my other letter enclosed, there 
is no way you can get a Court for an opinion. Indeed, if 
you make major changes, you may lose Byron - the only Jus-
tice to join you. And, if he and I both wer.e able to join 
you, you would have only three votes as agai.nst Bill Bren-
nan's four. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
• X 
·· .• ~ . ·' 
' ' • •-t ... ";" . . ' 
' ,,
June 7, 1985 
83-1158 Thornton v. Calder 
Dear Chief: 
Since our pleasant conversation in your Chambers 
on Wednesday, for the third time I have reviewed my file and 
the several oPinions circulated in this miserable case. 
My own record is as follows: At Conference, I 
voted to affirm on an "as applied basis", saying that the 
Connecticut statute "flunked the Lemon test". After there 
had been no response to your first draft of March 13, I 
\-lrote you on April 22 restating my view as to the applica-
bility of Lemon. In that letter, I did say Lemon had not 
always been applied literally. I had in mind your decisions 
in ft.lar.sh and Lynch in which the pr .tmarv reliance was on the 
history - thouqh Lemon was applied in Lynch. As to history, 
see my n 5, on p. 3 in my concurring opinion in Wallace. 
Again, after a careful reexamination, I wrote you 
on May 23, with copi.es to the Conference, stating that I 
"will simply join the judgment". I circulated a draft to 
that effect. 
In your third draft, you do apply the Lemon test 
but I still have considerable difficulty with your opinion 
as a whole. A good deal of it seems unnecessary, and also 
some of the analysis is not consistent with my joins in Wal-
lace, Grand Rapids and Aguilar. 
As the situation now stands, there will be no 
Court for an opinion. Byron has joined you, Sandra dis-
agrees with much of your opinion, and would join only Parts 
I and III. Bill Brennan has four votes for his opinion. 
Bill Rehnquist is the only .Justice dissenting from the judg-
ment. Thus, even if I were to join your present opinion or 
some revision of it, you would have only three votes for 
your opinion, and Bill would have four for his. There would 
be eight votes for the judgment. 
I suppose this means that he would have a plural-
ity but only for his opinion. As I have indicated, and is 
made clear from my opinions in Wallace, Grand Rapids and 
Aquilar, I am closer to Bill Brennan on Establishment Clause 
analysis than I am to you, and I could join him if he made 
; .... ~- -,_ : 
•. 
,,_. . 
. , 
··.·' 
some changes. But, I feel more comfortable with my little 
opinion concurring in the judgment. 
2. 
The decision and writing in this case will not be 
too important for the future. The Connecticut statute may 
well be unique. Moreover, the Court decisions in the other 
three religion cases mentioned abovP., in which you and I 
disagree, will be the controlling precedents. I therefore 
think the time has come simply to "let the chips fall". We 
both have other and more important cases to work on - cases 
in which I trust that you and I will be together - as we 
usually are. 
'rhe Chief Just ice 
lfp/ss 
t ' 
I < 
., 
. ,' 
~ . 
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'?' 
Sincerely, 
·' 
.in.prttttt <lfltltrl of t4t ~ltb .italtg 
.. a:glfinghtn, ~. <g. 2ll~~~ 
June 7, 1985 
Re: 83-1158 - Estate of Donald E. Thornton & Connecticut v. Calder 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I will undertake another effort to resolve the "logjam" 
in this case. 
P.S. (LFP only) Can you "pinpoint" just what it would take to 
meet your problems? 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.in.p:rttttt <!fonrl of tJrt ~~ .itattg 
Jlagltittgton, !fJ. QI. 2ll?'!~ 
PERSONAL 
June 10, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1158 - Estate of Donald E. Thornton and 
Connecticut v. Calder, Inc. 
Dear Lewis: 
I have your two "personal" memos of June 7. My 
effort to try to accommodate all views has plainly been 
unproductive and I will now pare my opinion down to a 
tight and brief draft on the effect. 
I am baffled by the Brennan opinion which paraphrases 
mine, but at greater length. 
I fear it is the June Syndrome at work--at least 
in part! 
Please stand by. 
Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
,jltJtrttttt <q1tttrtaf tltt ~ittb ,jbdt.&' 
Jht.&'qingbn, ~. <q. 2.ll,?'i~ 
June 13, 1985 / 
No. 83-1158 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me in your draft circulated June 12, 1985. 
I am circulating a revised concurring opinion. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
Jltp'rttttt ~aurt "f l4t ,nittb Jtalt.e' 
Jla.e'lfington, ~. ~· 2llp~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.• 
·' 
June 14, 1985 
Re: 83-1158, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
The second draft of my concurring opinion in 
this case, circulated yesterday, was erroneously 
marked "Stylistic Changes Throughout". It should have 
been marked "Substantial Changes Throughout." I 
apologize for any inconvenience. 
Sincerely, 
June 14, 1985 
83-1158 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. 
Dear Chief: 
I returned from Mayo late yesterday, and was happy to 
find your draft of June 12 on Caldor. I have sent you a 
join note. 
The changes you made have accommodated by concerns. I 
appreciate your making them. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
LFP/vde 
·." .··· 
,. 
' ,, 
.. · . 
June 14, 1985 
83-1158 Estate of Thornton v. Calder, Inc. 
Dear BlJl: 
I have noted vour letter to the Chief about his draft 
of June 12. 
Although you identified language that shouldn't be in 
the opinion, the Chief has come so far in response to our 
criticism of his prior ooinions that I can join him. As we 
have agreed, your excellent O'J?inions in Ball and Aguilar 
will he the 1a~;, and I also make clear in my concurring 
opinion that I am in agreement with you as to the apolica-
bility of !,emon analysis in Establishment Clause cases. 
May I say also, Bill, that I think you ar~ very gra-
cious to qive up your opinion in deference to the Chief. I 
would say that he has met our criticisms about 90% - which 
is quite a constructive change. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
LFP/vde 
June 14, 1985 
83-1158 Estate of Thornton v. Cal1or, Inc. 
Dear Chief: 
Please io{n me in your 4th Draft, circulated on June 
12. 
I will withdra'"' the little concurring opinion that I 
have heretofore circulate~. 
Sincerelv, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
LFP/vae 
. , 
' . 
CHAMI!IER5 OF" 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
June 12, 1985 
No. 83-1158 -- Estate of Thornton v. Calder 
Dear Chief: 
The draft of your op1n1on that circulated 
today comes closer to accommodating my views. On 
page 6, however, the opinion states: "In setting 
the appropriate boundaries in Establishment Clause 
cases, the Court has frequently relied on our 
holding in Lemon, supra, for guidance." In light 
of the other decisions this Term, would not 
consistency be better served by changing the 
underlined portion of the sentence to read: "we 
apply the criteria set out in Lemon, supra." If 
you would make that change, I would join. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
•,! 
.. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
June 18, 1985 
No. 83-1158 
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me in your fifth draft 
in this case. I appreciate the changes 
you have made and I will withdraw my 
separate concurring opinion. 
Sincer~ly, 
! • 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAM!!E:RS OP' 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.hvrmt.t aroun &tf ttr~ ~b .Blatt• 
JluJrbtgf~ ~. ar. 2LT.;t~~ 
June 18, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1158, Estate of Thornton v. Calder, Inc. 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in your 5th draft circulated today. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
i 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
jbprtmt Of,utrlltf tltt ~niftb ~httt• 
'~lhudfinghtn, ~· Of. 2ll~'l-~ 
June 18, 1985 
Re: 83-1158 - Thornton v. Calder 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
( 
( 
./) 
~-
CMAMISI!:"'S 01' 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.t'!tJtunu C!J~turi !tf tlrt ~b ,ttatte 
11htefringhtn. ~. C!J. 21l,?,..;t 
June 19, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1158-Estate of Donald E. Thornton and 
Connecticut v. Caldor 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me in your concurring opinion. 
Sincerely, 
T.M. 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
'I 
C_:d,-~.~ (c r') 
) 
~: 
li ,, 
.. 
•' 
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83-1158 Estate of Thornton v. Ca1dor (Dan) 
CJ for the Court 11/9/84 
1st draft 3/13/85 
2nd draft 5/13/85 
3rd draft 5/23/85 
4th draft 6/12/85 
5th draft 6/18/85 
Joined by BRW 5/28/85 
SOC joins Parts I and Ill 5/29/~ 
Joined by SOC 6/13/85 
IFP joins 4th draft and withdraws concurring 
opinion 6/14/85 
opinion. 
Joined by JPS 6/18/85 
Joined by HAB 6/18/85 
Joined by WJB 6/18/85 - withdrawing concurring 
WJB concurring in the judgment 
1st draft 5/17/85 
~d draft 5/21/85 
3rd draft 5j22j85 
Joined by JPS 5j20j85 
TM 5j22j85 
LFP concurring in the judgment 
1st draft 5/23/85 (withdrawn 6/14/85) 
SOC concurring in part and concurring in the judgmeoc 
1st draft 5j29j85 
2nd draft 6/6/85 
~d draft 6/13/85 
Another second draft 6/13/ffi 
3rd draft 6j20j85 
Joined by TM 6/19/ffi 
ERW dissents 6/3/85 
To: The Chief Justice t:_ '1-: (/? 
Justice White 
rJ) . -1 . ~ - ~ ~ - 2 .e.,/-~ Just~ce Marshall 
~._.. I , .. j. Justice Blackrnun 
1 ~~~-:Justice Powell 
_ 3 lf f Justice Rehnquist 
, 1 , .., ' 1 Justice Stevens 
~f- PL-. F ~Ltlt-4~ ...... 1{ ... JusticeO'Connor 
~~ ~ ~ .. - '~- From: Justice Brennan 
J ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Circulated: MAY 1 7 10~5 
c::A--<---'1--t::..Y-z.....t~..c.A.~Lr'L4/""-',. - 2..-, ~ ( ~ :') Recirculated: _______ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1158 ' 
ESTATE OF DONALD E. THORNTON AND CONNECTI-
CUT, PETITIONERS v. CALDOR, INC. 
~J1Jwt 
_s/'7 -t?i 
~~ 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF y ~ .. .....:. ,_.../. 
CONNECTICUT ~/--~~. ~ --- / _ , ~ 
[May-, 1985] --/7"~ 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment. J1/ ----~ 
I join in affirming the judgment of the Connecticut Su- ~~ J ~ 
preme Court that Con. Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b) violates the . 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. I believe ~ 
that this result is required by our consistent understanding of 
the Establishment Clause, as applied in this Court's prece- ~ 
dents over at least the past 40 years. However, I do not~ /. __, /-T;; 
agree with the Court's evident distaste for the Establishment - ......., .~ 
Clause guidelines derived from our prior cases and set forth ~~ ~ 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971). Because I be-
lieve that resolution of the sensitive issues in this case is best ~ ~ 
advanced by concentrating on the Lemon analysis, I there-
fore write separately to offer a less innovative explanation ~ 
for today's result. 
I 
The statute at issue in this case, as interpreted by the 
Connecticut Supreme Court, requires employers absolutely 
to accommodate the needs of employees who desire not to 
work on their Sabbath, regardless of the resulting impact on 
the employer or other employees. See ante, at 10-11, and 
n. 13. From petitioner's perspective, the statute is an ex-
ample of a familiar kind of antidiscrimination ordinance; it 
declares that a citizen whose religious beliefs require observ-
ance of a Sabbath should not thereby be disabled from par-
83-1158-CONCUR 
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ticipating on an equal basis with other employees in the 
State's workforce. Petitioner contends that the statute, far 
from inhibiting the freedom of religion, expands the realm of 
religious freedom in accordance with the purposes underlying 
the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. From respol!,d-
ent's perspective, however, the statute does not merely rem-
7 { edy ~ion, but also goeS'fartli;fa er to enlist the powers 
of the State to promote a certain religious practice (observing 
~ a Sabbath aay)and un!afrly to penaliZe those who do not take 
O part in that pradice.-'1t·eaatnafwaf,the statute is a law 
"re~tablishment of religion" and thus forbidden 
by the First Amendment. Because the statute may be 
viewed from either of these two perspectives, today's case 
raises sensitive and difficult issues concerning the scopeof 
perm1ssi0 e s ate actiOn under the Establishment Clause. 
. ~ 
Lemon v. Kurtz1fl,an, 403 .. U. S. 602 (1972), set forth a 
t ree-part tes that summarizes the constraints of the Estab-
lishmen lause as understood in our cases: 
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally the 
statute must not foster an excessive govern~nt entan-
glement with religion." I d., at 612-613. 
To be sure, the Lemon test provides no mechanistic formula 
~
for generating results in Establishment Clause cases, as at-
tested by the sharp disagreements among the Members of 
this Court concerning the application of the test in many of 
our Establishment Clause cases. Religion is a vital element 
in the life of our people, 1 and government actions of various 
sorts often have a substantial impact on the individual's prac-
tice of religion. Consequently, our goal in this area has been 
'Indeed, a major purpose of both Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment is not hostility toward religion, but protection of the vitality of reli-
gion from the interference of civil government. See, e. g., Engle v. 
Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 431 (1962) . 
83-1158-CONCUR 
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to permit the States as much flexibility as possible to accom-
plish legitimate state purposes, while preserving the funda-
mental rights to freedom of conscience that are the legacy of 
the Framers of the Bill of Rights. 2 Given this goal, no plau-
sible standard would make resolution of the sensitive cases 
that come before us easy. Nonetheless, the Lemon test fo-
cuses attention on the issues that are crucial in defining the 
limi~ov~rnm~n~a action urider the Establishment 
Clause;the tlireeprongs of Lemon "constitute a convenient, 
accurate distillation of this Court's efforts over the past dec-
ades to evaluate a wide range of governmental action chal-
lenged as violative of the [Establishment Clause]." Meek v. 
Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 358 (1975). Because it thus con-
centrates the constitutional inquiry on the values protected 
by the Establishment Clause, the Lemon test should be em-
ployed to analyze the difficult case before us today. 
Petitioner argues that the Lemon test is inappropriate 
here because "a law protecting religious freedom is a con-
stitutionally encouraged means of implementing the values of 
the Free Exercise Clause." Brief for Petitioner 22. For 
this reason, petitioner urges that the statute should be up-
held, like any statute not implicating constitutionally pro-
tected rights, if it rationally furthers a legitimate state 
purpose. Presumably, any statute that could be claimed to 
"implement the values" of the Religion Clauses would be held 
constitutional under this test, even if it had the purpose and 
effect of advancing religion and even if it deeply entangled 
the state in religious matters. 
The understanding of the Free Exercise Clause advanced 
by petitioner is deeply at odds with our interpretation of both 
Religion Clauses. Virtually every Establishment Clause 
case that comes before tfie Coui"'tiiiVOIVes an effort by a State 
to ru t e practice of religion in a way at is sru merely to 
=~ ...__. 
2 It is not necessary here to recount at length the history and purpo~ 
of the Religion Clauses. See, e. g. , Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U. S. 1, 8-15 (1947); id., at 33-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
7 '? 
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"accommodate" the religious beliefs of some group of citizens. 
For example, the state subsidies struck down in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, supra, could be defended as designed to accom-
modate those whose religion requires them to attend reli-
gious schools rather than public schools. State sponsorship 
of school prayers, see School District of Abington Township 
v. Sche , . . 226 (1963), similarly could be defended 
as ' accommodating" hose who desire to meet their religious 
obhgaticms-while attending public school. These claims of 
"accommodation" are unsuccessful because the F~cise 
Cla~ot provide all-purpose authority to the govern- . 
ment to extend positive assistance to those who choose to 
practice religion. 
The guarantees of the Free Exercise Clause come into play 
only when t e vernment itse has, in the course of pursu-
ing W 0 y SeCU ar 0 ~ec IVeS, imposed reg_uirem~ that 
burden or penalize individuals in fhe exercise of their reli-
gio~ee, e. g., 'fliomas v. Review Board, 450 u-:s. 707 
(1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972); Gillette v. 
United States, 401 U. S. 437 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U. S. 398 (1963 . There is no allegation in this case that 
§ 53-303e(b) alleviates a governmentally-imposed obligation 
that burdens private parties in the free exercise of their 
religion. See School District of Abington Township v. 
Schempp, supra, at 222-223.3 Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 
366 U. S. 420, 429 (1961). This is therefore not a case in 
which the Free Exercise Clause determines the result or, in-
deed, in which its mandates are in any serious tension with 
the strictures of the Establishment Clause. See Engle v. 
3 The Court in Schempp stated the controlling ptinciple: "Hence it is 
necessary ~cise case for one to show the coercive effect of the 
enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion. The 
distinction between the two clauses is apparent-a violation of the Free 
Excercise Clause 1s pre icate on ~on while the Establishment Clause 
violation need not be so attended." 374 U. S., at 223. See also id., at 
296-299 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 311 
(1952) • 
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Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430 (1962). Consequently, although 
there may be cases in which such tension influences the anal-
ysis under both Religion Clauses, I see no reason here to de-
part from application of the Lemon test, our settled mode of 
Establishment Clause analysis. 
II 
The first prong of the Lemon test involves an examination 
of the statute to determine whether it has a clear secular pur-
ose. Petitioner alleges that the purpose of the Connecticut 
statute is to assure that all citizens have an equal opportunity 
to participate in the economic life of the state. In the service 
of this goal, the statute seekSto attack a particular barrier-
the need to observe a weekly Sabbath-that stands in the 
way of equal participation; it permits those whose religious 
beliefs require the observance of a Sabbath to avoid being 
relegated to isolated or segregated employment "ghettos" 
where their religious beliefs do not interfere with their work. 
Rather, such individuals are permitted by the statute to 
enter the world of work on an equal basis with all other 
citizens. 
Respondent paints rather a different picture. Respondent 
alleges that t e race of the statute itself betra s an intent to 
benefit citizens w o are re 1gious. The statute gives those 
individuals who for religious reasons seek not to work on a 
particular day of the week the absolute right to do so, while 
individuals who have other reasons for refusin to work are 
at t e mercy o their em oyer. An employee who, for ex-
amp e, refuses to work on Sunday because it is the only day 
he can spend together with the rest of his family has no legal 
recourse if his employer fires him as a result. But if another 
employee refuses to work on Sunday for religious reasons, 
the law bars the employer from taking any action against 
him. By thus favoring the religious employee over the 
employee who has secular reasons for his refusal to work, 
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the statute, in respondent's view, impermissibly promotes 
religion. 
If carried to the limits of its lo ·c, respondent's argument 
might reaten any legislation that embodies a facial religious 
classification. ny sue egis a 1on is hkely either to pro-
mote orto inhibit religion under this analysis, and both of 
these purposes are illegitimate under the Establishment 
Clause. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 15 
(1947). Yet this extreme version of the ar ment misa re-
hends the scope o e 1ma e state action under the Lemon 
test.- The Esfii6hslimentciause rorbids the government 
from requiring religious exercises or practices in public insti-
tutions, or from attempting to propagate, encourage, or in-
duce religious beliefs. However, a statute's facial refe~ce 
to religion is insufficient without more to conclude that it is 
mOtiVated by a forbidden religious purpose. 4 Where the 
governmen seeKs" o expan the domain of civil liberty by 
protecting the rights of all citizens to participate on an equal 
basis, without regard to religion, in important public and 
private aspects of our national life, its purpose is wholly 
legitimate. 
To hold that the government ~_cts in acco~ sec-
ular purpose when combattin reli · ou 1scrimina~ay 
seem to some paradoxica . ndeei:l, if t te!s-oniyl{ur-
pose in prohibiting religious discrimination were to encour-
age otherwise indifferent or hostile citizens to join religious 
institutions and to participate in religious activities, it would 
surely be unco titutional. However, a prohibition of reli-
gio protects not only believers, but un-
• Cf. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U. S. 116, 123 (1982) (valid secular 
purpose of statute giving church veto power over nearby liquor applicants 
is to protect spiritual, cultural, and educational centers from the 'burly-
burly' associated with liquor outlets); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.. S. 349, 363 
(1975) (valid purpose of statute authorizing loan of instructional materials 
to parochial schools is to assure students ample opportunity to develop 
their intellectual capacities). 
? 
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believers as well: protecting the freedom of the religious 
individual to practice as his conscience dictates necessarily 
protects the freedom of the nonreligious individual to refuse 
to practice if his conscience so dictates. The ideal of a soci-
ety bereft of obstacles to the full participation' of each citizen 
is a fully secular ideal, and I have little doubt that ridding the 
workplace of such barriers to equal participation and achieve-
ment is a state purpose fully in keeping with our deepest na-
tional aspirations. 
This conclusion is supported by our prior cases. We have 
repeatedly recognized that state aid to parochial schools may 
be motivated by "the interest in preserving a healthy and 
safe educational environment for all of its schoolchildren." 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
773 (1973). Acco~, Committee for Public Education v. 
Regan, 444 l.k~646, 654 (1979); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U. S., at 613; E'Uerson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 16 
(1947). The mere fact that a statute makes available a public I 
benefit or activity to those who profess religious beliefs does 
not imply that the statu~e is motivated by a religious pur-
pose. The fact that the statute includes an explicitly reli-
gious classification does not necessarily alter this conclusion. 
See, e. g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664 (1971). 
Although statutes designed with this purpose may have an 
effect of promoting religion, e. g., Committee for Public 
Education v. Nyquist, supra, the purpose of "securing equal 
economic opportunity" to all individuals regardless of religion 
has consistently been recognized as legitimate. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 90, n. 4 
(1977) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
A statute that did no more than require an employer to 
make a reasonable accommodation to employees who seek to 
practice their religion could be based on this valid secular 
purpose. 5 A statute of this sort would be aimed at relieving 
5 For instance, sections 701(j) and 703(a)(l) of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a)(l), forbid dis-
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religious discrimination that erects obstacles to the full par-
ticipation by each individual in the nation's economic life. 
Cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, supra, at 63 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Of course, merely forbidding 
religious discrimination as such-without requiring reason-
able accommodation-would be one way of accomplishing this 
objective. But a state may reasonably believe that such a 
statute would be ineffective and that a reasonable accommo-
dation by private employers to the employees' religious needs 
is necessary fully to permit them to participate in the state's 
economic life. Thus, although the statute may require pri-
vate parties to give particular attention to their treatment of 
members of religious groups, this special attention would be 
required only in service of the goal of equal opportunity and 
full participation, not as an effort to institute a religious 
preference. 
The Connecticut statute in this case, however, goes far be-
yond reasonable accommodation. It requires the~ 
and other emp oyees o accommodate the Sabbath observer, 
regardless of cost, inconvenience, or disruption. Respond-
ent argues cogently that a statute so sweeping on its face 
could only be motivated by the forbidden purpose of granting 
religious observers a position of primacy in the workplace; 
the assertion of a goal of nondiscrimination for such an ex-
treme statute could, according to respondent, be no more 
than a pretext. Cf. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S 39 (1980). 
Yet petitioner argues that even a statute embodying this 
kind of absolute accommodation requirement could be moti-
vated by the legitimate secular purpose of making the oppor-
tunities of the state's economic life available to all, including 
crimination in employment on the basis of religion except where "an em-
ployer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an 
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice 
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." See 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63 (1977). 
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those whose religious beliefs would otherwise render them 
out of reach. According to petitioner, the statute is, like 
a "reasonable accommodation" statute, a form of legitimate 
anti-discrimination legislation. 
Petitioner and respondent both advance arguments of 
some force. But respondent's argument rests in large part 
on the effects that must accompany a statute requiring abso-
lute accommodation; the crucial premise is that the statute 
will necessarily enlist the powers of government positively to 
promote religion. This effect being so certain, according to 
respondent, it must be seen as the intended goal. The ef-
fects test, however, is an independent criterion of the valid-
ity of a statute under the Lemon test. I therefore find it 
more profitable to examine respondent's argument under the 
effects test. 
III 
Under the second prong of the Lemon test, a challenged 
statute violates the Establishment Clause if, regardless of its 
purpose, it has a "principal" or "primary'' effect of advancing 
religion. See Cemmittee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
413 U. S. 756, 783, n. 39 (1973). The Court has repeatedly 
held that a statute having an incidental or remote effect of 
advancing religion, if accomplished in the pursuit of a legiti-
mate secular end, is not forbidden under the Establishment 
Clause. Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 
U. S. 736, 747 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 
742-743 (1973); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 
(1968); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961); 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). On the 
other hand, even unintended consequences of an otherwise 
legitimate government program may render . that program 
unconstitutional if they have the "direct" and "immediate" 
effect of promoting or inhibiting religion. Committee for 
Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 783, n. 39. 
In my view, the Connecticut statute at issue here has the 
impermissible effect of advancing religion in two different, 
f: ( 
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though related, ways. First, the statute allocates a substan-
tial public benefit on an explicitly and exclusively religious 
basis, while at the same time concentrating the costs of the 
benefit on others on an exclusively religious basis. The right 
not to work on a day of one's choice is surely a scarce and val-
ued benefit in our society. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
U. S. 420, 451-452 (1961). Under the Connecticut statute, 
employees who need a specific day off to celebrate their Sab-
bath have the absolute right to do so; they need sacrifice no 
other interests to avail themselves of the statutory prefer-
ence. Yet employees who have strong but non-religious rea-
sons for wanting a day off-to be with their family, to par-
ticipate in community activities, to undertake a part-time 
educational program-have no positive rights under the 
Connecticut statute. These other employees must nonethe-
less sacrifice days off that would otherwise be available to 
them in order to "accommodate" their religious colleagues. 
Thus, the statute makes available a substantial and highly-
valued benefit to religious observers and in effect imposes a 
tax on non-observers to pay the cost. 
It might be argued that the benefit afforded religious ob- ~ 
servers by the statute is merely a remote and incidental by-
product of its central goal of ending religious discrimination. 
Yet the benefit accorded by the statute is the right to impose 
whatever cost is necessary on others in order to have one's 
religious preferences satisfied. This is simply too valuable a 
right, and too central to the operation of the statute, to be 
declared a merely "incidental" or "remote" effect that may 
pass muster under the Establishment Clause. 6 
There are certain circumstances in which public benefits of 
considerable value may be made available to religious institu-
• In contrast, the religious effects of a statute mandating only a "reason-
able accommodation" may well be only the "incidental" and "remote" 
effects that often flow from an attempt to pursue a legitimate secular objec-
tive. See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 784, 
n. 39 (1973). 
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tions, even if the costs are necessarily spread among the soci-
ety at large, including nonadherents of the benefitted institu-
tions. In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664 (1970), 
the Court held that the provision of tax exemptions to reli-
gious institutions, as part of a general program of tax deduc-
tions for private, nonprofit organizations, did not violate the 
Establishment Clause. The tax deductions were used by a 
wide range of institutions, while the "costs" of the tax 
subsidy were spread among all taxpayers. Cf. Everson v. 
Board of Education, supra, at 17. Our result in Walz, of 
course, depended on a number of factors aside from the size 
of the affected class. But the Connecticut statute gains little 
support from Walz in any event, because it has precisely the 
opposite effect of the tax deductions in Walz. It concen-
trates its benefits exclusively among religious observers, 
while tending to concentrate its substantial costs on those 
who do not engage in the favored religious observance. 
Compare Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 832 (1973) (chal-
lenged program "singled out a class of its citizens for an 
economic benefit" on religious lines). Thus, unlike the tax 
deductions in Walz, the benefits accorded by the Connecticut 
statute have the effect of advancing a particular religious 
practice at the expense of those, whether they profess a reli-
gion or not, who do not engage in that practice. 
The statute has an additional effect that reinforces my con-
viction that it transgresses tile limits of the Establishment 
Clause. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116 
(1983), we held unconstitutional a statute giving churches ab-
solute authority to exclude liquor establishments from within 
a fixed radius of the church. We stated that "the mere ap-
pearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church 
and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to religion in 
the minds of some by reason of the power conferred." I d., at 
125-126. Granting this kind of governmentally backed veto 
power to certain private individuals to be exercised on an ex-
plicitly religious basis is likely to be perceived by the adher-
. '• 
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ents as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disap-
proval, of their respective religious choices. See Lynch v. 
Donnelly,-- U.S.--,-- (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., Con-
curring). Either effect is equally forbidden under the Estab-
lishment Clause. 
Like the statute at issue in Grendel's Den, the Connecticut 
statute in this case gives Sabbath observers an absolute veto 
over interests of the employer as well as other employees; it 
permits the Sabbath observer to enlist the powers of the 
State to force others to sacrifice their own substantial inter-
ests so that the observer may engage in his religious practice. 
The effect of such a delegation of absolute power to individ-
uals could only be perceived as a governmental preference for 
certain religious conduct over other interests, both religious 
and non-religious. The insinuation of governmental power 
in this way into the religious choices of each individual de-
values both the religious commitments of observers and the 
status in the political community of nonobservers. It is pre-
cisely the kind of governmental involvement in matters of 
conscience whose avoidance, according to our cases, is the 
primary aim of the Establishment Clause. See, e. g., Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, at 625; School District of Abing-
ton Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 226; Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 U. S., at 15-16. 7 
IV 
During the debates in the First Congress on the Bill of 
Rights, Representative Daniel Carroll of Maryland noted 
that "the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of pecular 
delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of govern-
mental hand ... " I Annals of Cong. 730 (Aug. 15, 1789). 
When a state acts to overcome barriers that stand as obsta-
cles to the ability of each citizen to take full part in our 
7 Because I find the statute to be unconstitutional under the effects test, 
I need not reach the issue of its validity under the third, entanglement 
prong of the Lemon test . 
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economic life, the state acts to further the very interests un-
derlying the Religion Clauses, and much of the remainder of 
the Bill of Rights. Yet state action in this area, as in others 
in which the individual's freedom of conscience is involved, 
must be circumspect. Because the heavy-handed approach 
adopted by § 53-303e(b) places the imprimatur of govern-
mental endorsement and encouragement on a particular reli-
gious practice, it is a state law "respecting the establishment 
of religion," and thus invalid under the First Amendment. 
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, concuiTing in t 
I join in affirming the · ent of the Connecticut Su-
preme Court that Co . en. Stat. § 53-303e(b) violates the 
Establishment Clause f the First Amendment. I believe 
that this result is required by our consistent understanding of 
the Establishment Clause, as applied in this Court's prece-
dents over at least the past 40 years. However, I do not 
agree with the Court's evident distaste for the Establishment 
Clause guidelines derived from our prior cases and set forth 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971). Because I be-
lieve that resolution of the sensitive issues in this case is best 
advanced by concentrating on the Lemon analysis, I there-
fore write separately to offer a less innovative explanation 
for today's result. 
I 
The statute at issue in this case, as interpreted by the 
Connecticut Supreme Court, requires employers absolutely 
to accommodate the needs of employees who desire not to 
work on their Sabbath, regardless of the resulting impact on 
the employer or other employees. See ante, at 10-11, and 
n. 13. From petitioner's perspective, the statute is an ex-
ample of a familiar kind of antidiscrimination ordinance; it 
declares that a citizen whose religious beliefs require observ-
ance of a Sabbath should not thereby be disabled from par-
'i 
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ticipating on an equal basis with other employees in the 
State's workforce. Petitioner contends that the statute, far 
from inhibiting the freedom of religion, expands the realm of 
religious freedom in accordance with the purposes underlying 
the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. From respond-
ent's perspective, however, the statute does not merely rem-
edy discrimination, but also goes farther to enlist the powers 
of the State to promote a certain religious practice (observing 
a Sabbath day) and unfairly to penalize those who do not take 
part in that practice. Read that way, the statute is a law 
"respecting the establishment of religion" and thus forbidden 
by the First Amendment. Because the statute may be 
viewed from either of these two perspectives, today's case 
raises sensitive and difficult issues concerning the scope of 
permissible state action under the Establishment Clause. 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), set forth a 
three-part test that summarizes the constraints of the Estab-
lishment Clause as understood in our cases: 
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally the 
statute must not foster an excessive government entan-
glement with religion." I d., at 612-613. 
To be sure, the Lemon test provides no mechanistic formula 
for generating results in Establishment Clause cases, as at-
tested by the sharp disagreements among the Members of 
this Court concerning the application of the test in many of 
our Establishment Clause cases. Religion is a vital element 
in the life of our people, 1 and government actions of various 
sorts often have a substantial impact on the individual's prac-
tice of religion. Consequently, our goal in this area has been 
'Indeed, a major purpose of both Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment is not hostility toward religion, but protection of the vitality of reli-
gion from the interference of civil government. See, e. g., Engle v. 
Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 431 (1962). 
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to permit the States as much flexibility as possible to accom-
plish legitimate state purposes, while preserving the funda-
mental rights to freedom of conscience that are the legacy of 
the Framers of the Bill of Rights. 2 Given this goal, no plau-
sible standard would make resolution of the sensitive cases 
that come before us easy. Nonetheless, the Lemon test fo-
cuses attention on the issues that are crucial in defining the 
limits of governmental action under the Establishment 
Clause; the three prongs of Lemon "constitute a convenient, 
accurate distillation of this Court's efforts over the past dec-
ades to evaluate a wide range of governmental action chal-
lenged as violative of the [Establishment Clause]." Meek v. 
Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 358 (1975). Because it thus con-
centrates the constitutional inquiry on the values protected 
by the Establishment Clause, the Lemon test should be em-
ployed to analyze the difficult case before us today. 
Petitioner argues that the Lemon test is ina,ppropriate 
here because "a law protecting religious freedom is a con-
stitutionally encouraged means of implementing the values of 
the Free Exercise Clause." Brief for Petitioner 22. For 
this reason, petitioner urges that the statute should be up-
held, like any statute not implicating constitutionally pro-
tected rights, if it rationally furthers a legitimate state 
purpose. Presumably, any statute that could be claimed to 
"implement the values" of the Religion Clauses would be held 
constitutional under this test, even if it had the purpose and 
effect of advancing religion and even if it deeply entangled 
the state in religious matters. 
The understanding of the Free Exercise Clause advanced 
by petitioner is deeply at odds with our interpretation of both 
Religion Clauses. Virtually every Establishment Clause 
case that comes before the Court involves an effort by a state 
to aid the practice of religion in a way that is said merely to 
2 It is not necessary here to recount at length the history and purposes 
of the Religion Clauses. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U. S. 1, 8-15 (1947); id., at 33-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
... 
I 
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"accommodate" the religious beliefs of some group of citizens. 
For example, the state subsidies struck down in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, supra, could be defended as designed to accom-
modate those whose religion requires them to attend reli-
gious schools rather than public schools. State sponsorship 
of school prayers, see School District of Abington Township 
v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 226 (1963), similarly could be defended 
as "accommodating" those who desire to meet their religious 
obligations while attending public school. These claims of 
"accommodation" are unsuccessful because the Free Exercise 
Clause does not provide all-purpose authority to the govern-
ment to extend positive assistance to those who choose to 
practice religion. 
The guarantees of the Free Exercise Clause come into play 
only when the government itself has, in the course of pursu-
ing wholly secular objectives, imposed requirements that 
burden or penalize individuals in the exercise of their reli-
gion. See, e. g., Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U. S. 707 
(1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972); Gillette v. 
United States, 401 U. S. 437 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U. S. 398 (1963). There is no allegation in this case that 
§ 53-303e(b) alleviates a governmentally-imposed obligation 
that burdens private parties in the free exercise of their 
religion. See School District of Abington Township v. 
Schempp, supra, at 222-223. 3 Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 
366 U. S. 420, 429 (1961). This is therefore not a case in 
which the Free Exercise Clause determines the result or, in-
deed, in which its mandates are in any serious tension with 
the strictures of the Establishment Clause. See Engle v. 
3 The Court in Schempp stated the controlling principle: "Hence it is 
necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the 
enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion. The 
distinction between the two clauses is apparent-a violation of the Free 
Excercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause 
violation need not be so attended." 374 U. S., at 223. See also id., at 
296-299 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306,311 
(1952). 
,, 
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Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430 (1962). Consequently, although 
there may be cases in which such tension influences the anal-
ysis under both Religion Clauses, I see no reason here to de-
part from application of the Lemon test, our settled mode of 
Establishment Clause analysis. 
II 
The first prong of the Lemon test involves an examination 
of the statute to determine whether it has a clear secular pur-
pose. Petitioner alleges that the purpose of the Connecticut 
statute is to assure that all citizens have an equal opportunity 
to participate in the economic life of the state. In the service 
of this goal, the statute seeks to attack a particular barrier-
the need to observe a weekly Sabbath-that stands in the 
way of equal participation; it permits those whose religious 
beliefs require the observance of a Sabbath to avoid being 
relegated to isolated or segregated employment "ghettos" 
where their religious beliefs do not interfere with their work. 
Rather, such individuals are permitted by the statute to 
enter the world of work on an equal basis with all other 
citizens. 
Respondent paints rather a different picture. Respondent 
alleges that the face of the statute itself betrays an intent to 
benefit citizens who are religious. The statute gives those 
individuals who for religious reasons seek not to work on a 
particular day of the week the absolute right to do so, while 
individuals who have other reasons for refusing to work are 
at the mercy of their employer. An employee who, for ex-
ample, refuses to work on Sunday because it is the only day 
he can spend together with the rest of his family has no legal 
recourse if his employer fires him as a result. But if another 
employee refuses to work on Sunday for religious reasons, 
the law bars the employer from taking any action against 
him. By thus favoring the religious employee over the 
employee who has secular reasons for his refusal to work, 
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the statute, in respondent's view, impermissibly promotes 
religion. 
If carried to the limits of its logic, respondent's argument 
might threaten any legislation that embodies a facial religious 
classification. Any such legislation is likely either to pro-
mote or to inhibit religion under this analysis, and both of 
these purposes are illegitimate under the Establishment 
Clause. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 15 
(1947). Yet this extreme version of the argument misappre-
hends the scope of legitimate state action under the Lemon 
test. The Establishment Clause forbids the government 
from requiring religious exercises or practices in public insti-
tutions, or from attempting to propagate, encourage, or in-
duce religious beliefs. However, a statute's facial reference 
to religion is insufficient without more to conclude that it is 
motivated by a forbidden religious purpose. 4 Where the 
government seeks to expand the domain of civil liberty by 
protecting the rights of all citizens to participate on an equal 
basis, without regard to religion, in important public and. 
private aspects of our national life, its purpose is wholly 
legitimate. 
To hold that the government acts in accordance with a sec-
ular purpose when combatting religious discrimination may 
seem to some paradoxical. Indeed, if the statute's only pur-
pose in prohibiting religious discrimination were to encour-
age otherwise indifferent or hostile citizens to join religious 
institutions and to participate in religious activities, it would 
surely be unconstitutional. However, a prohibition of reli-
gious discrimination protects not only believers, but un-
4 Cf. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U. S. 116, 123 (1982) (valid secular 
purpose of statute giving church veto power over nearby liquor applicants 
is to protect spiritual, cultural, and educational centers from the 'burly-
burly' associated with liquor outlets); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 363 
(1975) (valid purpose of statute authorizing loan of instructional materials 
to parochial schools is to assure students ample opportunity to develop 
their intellectual capacities). 
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believers as well: protecting the freedom of the religious 
individual to practice as his conscience dictates necessarily 
protects the freedom of the nonreligious individual to refuse 
to practice if his conscience so dictates. The ideal of a soci-
ety bereft of obstacles to the full participation of each citizen 
is a fully secular ideal, and I have little doubt that ridding the 
workplace of such barriers to equal participation and achieve-
ment is a state purpose fully in keeping with our deepest na-
tional aspirations. 
This conclusion is supported by our prior cases. We have 
repeatedly recognized that state aid to parochial schools may 
be motivated by "the interest in preserving a healthy and 
safe educational environment for all of its schoolchildren." 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
773 (1973). Accord, Committee for Public Education v. 
Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 654 (1979); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U. S., at 613; Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 16 
(1947). The mere fact that a statute makes available a public 
benefit or activity to those who profess religious beliefs does 
not imply that the statute is motivated by a religious pur-
pose. The fact that the statute includes an explicitly reli-
gious classification does not necessarily alter this conclusion. 
See, e. g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664 (1971). 
Although statutes designed with this purpose may have an 
effect of promoting religion, e. g., Committee for Public 
Education v. Nyquist, supra, the purpose of "securing equal 
economic opportunity" to all individuals regardless of religion 
has consistently been recognized as legitimate. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 90, n. 4 
(1977) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
A statute that did no more than require an employer to 
make a reasonable accommodation to employees who seek to 
practice their religion could be based on this valid secular 
purpose. 5 A statute of this sort would be aimed at relieving 
5 For instance, sections 701(j) and 703(a)(l) of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a)(l), forbid dis-
' . .. , 
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religious discrimination that erects obstacles to the full par-
ticipation by each individual in the nation's economic life. 
Cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, supra, at 63 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Of course, merely forbidding 
religious discrimination as such-without requiring reason-
able accommodation-would be one way of accomplishing this 
objective. But a state may reasonably believe that such a 
statute would be ineffective and that a reasonable accommo-
dation by private employers to the employees' religious needs 
is necessary fully to permit them to participate in the state's 
economic life. Thus, although the statute may require pri-
vate parties to give particular attention to their treatment of 
members of religious groups, this special attention would be 
required only in service of the goal of equal opportunity and 
full participation, not as an effort to institute a religious 
preference. 
The Connecticut statute in this case, however, goes far be-
yond reasonable accommodation. It requires the employer 
and other employees to accommodate the Sabbath observer, 
regardless of cost, inconvenience, or disruption. Respond-
ent argues cogently that a statute so sweeping on its face 
could only be motivated by the forbidden purpose of granting 
religious observers a position of primacy in the workplace; 
the assertion of a goal of nondiscrimination for such an ex-
treme statute could, according to respondent, be no more 
than a pretext. Cf. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S 39 (1980). 
Yet petitioner argues that even a statute embodying this 
kind of absolute accommodation requirement could be moti-
vated by the legitimate secular purpose of making the oppor-
tunities of the state's economic life available to all, including 
crimination in employment on the basis of religion except where "an em-
ployer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an 
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice 
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." See 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63 (1977). 
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those whose religious beliefs would otherwise render them 
out of reach. According to petitioner, the statute is, like 
a "reasonable accommodation" statute, a form of legitimate 
anti-discrimination legislation. 
Petitioner and respondent both advance arguments of 
some force. But respondent's argument rests in large part 
on the effects that must accompany a statute requiring abso-
lute accommodation; the crucial premise is that the statute 
will necessarily enlist the powers of government positively to 
promote religion. This effect being so certain, according to 
respondent, it must be seen as the intended goal. The ef-
fects test, however, is an independent criterion of the valid-
ity of a statute under the Lemon test. I therefore find it 
more profitable to examine respondent's argument under the 
effects test. 
III 
Under the second prong of the Lemon test, a challenged 
statute violates the Establishment Clause if, regardless of its 
purpose, it has a "principal" or "primary" effect of advancing 
religion. See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
413 U. S. 756, 783, n. 39 (1973). The Court has repeatedly 
held that a statute having an incidental or remote effect of 
advancing religion, if accomplished in the pursuit of a legiti-
mate secular end, is not forbidden under the Establishment 
Clause. Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 
U. S. 736, 747 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 
742-743 (1973); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 
(1968); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961); 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). On the 
other hand, even unintended consequences of an otherwise 
legitimate government program may render that program 
unconstitutional if they have the "direct" and "immediate" 
effect of promoting or inhibiting religion. Committee for 
Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 783, n. 39. 
In my view, the Connecticut statute at issue here has the 
impermissible effect of advancing religion in two different, 
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though related, ways. First, the statute allocates a substan-
tial public benefit on an explicitly and exclusively religious 
basis, while at the same time concentrating the costs of the 
benefit on others on an exclusively religious basis. The right 
not to work on a day of one's choice is surely a scarce and val-
ued benefit in our society. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
U. S. 420, 451-452 (1961). Under the Connecticut statute, 
employees who need a specific day off to celebrate their Sab-
bath have the absolute right to do so; they need sacrifice no 
other interests to avail themselves of the statutory prefer-
ence. Yet employees who have strong but non-religious rea-
sons for wanting a day off-to be with their family, to par-
ticipate in community activities, to undertake a part-time 
educational program-have no positive rights under the 
Connecticut statute. These other employees must nonethe-
less sacrifice days off that would otherwise be available to 
them in order to "accommodate" their religious colleagues. 
Thus, the statute makes available a substantial and highly-
valued benefit to religious observers and in effect imposes a 
tax on non-observers to pay the cost. 
It might be argued that the benefit afforded religious ob-
servers by the statute is merely a remote and incidental by-
product of its central goal of ending religious discrimination. 
Yet the benefit accorded by the statute is the right to impose 
whatever cost is necessary on others in order to have one's 
religious preferences satisfied. This is simply too valuable a 
right, and too central to the operation of the statute, to be 
declared a merely "incidental" or "remote" effect that may 
pass muster under the Establishment Clause. 6 
There are certain circumstances in which public benefits of 
considerable value may be made available to religious institu-
6 In contrast, the religious effects of a statute mandating only a "reason-
able accommodation" may well be only the "incidental" and "remote" 
effects that often flow from an attempt to pursue a legitimate secular objec-
tive. See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 784, 
n. 39 (1973). 
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tions, even if the costs are necessarily spread among the soci-
ety at large, including nonadherents of the benefitted institu-
tions. In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664 (1970), 
the Court held that the provision of tax exemptions to reli-
gious institutions, as part of a general program of tax deduc-
tions for private, nonprofit organizations, did not violate the 
Establishment Clause. The tax deductions were used by a 
wide range of institutions, while the "costs" of the tax 
subsidy were spread among all taxpayers. Cf. Everson v. 
Board of Education, supra, at 17. Our result in Walz, of 
course, depended on a number of factors aside from the size 
of the affected class. But the Connecticut statute gains little 
support from Walz in any event, because it has precisely the 
opposite effect of the tax deductions in Walz. It concen-
trates its benefits exclusively among religious observers, 
while tending to concentrate its substantial costs .on those 
who do not engage in the favored religious observance. 
Compare Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 832 (1973) (chal-
lenged program "singled out a class of its citizens for an 
economic benefit" on religious lines). Thus, unlike the tax 
deductions in Walz, the benefits accorded by the Connecticut 
statute have the effect of advancing a particular religious 
practice at the expense of those, whether they profess a reli-
gion or not, who do not engage in that practice. 
The statute has an additional effect that reinforces my con-
viction that it transgresses the limits of the Establishment 
Clause. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116 
(1983), we held unconstitutional a statute giving churches ab-
solute authority to exclude liquor establishments from within 
a fixed radius of the church. We stated that "the mere ap-
pearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church 
and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to religion in 
the minds of some by reason of the power conferred." I d., at 
125-126. Granting this kind of governmentally backed veto 
power to certain private individuals to be exercised on an ex-
plicitly religious basis is likely to be perceived by the adher-
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ents as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disap-
proval, of their respective religious choices. See Lynch v. 
Donnelly,-- U.S.--,-- (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., Con-
curring). Either effect is equally forbidden under the Estab-
lishment Clause. 
Like the statute at issue in Grendel's Den, the Connecticut 
statute in this case gives Sabbath observers an absolute veto 
over interests of the employer as well as other employees; it 
permits the Sabbath observer to enlist the powers of the 
State to force others to sacrifice their own substantial inter-
ests so that the observer may engage in his religious practice. 
The effect of such a delegation of absolute power to individ-
uals could only be perceived as a governmental preference for 
certain religious conduct over other interests, both religious 
and non-religious. The insinuation of governmental power 
in this way into the religious choices of each individual de-
values both the religious commitments of observers and the 
status in the political community of nonobservers. It is pre-
cisely the kind of governmental involvement in matters of 
conscience whose avoidance, according to our cases, is the 
primary aim of the Establishment Clause. See, e. g., Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, at 625; School District of Abing-
ton Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 226; Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 U. S., at 15-16.7 
IV 
During the debates in the First Congress on the Bill of 
Rights, Representative Daniel Carroll of Maryland noted _(; j 
that "the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of pecu~ '-V' 
delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of govern-
mental hand ... " I Annals of Cong. 730 (Aug. 15, 1789). 
When a state acts to overcome barriers that stand as obsta-
cles to the ability of each citizen to take full part in our 
7 Because I find the statute to be unconstitutional under the effects test, 
I need not reach the issue of its validity under the third, entanglement 
prong of the Lemon test. 
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economic life, the state acts to further the very interests un-
derlying the Religion Clauses, and much of the remainder of 
the Bill of Rights. Yet state action in this area, as in others 
in which the individual's freedom of conscience is involved, 
must be circumspect. Because the heavy-handed approach 
adopted by § 53-303e(b) places the imprimatur of govern-
mental endorsement and encouragement on a particular reli-
gious practice, it is a state law "respecting the establishment 
of religion," and thus invalid under the First Amendment. 
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I 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL, Jus-
TICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in 
the judgment. 
I join in affirming the judgment of the Connecticut Su-
preme Court that Con. Gen, Stat. § 53-303e(b) violates the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. I believe 
that this result is required by our consistent understanding of 
the Establishment Clause, as applied in this Court's prece-
dents over at least the past 40 years. However, I do not 
agree with the Court's evident distaste for the Establishment 
Clause guidelines derived from our prior cases and set forth 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971). Because I be-
lieve that resolution of the sensitive issues in this case is best 
advanced by concentrating on the Lemon analysis, I there-
fore write separately to offer a less innovative explanation 
for today's result. 
I 
The statute at issue in this case, as interpreted by the 
Connecticut Supreme Court, requires employers absolutely 
to accommodate the needs of employees who desire not to 
work on their Sabbath, regardless of the resulting impact on 
the employer or other employees. See ante, at 10-11, and 
n. 13. From petitioner's perspective, the statute is an ex-
ample of a familiar kind of antidiscrimination ordinance; it 
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declares that a citizen whose religious beliefs require observ-
ance of a Sabbath should not thereby be disabled from par-
ticipating on an equal basis with other employees in the 
State's workforce. Petitioner contends that the statute, far 
from inhibiting the freedom of religion, expands the realm of 
religious freedom in accordance with the purposes underlying 
the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. From respond-
ent's perspective, however, the statute does not merely rem-
edy discrimination, but also goes farther to enlist the powers 
of the State to promote a certain religious practice (observing 
a Sabbath day) and unfairly to penalize those who do not take 
part in that practice~ Read that way, the statute is a law 
"respecting the establishment of religion" and thus forbidden 
by the First Amendment. Because the statute may be 
viewed from either of these two perspectives, today's case 
raises sensitive and difficult issues concerning the scope of 
permissible state action under the Establishment Clause. 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), set forth a 
three-part test that summarizes the constraints of the Estab-
lishment Clause as understood in our cases: 
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one 
that neither advances :aor inhibits religion; finally the 
statute must not foster an excessive government entan-
glement with religion." ld., at 612-613. 
To be sure, the Lemon test provides no mechanistic formula 
for generating results in Establishment Clause cases, as at-
tested by the sharp disagreements among the Members of 
this Court concerning the application of the test in many of 
our Establishment Clause cases. Religion is a vital element 
in the life of our people, 1 and government actions of various 
sorts often have a substantial impact on the individual's prac-
'Indeed, a major purpose of both Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment is not hostility toward religion, but protection of the vitality of reli-
gion from the interference of civil government. See, e. g., Engle v. Vitale, 
370 u. s. 421, 431 (1962). 
. ,. 
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tice of religion. Consequently, our goal in this area has been 
to permit the States as much flexibility as possible to accom-
plish legitimate state purposes, while preserving the funda-
mental rights to freedom of conscience that are the legacy of 
the Framers of the Bill of Rights. 2 Given this goal, no plau-
sible standard would make resolution of the sensitive cases 
that come before us easy. Nonetheless, the Lemon test fo-
cuses attention on the issues that are crucial in defining the 
limits of governmental action under the Establishment 
Clause; the three prongs of Lemon "constitute a convenient, 
accurate distillation of this Court's efforts over the past dec-
ades to evaluate a wide range of governmental action chal-
lenged as violative of the [Establishment Clause]." Meek v. 
Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 358 (1975). Because it thus con-
centrates the constitutional inquiry on the values protected 
by the Establishment Clause, the Lemon test should be em-
ployed to analyze the difficult case before us today. 
Petitioner argues that the Lemon test is inappropriate 
here because "a law protecting religious freedom is a con-
stitutionally encouraged means of implementing the values of 
the Free Exercise Clause.'" · Brief for Petitioner 22. For 
this reason,· petitioner urges that the statute should be up-
held, like any statute not implicating constitutionally pro-
tected rights, if it rationally furthers a legitimate state 
purpose. Presumably, any statute that could be claimed to 
"implement the values" of the Religion Clauses would be held 
constitutional under this test, even if it had the purpose and 
effect of advancing religion and even if it deeply entangled 
the state in religious matters. 
The understanding of the Free Exercise Clause advanced 
by petitioner is deeply at odds with our interpretation of both 
Religion Clauses. Virtually every Establishment Clause 
case that comes before the Court involves an effort by a state 
2 It is not necessary here to recount at length the history and purposes 
of the Religion Clauses. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U. S. 1, 8-15 (1947); id., at 33-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) . 
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to aid the practice of religion in a way that is said merely to 
"accommodate" the religious beliefs of some group of citizens. 
For example, the state subsidies struck down in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, supra, could be defended as designed to accom-
modate those whose religion requires them to attend reli-
gious schools rather than public schools. State sponsorship 
of school prayers, see School District of Abington Township 
v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 226 (1963), similarly could be defended 
as "accommodating".- those who desire to meet their religious 
obligations while attending public school. These claims of 
"accommodation" are unsuccessful because the Free Exercise 
Clause does not provide all-purpose authority to the govern-
ment to extend positive assistance to those who choose to 
practice religion. 
The guarantees of the Free Exercise Clause come into play 
only when the government itself has, in the course of pursu-
ing wholly secular objectives, imposed requirements that 
burden or penalize individuals in the exercise of their reli-
gion. See, e. g., Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U. S. 707 
(1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder,_ 406 U. S. 205 (1972); Gillette v. 
United States, 401 U. S. 437 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U. S. 398 (1963). There is no allegation in this case that 
§ 53-303e(b) alleviates a governmentally-imposed obligation 
that burdens private parties in the free exercise of their 
religion. See School District of Abington Township v. 
Schempp, supra, at 222-223. 3 Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 
366 U. S. 420, 429 (1961). This is therefore not a case in 
which the Free Exercise Clause determines the result or, in-
deed, in which its mandates are in any serious tension with 
3 The Court in Schempp stated the controlling principle: "Hence it is 
necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the 
enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion. The 
distinction between the two clauses is apparent-a violation of the Free 
Excercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause 
violation need not be so 1:\ttended." 374 U. S., at 223. See also id., at 
296-299 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 311 
(1952). 
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the strictures of the Establishment Clause. See Engle v. 
Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430 (1962). Consequently, although 
there may be cases in which such tension influences the anal-
ysis under both Religion Clauses, I see no reason here to de-
part from application of the Lemon test, our settled mode of 
Establishment Clause analysis. 
II 
The first prong or"the Lemon test involves an examination 
of the statute to determine whether it has a clear secular pur-
pose. Petitioner alleges that the purpose of the Connecticut 
statute is to assure that all citizens have an equal opportunity 
to participate in the economic life of the state. In the service 
of this goal, the statute seeks to attack a particular barrier-
the need to ·observe a weekly Sabbath-that stands in the 
w~y of equal participation; it permits those whose religious 
beliefs require the observance of a Sabbath to avoid being 
relegated to isolated or segregated employment "ghettos" 
where their religious beliefs do not interfere with their work. 
Rather, such individuals are permitted by the statute to 
enter the world of work on an equal basis with all other 
citizens. 
Respondent paints rather a different picture. Respondent 
alleges that the face of the statute itself betrays an intent to 
benefit citizens who are religious. The statute gives those 
individuals who for religious reasons seek not to work on a 
particular day of the week the absolute right to do so, while 
individuals who have other reasons for refusing to work are 
at the mercy of their employer. An employee who, for ex-
ample, refuses to work on Sunday because it is the only day 
he can spend together with the rest of his family has no legal 
recourse if his employer fires him as a result. But if another 
employee refuses to work on Sunday for religious reasons, 
the law bars the employer from taking any action against 
him. By thus favoring the religious employee over the 
employee who has secular reasons for his refusal to work, 
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the statute, in respondent's view, impermissibly promotes 
religion. 
If carried to the limits of its logic, respondent's argument 
might threaten any legislation that embodies a facial religious 
classification. Any such legislation is likely either to pro-
mote or to inhibit religion under this analysis, and both of 
these purposes are illegitimate under the Establishment 
Clause. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 15 
(1947). Yet this extreme version of the argument misappre-
hends the scope of legitimate state action under the Lemon 
test. The Establishment Clause forbids the government 
from requiring religious exercises or practices in public insti-
tutions, or from attempting to propagate, encourage, or in-
duce religious beliefs. However, a statute's facial reference 
to religion is insufficient without more to conclude that 'it is 
motivated by a forbidden religious purpose. 4 Where the 
government seeks to expand the domain of civil liberty by 
protecting the rights of all citizens to participate on an equal 
basis, without regard to religion, in important public and 
private aspects of our nati.onal life, its purpose is wholly 
legitimate. ' ·· 
To hold that the government acts in accordance with a sec-
ular purpose when combatting religious discrimination may 
seem to some paradoxical. Indeed, if the statute's only pur-
pose in prohibiting religious discrimination were to encour-
age otherwise indifferent or hostile citizens to join religious 
institutions and to participate in religious activities, it would 
surely be unconstitutional. However, a prohibition of reli-
gious discrimination protects not only believers, but un-
'Cf. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U. S. 116, 123 (1982) (valid secular 
purpose of statute giving church veto power over nearby liquor applicants 
is to protect spiritual, cultural, and educational centers from the 'burly-
burly' associated with liquor outlets); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 363 
(1975) (valid purpose of statute authorizing loan of instructional materials 
to parochial schools is to assure students ample opportunity to develop 
their intellectual capacities). 
·' ~,. 
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believers as well: protecting the freedom of the religious 
individual to practice as his conscience dictates necessarily 
protects the freedom of the nonreligious individual to refuse 
to practice if his conscience so dictates. The ideal of a soci-
ety bereft of obstacles to the full participation of each citizen 
is a fully secular ideal, and I have little doubt that ridding the 
workplace of such barriers to equal participation and achieve-
ment is a state purpose fully in keeping with our deepest na-
tional aspirations. • 
This conclusion is supported by our prior cases. We have 
repeatedly recognized that state aid to parochial schools may 
be motivated by "the interest in preserving a healthy and 
safe educational environment for all of its schoolchildren." 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, ·413 U. S. 756, 
773 (1973). Accord, Committee for Public Education v. 
Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 654 (1979); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U. S., at 613; Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 16 
(1947). The mere fact that a statute makes available a public 
benefit or activity to those who profess religious beliefs does 
not imply that the statute is motivated by a religious pur-
pose. The fact that the statute hicludes an explicitly reli-
gious classification does not necessarily alter this conclusion. 
See, e. g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664 (1971). 
Although statutes designed with this purpose may have an 
effect of promoting religion, e. g., Committee for Public 
Education v. Nyquist, supra, the purpose of "securing equal 
economic opportunity" to all individuals regardless of religion 
has consistently been recognized as legitimate. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 90, n. 4 
(1977) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
A statute that did no more than require an employer to 
make a reasonable accommodation to employees who seek to 
practice their religion could be based on this valid secular 
purpose. 5 A statute of this sort would be aimed at relieving 
5 For instance, sections 701(j) and 703(a)(l) of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a)(l), forbid dis-
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religious discrimination that erects obstacles to the full par-
ticipation by each individual in the nation's economic life. 
Cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, supra, at 63 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Of course, merely forbidding 
religious discrimination as such-without requiring reason-
able accommodation-would be one way of accomplishing this 
objective. But a state may reasonably believe that such a 
statute would be ineffective and that a reasonable accommo-
dation by private employers to the employees' religious needs 
is necessary fully to permit them to participate in the state's 
economic life. Thus, although the statute may require pri-
vate parties to give particular attention to their treatment of 
members of religious groups, this special attention would be 
required only in service of the goal of equal opportunity and 
full participation, not as an effort to institute a religious 
preference. 
The Connecticut statute in this case, however, goes far be-
yond · reasonable accommodation. It requires the employer 
and other employees to accommodate the Sabbath observer, 
regardless of cost, inconvenience, or disruption. Respond-
ent argues cogently that a statute so sweeping on its face 
could only be motivated by the forbidden purpose of granting 
religious observers a position of primacy in the workplace; 
the assertion of a goal of nondiscrimination for such an ex-
treme statute could, according to respondent, be no more 
than a pretext. Cf. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S 39 (1980). 
Yet petitioner argues that even a statute embodying this 
kind of absolute accommodation requirement could be moti-
vated by the legitimate secular purpose of making the oppor-
tunities of the state's economic life available to all, including 
crimination in employment on the basis of religion except where "an em-
ployer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an 
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice 
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." See 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63 (1977). 
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those whose religious beliefs would otherwise render them 
out of reach. According to petitioner, the statute is, like 
a "reasonable accommodation" statute, a form of legitimate 
anti-discrimination legislation. 
Petitioner and respondent both advance arguments of 
some force. But respondent's argument rests in large part 
on the effects that must accompany a statute requiring abso-
lute accommodation; the crucial premise is that the statute 
will necessarily enlist the powers of government positively to 
promote religion. This effect being so certain, according to 
respondent, it must be seen as the intended goal. The ef-
fects test, however, is an independent criterion of the valid-
ity of a statute under the Lemon test. I therefore find it 
more profitable to ·examine respondent's argument under the 
effects test. 
III 
Under the second prong of the Lemon test, a challenged 
statute violates the Establishment Clause if, regardless of its 
purpose, it has a "principal" or "primary'' effect of advancing 
religion. See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
413 U. S. 756, 783, n. 39 (1973). The Court has repeatedly 
held that a statute having an incidental or remote effect of 
advancing religion, if accomplished in the pursuit of a legiti-
mate secular end, is not forbidden under the Establishment 
Clause. Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 
U. S. 736, 747 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 
742-743 (1973); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 
(1968); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961); 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). On the 
other hand, even unintended consequences of an otherwise 
legitimate government program may render that program 
unconstitutional if they have the "direct" and "immediate" 
effect of promoting or inhibiting religion. Committee for 
Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 783, n. 39. 
In my view, the Connecticut statute at issue here has the 
impermissible effect of advancing religion in two different, 
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though related, ways. First, the statute allocates a substan-
tial public benefit on an explicitly and exclusively religious 
basis, while at the same time concentrating the costs of the 
benefit on others on an exclusively religious basis. The right 
not to work on a day of one's choice is surely a scarce and val-
ued benefit in our society. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
U. S. 420, 451-452 (1961). Under the Connecticut statute, 
employees who need a specific day off to celebrate their Sab-
bath have the absolute right to do so; they need sacrifice no 
other interests to avail themselves of the statutory prefer-
ence. Yet employees who have strong but non-religious rea-
sons for wanting a day off-to be with their family, to par-
ticipate in community activities, to undertake a part-time 
educational program-have no positive rights under the 
Connecticut statute. These other employees must nonethe-
less sacrifice days off that would otherwise be available to 
them in order .to "accommodate" their religious colleagues. 
Thus, the statute makes available a substantial and highly-
valued benefit to religious observers and in effect imposes a 
tax on non-observers to pay. the cost. 
It might be argued that the benefit afforded religious ob-
servers by the statute is merely a remote and incidental by-
product of its central goal of ending religious discrimination. 
Yet the benefit accorded by the statute is the right to impose 
whatever cost is necessary on others in order to have one's 
religious preferences satisfied. This is simply too valuable a 
right, and too central to the operation of the statute, to be 
declared a merely "incidental" or "remote" effect that may 
pass muster under the Establishment Clause. 6 
There are certain circumstances in which public benefits of 
considerable value may be made available to religious institu-
6 In contrast, the religious effects of a statute mandating only a "reason-
able accommodation" may well be only the "incidental" and "remote" 
effects that often flow from an attempt to pursue a legitimate secular objec-
tive. See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 784, 
n. 39 (1973). 
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tions, even if the costs are necessarily spread among the soci-
ety at large, including nonadherents of the benefitted institu-
tions. In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664 (1970), 
the Court held that the provision of tax exemptions to reli-
gious institutions, as part of a general program of tax deduc-
tions for private, nonprofit organizations, did not violate the 
Establishment Clause. The tax deductions were used by a 
wide range of institutions, while the "costs" of the tax 
subsidy were spread among all taxpayers. Cf. Everson v. 
Board of Education, supra, at 17. Our result in Walz, of 
course, depended on a number of factors aside from the size 
of the affected class. But the Connecticut statute gains little 
support from Walz in any event, because it has precisely the 
opposite effect of the tax deductions in Walz. It concen-
trates its benefits exclusively among religious observers, 
while tending to concentrate its substantial costs on those 
who do not engage in the favored religious observance. 
Compare Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 832 (1973) (chal-
lenged program "singled out a class of its citizens for an 
economic be"nefit" on religio!ls lines). Thus, unlike the tax 
deductions in Walz, the benefits accorded by the Connecticut 
statute have the effect of advancing a particular religious 
practice at the expense of those, whether they profess a reli-
gion or not, who do not engage in that practice. 
The statute has an additional effect that reinforces my con-
viction that it transgresses the limits of the Establishment 
Clause. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116 
(1983), we held unconstitutional a statute giving churches ab-
solute authority to exclude liquor establishments from within 
a fixed radius of the church. We stated that "the mere ap-
pearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church 
and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to religion in 
the minds of some by reason of the power conferred." I d., at 
125-126. Granting this kind of governmentally backed veto 
power to certain priv~te individuals to be exercised on an ex-
plicitly religious basis is likely to be perceived by the adher-
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ents as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disap-
proval, of their respective religious choices. See Lynch v. 
Donnelly,-- U.S.--,-- (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., Con-
curring). Either effect is equally forbidden under the Estab-
lishment Clause. 
Like the statute at issue in Grendel's Den, the Connecticut 
statute in this case gives Sabbath observers an absolute veto 
over interests of the employer as well as other employees; it 
permits the Sabbath observer to enlist the powers of the 
State to force others to sacrifice their own substantial inter-
ests so that the observer may engage in his religious practice. 
The effect of such a delegation of absolute power to individ-
uals could only be perceived as a governmental preference for 
certain religious conduct over other interests, both religious 
and non-religious. The insinuation of governmental power 
in this way into the religious choices of each individual de-
values both the religious commitments of observers and the 
status in the political community of nonobservers. It is pre-
cisely the kind . of governmental involvement in matters of 
conscience whose avoidance, according to our cases, is the 
primary aim of the Establishhient Clause. See, e. g., Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, at 625; School District of Abing-
ton Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 226; Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 U. S., at 15~16. 7 
IV 
During the debates in the First Congress on the Bill of 
Rights, Representative Daniel Carroll of Maryland noted 
that "the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of pecular 
delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of govern-
mental hand ... " I Annals of Cong. 730 (Aug. 15, 1789). 
When a state acts to overcome barriers that stand as obsta-
cles to the ability of each citizen to take full part in our 
7 Because I find the statute to be unconstitutional under the effects test, 
I need not reach the issue of its validity under the third, entanglement 
prong of the Lemon test. 
. ' 
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economic life, the state acts to further the very interests un-
derlying the Religion Clauses, and much of the remainder of 
the Bill of Rights. Yet state action in this area, as in others 
in which the individual's freedom of conscience is involved, 
must be circumspect. Because the heavy-handed approach 
adopted by § 53-303e(b) places the imprimatur of govern-
mental endorsement and encouragement on a particular reli-
gious practice, it is a state law "respecting the establishment 
of religion," and thus invalid under the First Amendment. 
;. . 
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We granted certiorari to decide whether a State statute 
that provides employees with the absolute right not to work 
on their chosen Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. 
I 
In early 1975, petitioner's decedent Donald E. Thornton 1 
began working for respondent Caldor, Inc., a chain of New 
England retail stores; he managed the men's and boys' cloth-
ing department in respondent's Waterbury, Connecticut, 
store. At that time, respondent's Connecticut stores were 
closed on Sundays pursuant to state law. Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§§ 53-300 to 53-303 (1975 ed.). 
In 1977, following the state legislature's revision of the 
Sunday-closing laws, 2 respondent opened its Connecticut 
1 Thornton died on February 4, 1982, while his appeal was pending be-
fore the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The administrator of Thornton's 
estate has continued the suit on behalf of the decedent's estate. 
2 The state legislature revised the Sunday-closing laws in 1976 after a 
state court held that the existing laws were unconstitutionally vague. 
State v. Anonymous, 33 Conn. Supp. 55, 364 A. 2d 244 (C. P. 1976). The 
legislature modified the laws to permit certain classes of businesses to re-
main open. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-302a (1976 ed.). At the same time, a 
C4:ef Ju~Le ~ ey-"';ov,_ 
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stores for Sunday business. In order to handle the ex-
panded store hours, respondent required its managerial 
employees to work every third or fourth Sunday. Thornton, 
a Presbyterian who observed Sunday as his Sabbath, initially 
complied with respondent's demand and worked a total of 31 
Sundays in 1977 and 1978. In October 1978, Thornton was 
transferred to a management position in respondent's Tor-
rington store; he continued to work on Sundays during the 
first part of 1979. In November 1979, however, Thornton 
informed respondent that he would no longer work on Sun-
days because he observed that day as his Sabbath; he in-
voked the protection of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b), which 
provides: 
"No person who states that a particular day of the week 
is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his em-
ployer to work on such day. An employee's refusal to 
work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his 
dismissal." 3 
new provision was added, Section 53-303e, which prohibited employment 
of more than six days in any calendar week and guaranteed employees the 
right not to work on the Sabbath of their religious faith. See n. 3, infra. 
Soon after the revised Sunday-closing law was enacted, the Court of 
Common Pleas once again declared it unconstitutional. State v. Anony-
mous, 33 Conn. Supp. 141, 366 A. 2d 200 (C. P. 1976). This decision was 
limited to the provision requiring Sunday closing, Section 53-302a; the 
court did not consider the validity of other provisions such as Section 
53-303e. In 1978, the state legislature tried its hand at enacting yet 
another Sunday-closing law, Pub. Act No. 78-329, 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts 
700-702; the Supreme Court of Connecticut declared the statute uncon-
stitutional. Caldor's Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 417 A. 2d 
343 (1979). As had the Court of Common Pleas, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court did not address the constitutionality of Section 53-303e and that pro-
vision remained in effect until challenged in this action. 
a Thornton had learned of this statutory protection by consulting with 
an attorney. See J. A. 88a-90a. 
Section 53-303e was enacted as part of the 1976 revision of the Sunday-
closing laws. Apart from the six-day week and the Sabbath-observance 
provisions, see n. 2, supra, the remainder of the statute provides: 
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Thornton rejected respondent's offer either to transfer him 
to a management job in a Massachusetts store that was 
closed on Sundays, or to transfer him to a nonsupervisory 
position in the Torrington store at a lower salary.4 In 
March 1980, respondent transferred Thornton to a clerical 
position in the Torrington store; Thornton resigned two days 
later and filed a grievance with the State Board of Mediation 
and Arbitration alleging that he was discharged from his 
manager's position in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §53-
303e(b). 
Respondent defended its action on the ground that Thorn-
ton had not been "discharged" within the meaning of the stat-
ute; respondent also urged the Board to find that the statute 
violated Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution as well as 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
After holding an evidentiary hearing the Board evaluated 
the sincerity of Thornton's claim and concluded it was based 
on a sincere religious conviction; it issued a formal decision 
sustaining Thornton's grievance. The Board framed the sta-
tutory issue as follows, "[i]f a discharge for refusal to work 
Sunday hours occurred and Sunday was the Grievant's Sab-
bath ... ," Section 53-303e(b) would be violated; the Board 
held that respondent had violated the statute by "discharg-
[ing] Mr. Thornton as a management employee for refusing 
"(c) Any employee, who believes that his discharge was in violation of 
subsection (a) or (b) of this section may appeal such discharge to the state 
board of mediation and arbitration. If said board finds that the employee 
was discharged in violation of said subsection (a) or (b), it may order what-
ever remedy will make the employee whole, including but not limited to 
reinstatement to his former or a comparable position. 
"(d) No employer may, as a prerequisite to employment, inquire 
whether the applicant observes any Sabbath. 
"(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall not be 
fined more than two hundred dollars." 
• The collective bargaining agreement in effect for nonsupervisory em-
ployees provided that they were not required to work on Sundays if it was 
"contrary [to the employee's] personal religious convictions." J. A. 91a. 
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to work ... [on] Thornton's ... Sabbath." J. A. lla, 12a. 
The Board ordered respondent to reinstate Thornton with 
back pay and compensation for lost fringe benefits. 5 The 
Superior Court, in affirming that ruling, concluded that the 
statute did not offend the Establishment Clause. 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, holding the j 
statute did not have a "clear secular purpose." Caldor, Inc. 
v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 349, 464 A. 2d 785, 792 (1983). 6 
By authorizing each employee to designate his own Sabbath 
as a day off, the statute evince t e 'unrrusta a rpose 
... [of] allow[ing] those persons who wish to worship on a 
particular day the freedom to do so." !d., at 349, 464 A. 2d, 
at 792. The court then held that the "primary effect" of the 
statute was toaavarice reli ·on; the statute "coniers i£81ben-
efi on an e phc1 reli ous basis.-Dnly those emplOyees~ · 
w o designate a Sabbath are entitled not to work on that par-
ticular day, and may not be penalized for so doing." !d., at 
350, 464 A. 2d, at 794. The court noted that the statute re-
quired the State Mediation Board to decide which religious 
activities may be characterized as an "observance of Sab-
bath" in order to assess employees' sincerity, and concluded 
that this type of inquiry is "exactly the type of 'comprehen-
sive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance' ... 
which creates excessive governmental entanglements be-
tween church and state." !d., at 351, 464 A. 2d, at 794 
(quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 619 (1971)). 
We granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1984). 7 We 
affirm. 
5 The Board refused to consider respondent's constitutional challenge on 
the ground that, as a quasi-judicial body, it had no authority to pass on the 
constitutionality of state law. J. A. 9a-10a. 
6 The court expressly chose not to consider whether the statute violated 
Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 
Conn. 336, 346, n. 7, 464 A. 2d 785, 792, n. 7 (1983). 
'We also granted the State of Connecticut's motion to intervene as of 
right to defend the constitutionality of the state law. 
~· .. ,;·· 
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II 
A 
Petitioner and the State of Connecticut assert that deci-
sions such as Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), and 
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U. S. 707 (1981), recognized 
the government's duty to take account of the special needs of 
religious observers and thus insulate the Connecticut statute 
from constitutional attack. In Sherbert, a Seventh-day 
Adventist lost her job because she would not work on Satur-
day, her Sabbath. Similarly, in Thomas, a Jehovah's Wit-
ness lost employment after refusing to participate in the pro-
duction of armaments, an activity contrary to the tenets of 
his faith. 
In each of these cases the Free Exercise Clause was held to 
require the State to extend unemployment benefits to these 
persons who, having lost their jobs as a result of their refusal 
to compromise their religious practices at the workplace, 
were not able to secure employment. Sherbert, 374 U. S., at 
410; Thomas, 450 U. S., at 718-719. 
The State must provide the religious employee with the 
benefits of "an otherwise available public program," avail-
able to all, id., at 716; the Free Exercise Clause prohibited 
the State from unduly burdening the employee's exercise of 
religion. In other words, the State could not exclude the 
employee from participating in the government program-
receipt of unemployment compensation-because unemploy-
ment resulted from the employee's religious beliefs. 
B 
The First Amendment's guarantee against the "establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" 
turned away from the tradition of government-supported re-
ligions long prevalent in Europe. 8 Acknowledgment and 
8 In Blackstone's words, for example, "the civil magistrate . .. is bound 
indeed to protect the established church: and, if this can be better effected, 
by admitting none but its genuine members to offices of trust and emolu-
.. J ....... 
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accommodation of religion have been closely identified with 
our history, beginning at the Constitutional Convention and 
notably in actions taken in the first days of the First Con-
gress. See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 
(1983). 9 Since the colonial era, our society has set aside 
Sunday as a common day of rest and religious observance. 10 
Reviewing the history of "Sunday Closing Laws" extant in 
the colonies in 1787 when the Constitution was drafted and 
debated, and when the First Amendment was adopted in 
1791, this Court recognized the "strongly religious origin of 
these laws." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 433 
(1961). 
Throughout our entire history there has been widespread 
acceptance of having one day of the week set aside for wor-
ship and pursuits other than labor. In McGowan, the Court 
rejected the contention that the religious overtones of laws in 
vogue since the beginning of the Republic rendered them un-
constitutional. On the contrary, the Court held expressly 
that such laws were within constitutional bounds because 
they also achieve a secular goal-providing a uniform day of 
rest for all, notwithstanding the widespread use of the day 
for religious worship. To conclude otherwise would "give a 
constitutional interpretation of hostility to the public welfare 
rather than one of mere separation of church and State." 
Id., at 445. 
The background of accommodation and acknowledgment of 
religion must be weighed, however, against an equally in-
structive lesson from history: that the Establishment Clause 
ment, he is certainly at liberty to do so .... " 4 W. Blackstone, Com-
mentaries 52*. 
9 In the space of a single week in the opening sessions of the First Con-
gress in 1789, paid chaplains were authorized for each House. See Marsh 
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,- (1983). 
'
0 In Connecticut, for example, laws requiring businesses to close on 
Sunday, the traditional Christian day of Sabbath, date back to 1656. The 
Earliest Laws of the New Haven and Connecticut Colonies 1639-1673, at 
47 (J. Cushing ed. 1977) . 
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was intended to foreclose governmental compulsion of some 
of the people to support and facilitate the religious activities 
of others. Clearly all forms of direct, absolute coercion were 
proscribed. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U. S. 1, 8-16 (1947). Justice Frankfurter, concurring in 
McGowan, observed: 
"In assuring the free exercise of religion, the Framers 
of the First Amendment were sensitive to the then re-
cent history of those persecutions and impositions of civil 
disability with which sectarian majorities in virtually all 
of the Colonies had visited deviation in the matter of con-
science. This protection of unpopular creeds, however, 
was not to be the full extent of the Amendment's guaran-
tee of freedom from governmental intrusion in matters of 
faith." 366 U. S. , at 464-465 (footnotes omitted). 
The Framers' fear of governmental coercion in religious 
matters 11 stemmed from their awareness of how often in their 
own time governmental authority intruded into the religious 
sphere and led to unwanted conflict and oppression. See 
Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 431-432 (1962). Govern-
ment, Madison asserted, should not "employ Religion as an 
engine of Civil policy," 2 The Writings of James Madison 187 
(G. Hunt ed. 1901). Concurring in Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion, 397 U. S. 664, 694 (1970), Justice Harlan suggested that 
at stake 
"is preventing that kind of governmental involvement in 
religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead 
to strife and frequently strain a political system to the 
breaking point . . . . " 
11 The Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, an acknowledged antecedent of 
the First Amendment, proclaimed as one of its guiding principles that 
"no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship 
. . . nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body 
or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or 
beliefs . . . . " 12 Hening, Statutes of Virginia 84 (1823). 
,. ' 
' 
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Government must not only guard against activity that im-
pinges on religious freedom, but it must take pains not to 
compel citizens to act in the name of any religion. Cf. 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714-717 (1977). The 
genius of the Religion Clauses preserves the Framers' 
"awareness of the historical fact that governmentally estab-
lished religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand." 
Engle, supra, at 432. Concurring in McGowan, supra, at 
460, Justice Frankfurter pointed to 
"the long colonial struggle for disestablishment [was] the 
struggle to free all men, whatever their theological 
views, from state-compelled obligation to acknowledge 
and support state-favored faiths." 
c 
This history of accommodating all religious exercise while 
guarding against governmental efforts to press any religion 
on the people counsels against rigid rules under the Estab-
lishment Clause. In the recent Term we emphasized that 
"[i]n our modern, complex society, whose traditions and con-
stitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity and 
pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in applying the 
Establishment Clause is simplistic and has been uniformly re-
jected by this Court." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. --, 
-- (1984); see, e. g., Walz, supra, at 671. 
In setting the appropriate boundaries in Establishment 
Clause cases, the Court has referred to Lemon for a conve-
nient shorthand of "the cumulative criteria developed by the 
Court over many years." 403 U. S., at 612. However, the 
Court has repeatedly rejected the concept that "any single 
test or criterion" provides the touchstone for resolving 
Establishment Clause cases, see, e. g., Lynch, supra, at 
--; id., at--, n. 1 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); id., at 
--, n. 2 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); the Court has ex-
pressly characterized Lemon as establishing "'no more than 
[a] helpful signpost' in dealing with Establishment Clause 
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challenges," Mueller v. Allen, -- U. S. --, -- (1983) 
(quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 741 (1973)). 12 
Our recent decision in Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, suggests 
the limited utility of fixed tests in that category of cases 
where the Court must decide whether a particular govern-
mental accommodation of religion violates the prohibition 
against the establishment of religion. As Lynch makes 
clear, the effort to accommodate religion may have pre-
dominantly nonsecular purposes and even may encourage and 
foster religion. By definition efforts toward accommodation 
inevitably implicate consideration of religious factors; such 
consideration, however, does not necessarily contravene the 
Establishment Clause, as Lynch demonstrates. See also 
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1943). To pigeonhole 
analysis in all cases into fixed inquiries may well obscure 
rather than illuminate the sensitive issues surrounding ac-
commodation of religion. Cf. Lynch, supra, at-- (O'CoN-
NOR, J., concurring). No single "test" or formula fits every 
case raising Establishment Clause questions. Courts must 
look beyond the rhetoric of any single approach to determine 
whether the values protected by the Religion Clauses have 
been offended. 
When a court considers the extent to which government 
may accommodate religion, the focus must be on the core 
objectives of the Religion Clauses themselves: is the chal-
lenged action a step toward the establishment of a religion by 
or with the approval of government, or does such action sub-
stantially impair the free exercise of religion. Thus, the 
12 Where a mechanistic inquiry obscures rather than illuminates the con-
cerns underlying the Establishment Clause, the Court has not hesitated to 
proceed along different lines. In Marsh v. Chambers, supra, for example, 
the Court did not consider the Lemon analysis relevant in determining the 
validity of state-sponsored legislative prayer. Although Lemon was dis-
cussed in Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 251-255 (1982), the Court did 
not find the Lemon criteria particularly useful where there was substantial 
evidence of overt discrimination against particular types of religious 
groups. 
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government may neither coerce or induce adherence to any 
religion, nor compel conduct to conform to a religious creed 
or practice. This circumscribed scope of accommodation ful-
fills the Constitutional purpose "to promote and assure the 
fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all 
and to nurture the conditions which secure the best hope of 
attainment of that end." Abington School District v. 
c empp, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
III 
The challenged statute guarantees every employee, who 
"states that a particular day of the week is observed as his 
Sabbath," the right not to work on his chosen day. Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b). In the view of the legislature a Sab-
bath observer should not be forced to choose between com-
promising a religious conviction and jeopardizing a job. In 
short, the State has decreed that a person who observes one 
day of the week as a matter of religious conviction must be 
relieved of any contract duty to work on that day, without 
regard to the burdens or inconvenience this imposes on the 
employer or fellow workers. We cannot accept the sugges-
tion that the statute does not arm Sabbath observers with an 
absolute and unqualified right not to work on their desig-
nated Sabbath. Such a reading of Section 53-303e(b) contra-
dicts the unambiguous wording of the statute and ignores the 
statute's construction by the Connecticut authorities en-
trusted with this task, including the State's highest court. 13 
18 The State Board of Mediation and Arbitration construed the statute as 
providing Thornton with the absolute right not to work on his Sabbath. 
Caldor, Inc. v. Tlwrnton, Conn. Bd. Arb. & Med. No. 7980-A-727 (Oct. 
20, 1980), J. A. lla-12a; accord, G. Fox & Co. v. Rinaldi, Conn. Bd. Arb. 
& Med. No. 8182-A-440 (Nov. 17, 1982) ("There is no question that .. . the 
employee has an absolute right to designate any day of the week as his or 
her sabbath [and that Section 53-303e(b) would be violated if] the termina-
tion was as a result of the employee's refusal to work on her sabbath."). 
Following settled state law, see, e. g., Bruno v. Department of Consumer 
Protection, 190 Conn. 14, 18, 458 A. 2d 685, 688 (1983) (per curiam), the 
State Superior Court and the Supreme Court of Connecticut adopted the 
.. 
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This case does not bear on the constitutionality of the reli-
gious accommodation provisions of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and its various state counterparts. In 
1972, Congress amended Title VII, which outlawed employ-
ment discrimination based on an individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin. As amended, Title VII re-
quires employers only "to reasonably accommodate" an 
employee's religious observances and practices when so doing 
does not cause "undue hardship on the conduct of the employ-
er's business," 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e(j) and 2000e-2(a)(1). A 
number of states have comparable legislation. 14 The 
Connecticut statute, however, goes beyond the "accommoda-
tion" laws currently in force; the commands of Section 
303e(b) are absolute and unqualified. 15 
In essence, the Connecticut statute imposes on some peo-
ple an absolute duty to conform their conduct and business 
practices to the religious practices of others; it enforces 
Board's construction of the statute, Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 
336, 340-343, 350, 464 A. 2d 785, 789-790, 794 (1983). This construction of 
the state law is, of course, binding on federal courts. E. g., Brown v. 
Ohio, 432 U. S. 161, 167 (1977); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, 169 
(1961); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875). 
14 See, e. g., Alaska Stat. § 18.80.200 (1983); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 41-1461(6), 41-1463 (1956); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1-570, 45-19-22 (1982); 
Iowa Code Ann. § 601A.6(1)(a) (West 1975); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.030(5) 
(1975); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4572(1)(A) (1979); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 
151B, § 4.1A (Law. Co-op. 1976); S. C. Code Ann. § 1-13-30(k) (Law. Co-
op. 1976); Tex. Ann. Civ. St. art. 5221k, §§ 1.01, 2.01(13), 5.01 (Vernon 
Supp. 1984); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.337 (West Supp. 1983). 
Mter the Connecticut Supreme Court invalidated Section 53-303e(b), 
the Connecticut legislature enacted a statute prohibiting religious dis-
crimination in employment that precisely tracks the language of Title VII. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-51(18). The legislature, however, did not repeal 
Section 53-303e(b), which indicates that Sabbath observers have an abso-
lute right not to work on their Sabbath. 
15 The United States, as amicus curiae, acknowledges that "[i]fthere is a 
constitutional defect in Section 53-303e(b), it is its absolute character-a 
character that Title VII and the parallel state statutes do not share." 
Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae at 24 . 
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observance of whatever religious holiday the employee desig-
nates. The State thus commands that Sabbath religious con-
cerns automatically trump all secular and other religious in-
terests at the workplace; the statute takes no account of the 
convenience or interests of the employer or those of other 
employees who do not observe a Sabbath. The employer 
and others must adjust their affairs to the command of the 
State whenever the statute is invoked by an employee. 
There is no exception under the statute for special circum-
stances, such as the Friday Sabbath observer employed in an 
activity, such as school with a Monday through Friday sched-
ule; the statute provides for no special consideration if a high 
percentage of an employer's workforce asserts rights to the 
same day off; and there is no exception to take account of em-
ployers whose work schedules reflect their own religious 
practices. In addition, there is no exception when following 
the dictates of Sabbath observers would cause the employer 
substantial economic burdens or when the employer's compli-
ance would require the imposition of significant burdens on 
other employees who must work in place of the Sabbath ob-
servers.16 Finally, the statute allows for no consideration as 
to whether the employer has made reasonable accommoda-
tion proposals. This unyielding weighting in favor of Sab-
16 Section 53-303e(b) gives Sabbath observers the valuable right to des-
ignate a particular weekly day off-typically a weekend day, widely prized 
as a day off. Other employees who have strong and legitimate, but non-
religious reasons for wanting a weekend day off have no rights under the 
statute. For example, those employees who have earned the privilege 
through seniority to have weekend days off may be forced to surrender this 
privilege to the Sabbath observer; years of service and payment of "dues" 
at the workplace simply cannot compete with the Sabbath observer's abso-
lute right under the statute. Similarly, those employees who would like a 
weekend day off, because that is the only day their spouses are also not 
working, must take a back seat to the Sabbath observer. As explained 
infra, the Establishment Clause does not permit the state to coerce per-
sons' conduct in such a direct and absolute manner in order to facilitate the 
religious practices of others. 
.. /. .,. 
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bath observers over all other interests contravenes a funda-
mental principle of the Religion Clauses: 
"The First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to in-
sist that in pursuit of their own interests others must 
conform their conduct to his own religious necessities." 
Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F. 2d 58, 61 (CA2 
1953) (L. Hand, J. ). 
The government may insist that religion be treated in a 
spirit of accommodation, but accommodation is just that-a 
reasonable balancing of all the competing interests involved, 
both secular and religious, see, e. g., United States v. Lee, 
455 u. s. 252 (1982). 
Connecticut singles out Sabbath observance and commands 
that all such observance override every other legitimate 
interest of employers and employees alike. Any conflict be-
tween Sabbath observance and other interests is resolved 
mandatorily under the statute; the State lends its power ex-
clusively to the religious practice of the demanding employee. 
This goes well beyond acknowledging religion's place as an 
aspect of our society's "diversity and pluralism," Lynch, 
465 U. S., at--, and leaves no "play in the joints," Walz, 
397 U. S., at 669, for other substantial secular and religious 
values. 
We conclude, therefore, that the Connecticut statute's ab-
solute mandate constitutes governmental coercion of conduct 
on behalf of particular religious adherents. 
IV 
The Court's holdings in Sherbert and Thomas on the one 
hand, and the Connecticut statute on the other, as in so many 
cases arising under the Religion Clauses, calls for line draw-
ing. Distinguishing between cases falling next to the line on 
either side is often difficult, but lines must be drawn. See, 
e. g., United States v. Lee, supra; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 
U. S. 599 (1961). Sherbert and Thomas involved situations 
where the State was called upon to take steps to "accommo-
r:. 
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date" religious observers in order to allow them the benefit of 
an unemployment insurance program open to all other unem-
ployed; the eligibility factor for that economic benefit coult 
not be made to rest on a religious conviction or practice. 17 
Under such circumstances the Religion Clauses require the 
accommodation to avoid a state-created conflict between af-
firmative governmental action and free exercise of religious 
beliefs. 18 Those holdings carried accommodation to its outer 
limits. 
Such accommodation for religious observers or religious in-
stitutions from governmental coercion has been long recog-
nized by the Court. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 
437 (1971), for example, the Court rejected an Establishment 
Clause challenge to statutory provisions exempting religious 
and conscientious objectors from the draft. The Court con-
cluded that such an exemption was "in line with 'our happy 
17 See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972), where the Court 
held that the state must exempt Amish children from compulsory school 
attendance laws in order to allow the Amish to exercise their religious be-
liefs. This did little more than states have done with respect to church-
sponsored elementary schools. All such non-public mandatory education 
must meet State standards. 
18 Sherbert explained that the Free Exercise Clause's requiring the state 
to dole out benefits to religious employees did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause because the state was merely fulfilling its "obligation of neu-
trality in the face of religious differences." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398, 409 (1963). This reasoning was expressly affirmed in Thomas v. 
Review Board, 450 U. S. 707, 720 (1981). 
As is evident from the tension inherent in the Religion Clauses, see, 
e. g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. --, ----- (1984); Wale v. Tax 
Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668-669 (1970). The state's adhering to the 
constitutional command of one Clause does not readily create a violation of 
its counterpart. This is especially true where the state's efforts draw no 
lines with respect to particular religions and where the state's actions are 
motivated for reasons wholly divorced from religious ones. In the end, it 
should come as no surprise that the Establishment Clause's concern that 
government refrain from endorsing or coercing adherence to religion is 
implicated only slightly, if at all, where the state administers an unemploy-
ment benefits program consistent with the Free Exercise Clause. 
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tradition' of 'avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates 
of conscience."' !d., at 453 (quoting United States v. Macin-
tosh, 283 U. S. 605, 634 (1931) (Hughes, C. J., dissenting)). 
Similarly, as the Court held in Walz, supra, the Establish-
ment Clause did not forbid the granting of a property tax ex-
emption to all churches. The exemption "simply spar[ed] 
the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation 
levied on private profit institutions," 397 U. S., at 673, and 
avoided tensions between governmental power and religious 
institutions. See also Mueller v. Allen, supra; Braunfeld v. 
Brown, supra. 
Our prior holdings relied on a careful balancing of two 
overriding factors: the government's adherence to the com-
mand of the Free Exercise Clause to eliminate a burden cre-
ated by governmental action; moreover, the Establishment 
Clause's concern with governmental advancement or coercion 
of conduct on behalf of religion was not seriously at issue. 
Section 53-303e(b) offers a strikingly different situation. In 
enforcing the statute, Connecticut coercively burdens a host 
of others to conform their conduct in order to facilitate the 
religious activity of Sabbath observers. Far from prevent-
ing its own programs from unnecessarily burdening religious 
exercise, the State is reaching out into the private sector to 
compel absolute deference to a certain religious practice--
this goes beyond accommodation. 
The Connecticut statute, unlike governmental actions up-
held in our holdings, contravenes a core principle of the 
Establishment Clause that the government may not compel 
private parties to conform their conduct and subordinate 
their own legitimate interests to the religious needs of 
others. At the same time, the statute takes this impermissi-
ble step where there is no equally competing constitutional 
need of avoiding governmental coercion of religious activity. 
See, e. g., Sherbert, 374 U. S., at 406-409; Braunfeld, supra, 
at 603-604. 
1-J. 
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v 
We hold that the Connecticut statute, which provides Sab-
bath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to 
work on their Sabbath, constitutes impermissible govern-
mental coercion of private conduct on behalf of religion in 
violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut is 
affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
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CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether a State statute 
that provides employees with the absolute right not to work 
on their chosen Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. 
I 
In early 1975, petitioner's decedent Donald E. Thornton 1 
began working for respondent Caldor, Inc., a chain of New 
England retail stores; he managed the men's and boys' cloth-
ing department in respondent's Waterbury, Connecticut, 
store. At that time, respondent's Connecticut stores were 
closed on Sundays pursuant to state law. Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§§ 53-300 to 53-303 (1975 ed.). 
In 1977, following the state legislature's revision of the 
Sunday-closing laws, 2 respondent opened its Connecticut 
1 Thornton died on February 4, 1982, while his appeal was pending be-
fore the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The administrator of Thornton's 
estate has continued the suit on behalf of the decedent's estate. 
2 The state legislature revised the Sunday-closing laws in 1976 after a 
state court held that the existing laws were unconstitutionally vague. 
State v. Anonymous, 33 Conn. Supp. 55, 364 A. 2d 244 (C. P. 1976). The 
legislature modified the laws to permit certain classes of businesses to re-
main open. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-302a (1976 ed.). At the same time, a 
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stores for Sunday business. In order to handle the ex-
panded store hours, respondent required its managerial 
employees to work every third or fourth Sunday. Thornton, 
a Presbyterian who observed Sunday as his Sabbath, initially 
complied with respondent's demand and worked a total of 31 
Sundays in 1977 and 1978. In October 1978, Thornton was 
transferred to a management position in respondent's Tor-
rington store; he continued to work on Sundays during the 
first part of 1979. In November 1979, however, Thornton 
informed respondent that he would no longer work on Sun-
days because he observed that day as his Sabbath; he in-
voked the protection of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b), which 
provides: 
"No person who states that a particular day of the week 
is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his em-
ployer to work on such day. An employee's refusal to 
work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his 
dismissal." 3 
new provision was added, Section 53-303e, which prohibited employment 
of more than six days in any calendar week and guaranteed employees the 
right not to work on the Sabbath of their religious faith. See n. 3, infra. 
Soon after the revised Sunday-closing law was enacted, the Court of 
Common Pleas once again declared it unconstitutional. State v. Anony-
mous, 33 Conn. Supp. 141, 366 A. 2d 200 (C. P. 1976). This decision was 
limited to the provision requiring Sunday closing, Section 53-302a; the 
court did not consider the validity of other provisions such as Section 
53-303e. In 1978, the state legislature tried its hand at enacting yet 
another Sunday-closing law, Pub. Act No. 78-329, 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts 
700-702; the Supreme Court of Connecticut declared the statute uncon-
stitutional. Caldor's Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc ., 177 Conn. 304, 417 A. 2d 
343 (1979). As had the Court of Common Pleas, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court did not address the constitutionality of Section 53-303e and that pro-
vision remained in effect until challenged in this action. 
3 Thornton had learned of this statutory protection by consulting with 
an attorney. See J. A. 88a-90a. 
Section 53-303e was enacted as part of the 1976 revision of the Sunday-
closing laws. Apart from the six-day week and the Sabbath-observance 
provisions, see n. 2, supra, the remainder of the statute provides: 
• ·f ... 
' 
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Thornton rejected respondent's offer either to transfer him 
to a management job in a Massachusetts store that was 
closed on Sundays, or to transfer him to a nonsupervisory 
position in the Torrington store at a lower salary.4 In 
March 1980, respondent transferred Thornton to a clerical 
position in the Torrington store; Thornton resigned two days 
later and filed a grievance with the State Board of Mediation 
and Arbitration alleging that he was discharged from his 
manager's position in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-
303e(b). 
Respondent defended its action on the ground that Thorn-
ton had not been "discharged" within the meaning of the stat-
ute; respondent also urged the Board to find that the statute 
violated Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution as well as 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
After holding an evidentiary hearing the Board evaluated 
the sincerity of Thornton's claim and concluded it was based 
on a sincere religious conviction; it issued a formal decision 
sustaining Thornton's grievance. The Board framed the sta-
tutory issue as follows, "[i]f a discharge for refusal to work 
Sunday hours occurred and Sunday was the Grievant's Sab-
bath . . . ," Section 53-303e(b) would be violated; the Board 
held that respondent had violated the statute by "discharg-
[ing] Mr. Thornton as a management employee for refusing 
"(c) Any employee, who believes that his discharge was in violation of 
subsection (a) or (b) of this section may appeal such discharge to the state 
board of mediation and arbitration. If said board finds that the employee 
was discharged in violation of said subsection (a) or (b), it may order what-
ever remedy will make the employee whole, including but not limited to 
reinstatement to his former or a comparable position. 
"(d) No employer may, as a prerequisite to employment, inquire 
whether the applicant observes any Sabbath. 
"(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall not be 
fined more than two hundred dollars." 
• The collective bargaining agreement in effect for nonsupervisory em-
ployees provided that they were not required to work on Sundays if it was 
"contrary [to the employee's] personal religious convictions." J. A. 91a . 
.. 
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to work ... [on] Thornton's ... Sabbath." J. A. lla, 12a. 
The Board ordered respondent to reinstate Thornton with 
back pay and compensation for lost fringe benefits. 5 The 
Superior Court, in affirming that ruling, concluded that the 
statute did not offend the Establishment Clause. 
The Supreme Court of Co ecticut reversed, holding the 
statute did not ave a "clear secular purpose." Caldor, Inc. 
v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 349, 464 A. 2d 785, 792 (1983). 6 
By authorizing each employee to designate his own Sabbath l 
as a day off, the statute evinced the "unmistakable purpose 
... [of] allow[ing] those persons who wish to worship on a 
particular day the freedom to do so." ld., at 349, 464 A. 2d, 
at 792. The court then held that the "primary effect" of the 
statute was to a~nce ~on; the statute "confe~ its 'ben-
efit' on an exJ?.!iCit~ous ~asis. Only those employees 
who designate a-saooath b.feeiitit!ed not to work on that par-
ticular day, and may not be penalized for so doing." ld., at 
350, 464 A. 2d, at 794. The court noted that the statute re-
quired the State Mediation Board to decide which religious 
activities may be characterized as an "observance of Sab-
bath" in order to assess employees' sincerity, and concluded 
that this type of inquiry is "exactly the type of 'comprehen-
sive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance' ... 
which creates excessive governmental entanglements be-
tween church and state." ld., at 351, 464 A. 2d, at 794 
(quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 619 (1971)). 
We granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1984). 7 We 
affirm. 
5 The Board refused to consider respondent's constitutional challenge on 
the ground that, as a quasi-judicial body, it had no authority to pass on the 
constitutionality of state law. J. A. 9a-10a. 
6 The court expressly chose not to consider whether the statute violated 
Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 
Conn. 336, 346, n. 7, 464 A. 2d 785, 792, n. 7 (1983). 
7 We also granted the State of Connecticut's motion to intervene as of 
right to defend the constitutionality of the state law . 
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II 
A 
Petitioner and the State of Connecticut assert that deci-
sions such as Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), and 
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U. S. 707 (1981), recognized 
the government's duty to take account of the special needs of 
religious observers and thus insulate the Connecticut statute 
from constitutional attack. In Sherbert, a Seventh-day 
Adventist lost her job because she would not work on Satur-
day, her Sabbath. Similarly, in Thomas, a Jehovah's Wit-
ness lost employment after refusing to participate in the pro-
duction of armaments, an activity contrary to the tenets of 
his faith. 
In each of these cases the Free Exercise Clause was held to 
require the State to extend unemployment benefits to these 
persons who, having lost their jobs as a result of their refusal 
to compromise their religious practices at the workplace, 
were not able to secure employment. Sherbert, 37 4 U. S., at 
410; Thomas, 450 U. S., at 718-719. 
The State must provide the religious employee with the 
benefits of "an otherwise available public program," avail-
able to all, id., at 716; the Free Exercise Clause prohibited 
the State from unduly burdening the employee's exercise of 
religion. In other words, the State could not exclude the 
employee from participating in the government program-
receipt of unemployment compensation-because unemploy-
ment resulted from the employee's religious beliefs. 
B 
The First Amendment's guarantee against the "establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" 
turned away from the tradition of government-supported re-
ligions long prevalent in Europe. 8 Acknowledgment and 
8 In Blackstone's words, for example, "the civil magistrate ... is bound 
indeed to protect the established church: and, if this can be better effected, 
by admitting none but its genuine members to offices of trust and emolu-
.. -.;-· 
83-1158---0PINION 
6 ESTATE OF THORNTON v. CALDOR, INC. 
accommodation of religion have been closely identified with 
our history, beginning at the Constitutional Convention and 
notably in actions taken in the first days of the First Con-
gress. See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 
(1983). 9 Since the colonial era, our society has set aside 
Sunday as a common day of rest and religious observance. 10 
Reviewing the history of "Sunday Closing Laws" extant in 
the colonies in 1787 when the Constitution was drafted and 
debated, and when the First Amendment was adopted in 
1791, this Court recognized the "strongly religious origin of 
these laws." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 433 
(1961). 
Throughout our entire history there has been widespread ! 
acceptance of having one day of the week set aside for wor-
ship and pursuits other than labor. In McGowan, the Court 
rejected the contention that the religious overtones of laws in 
vogue since the beginning of the Republic rendered them un-
constitutional. On the contrary, the Court held expressly 
that such laws were within constitutional bounds because 
they also achieve a secular goal-providing a uniform day of 
rest for all, notwithstanding the widespread use of the day 
for religious worship. To conclude otherwise would "give a 
constitutional interpretation of hostility to the public welfare 
rather than one of mere separation of church and State." 
Id., at 445. j 
The background of accommodation and acknowledgment of 
religion must be weighed, however, against an equally in-
structive lesson from history: that the Establishment Clause 
ment, he is certainly at liberty to do so .... " 4 W. Blackstone, Com-
mentaries 52*. 
9 In the space of a single week in the opening sessions of the First Con-
gress in 1789, paid chaplains were authorized for each House. See Marsh 
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,- (1983). 
10 In Connecticut, for example, laws requiring businesses to close on 
Sunday, the traditional Christian day of Sabbath, date back to 1656. The 
Earliest Laws of the New Haven and Connecticut Colonies 1639-1673, at 
47 (J. Cushing ed. 1977) . 
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was intended to foreclose governmental compulsion of some 
of the people to support and facilitate the religious activities 
of others. Clearly all forms of direct, absolute coercion were 
proscribed. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U. S. 1, 8-16 (1947). Justice Frankfurter, concurring in 
McGowan, observed: 
"In assuring the free exercise of religion, the Framers 
of the First Amendment were sensitive to the then re-
cent history of those persecutions and impositions of civil 
disability with which sectarian majorities in virtually all 
of the Colonies had visited deviation in the matter of con-
science. This protection of unpopular creeds, however, 
was not to be the full extent of the Amendment's guaran-
tee of freedom from governmental intrusion in matters of 
faith." 366 U. S., at 464-465 (footnotes omitted). 
The Framers' fear of governmental coercion in religious 
matters 11 stemmed from their awareness of how often in their 
own time governmental authority intruded into the religious 
sphere and led to unwanted conflict and oppression. See 
Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 431-432 (1962). Govern-
ment, Madison asserted, should not "employ Religion as an 
engine of Civil policy," 2 The Writings of James Madison 187 
(G. Hunt ed. 1901). Concurring in Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion, 397 U. S. 664, 694 (1970), Justice Harlan suggested that 
at stake 
"is preventing that kind of governmental involvement in 
religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead 
to strife and frequently strain a political system to the 
breaking point . . . . " 
11 The Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, an acknowledged antecedent of 
the First Amendment, proclaimed as one of its guiding principles that 
"no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship 
. . . nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body 
or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or 
beliefs .... " 12 Hening, Statutes of Virginia 84 (1823). 
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Government must not only guard against activity that im-
pinges on religious freedom, but it must take pains not to 
compel citizens to act in the name of any religion. Cf. 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714-717 (1977). The 
genius of the Religion Clauses preserves the Framers' 
"awareness of the historical fact that governmentally estab-
lished religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand." 
Engle, supra, at 432. Concurring in McGowan, supra, at 
460, Justice Frankfurter pointed to 
"the long colonial struggle for disestablishment [was] the 
struggle to free all men, whatever their theological 
views, from state-compelled obligation to acknowledge 
and support state-favored faiths." 
c 
This history of accommodating all religious exercise while 
guarding against governmental efforts to press any religion 
on the people counsels a ainst rigid rules under the Estab-
lishment Clause. In the recent erm we emphasized that 
"[i]n our modern, complex society, whose traditions and con-
stitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity and 
pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in applying the 
Establishment Clause is simplistic and has been uniformly re-
jected by this Court." vLynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. --, 
-- (1984); see, e. g., Walz, supra, at 671. 
In setting the appropriate boundaries in Establishment 
Clause cases, the Court has referred o emon for a conve-
nient shorthand of "the cumu a 1ve criteria eveloped by the 
Court over many years." 403 U. S., at 612. However, the 
Court has repeatedly rejected the concept that "any single 
test or criterion" provides the touchstone for resolving 
Establishment Clause cases, see, e. g., Lynch, supra, at 
--; id., at--, n. 1 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); id., at 
--, n. 2 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); the Court has ex-
pres ch ac rized Lemon as establishing "'no more tlPan 
[a] helpful signpos 1sliment Clause --
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challenges," Mueller v. Allen, -- U. S. --, -- (1983) 
(quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 741 (1973)). 12 
Our recent decision in Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, suggests 
the lim_ite~y~of fixed tests in that category of cases 
where the Court -mus~whether a particular govern-
mental accommodation of religion violates the prohibition 
against the establishment of religion. As Lynch makes 
clear, the effort to accommodate religion may have pre-
dominantly nonsecular purposes and even may encourage and 
foster religion. By definition efforts toward accommodation 
inevitably implicate consideration of religious factors; such 
consideration, however, does not necessarily contravene the 
Establishment Clause, as Lynch demonstrates. See also 
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1943). To pigeonhole 
analysis in all cases into fixed inquiries may well obscure 
rather than illuminate the sensitive issues surrounding ac-
commodation of religion. Cf. Lynch, supra, at-- (O'CON-
NOR, J., concurring). No single "test" or formula fits every 
case raising Establishment Clause questions. Courts must ) 
look beyond the rhetoric of any single approach to determine 
whether the values protected by the Religion Clauses have 
been offended. 
When a court considers the extent to which government 
may accommodate religion, the focus must be on the core 
objectives of the Relig!o Clauses themselves: is the Clial-
lenged action a s ep owar e establishment of a religion by ? 
or with the approval of government, o~sub­
stantially impair the free exercise of religion. Thus, the 
12 Where a mechanistic inquiry obscures rather than illuminates the con-
cerns underlying the Establishment Clause, the Court has not hesitated to 
proceed along different lines. In Marsh v. Chambers , supra, for example, 
the Court did not consider the Lemon analysis relevant in determining the 
validity of state-sponsored legislative prayer. Although Lemon was dis-
cussed in Larson v. Valente , 456 U. S. 228, 251-255 (1982), the Court did 
not find the Lemon criteria particularly useful where there was substantial 
evidence of overt discrimination against particular types of religious 
groups. 
83-ll~OPINION 
10 ESTATE OF THORNTON v. CALDOR, INC. 
government may neither coerce or induce adherence to any 
religion, nor compel conduct to conform to a religious creed 
or practice. This circumscribed scope of accommodation ful-
fills the Constitutional purpose "to promote and assure the 
fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all 
and to nurture the conditions which secure the best hope of 
attainment of that end." Abington School District v. 
Schempp, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
III 
The challenged statute guarantees every employee, who 
"states th~ a paf€Icuh1r day of the week is observed as his 
Sabbath," the right not to work on his chosen day. Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b). In the view of the legislature a Sab-
bath observer should not be forced to choose between com-
promising a religious conviction and jeopardizing a job. In 
short, the State has decreed that a person who observes one 
day of the week as a matter of religious conviction must be 
relieved of any contract duty to work on that day, without 
regard to the urdens or inconvenience this imposes Onthe 
e ~r fello workers. We cannot accep t e sugges-
tion hat the statute oes not arm Sabbath observers with an 
absolute and unqualified right not to work on their desig-
nated Sabbath. Such a reading of Section 53-303e(b) contra-
dicts the unambiguous wording of the statute and ignores the 
statute's construction by the Connecticut authorities en-
trusted with this task, including the State's highest court. 18 
13 The State Board of Mediation and Arbitration construed the statute as 
providing Thornton with the absolute right not to work on his Sabbath. 
Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, Conn. Bd. Arb. & Med. No. 7980-A-727 (Oct. 
20, 1980), J. A. lla-12a; accord, G. Fox & Co. v. Rinaldi, Conn. Bd. Arb. 
& Med. No. 8182-A-440 (Nov. 17, 1982) ("There is no question that ... the 
employee has an absolute right to designate any day of the week as his or 
her sabbath [and that Section 53-303e(b) would be violated if] the termina-
tion was as a result of the employee's refusal to work on her sabbath."). 
Following settled state law, see, e. g. , Bruno v. Department of Consumer 
Protection, 190 Conn. 14, 18, 458 A. 2d 685, 688 (1983) (per curiam), the 
State Superior Court and the Supreme Court of Connecticut adopted the 
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This case does not bear on the constitutionality of the reli-
gious accommodation provisions of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and its various state counterparts. In 
1972, Congress amended Title VII, which outlawed employ-
ment discrimination based on an individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin. As amended, Title VII re-
quires employers only "to reasonably accommodate" an 
employee's religious observances an prac Ices w en so doing 
does not cause "undue hardship on the conduct of the employ-
er's business," 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e(j) and 2000e-2(a)(l). A 
number of states have comparable legislation. 14 The 
Connecticut statute, however, goes beyond the "accommoda-
tion" laws currently in force; the commands of Section 
303e(b) are absolute and unqualified. 15 ~ 
In essence, the Connecticut statute imposes on some peo-
ple an absolute duty to conform their conduct and business 
practices to the religious practices of others; it enforces 
Board's construction of the statute, Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 
336, 340-343, 350, 464 A. 2d 785, 789-790, 794 (1983). This construction of 
the state law is, of course, binding on federal courts. E. g., Brown v. 
Ohio, 432 U. S. 161, 167 (1977); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, 169 
(1961); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875). 
1
' See, e. g., Alaska Stat. § 18.80.200 (1983); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 41-1461(6), 41-1463 (1956); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1-570, 45-19-22 (1982); 
Iowa Code Ann. § 601A.6(1)(a) (West 1975); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.030(5) 
(1975); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4572(1)(A) (1979); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 
151B, § 4.1A (Law. Co-op. 1976); S. C. Code Ann. § 1-13-30(k) (Law. Co-
op. 1976); Tex. Ann. Civ. St. art. 5221k, §§ 1.01, 2.01(13), 5.01 (Vernon 
Supp. 1984); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.337 (West Supp. 1983). 
After the Connecticut Supreme Court invalidated Section 53-303e(b), 
the Connecticut legislature enacted a statute prohibiting religious dis-
crimination in employment that precisely tracks the language of Title VII. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-51(18). The legislature, however, did not repeal 
Section 53-303e(b), which indicates that Sabbath observers have an abso-
lute right not to work on their Sabbath. 
16 The United States, as amicus curiae, acknowledges that "[i]fthere is a 
constitutional defect in Section 53-303e(b), it is its absolute character-a 
character that Title VII and the parallel state statutes do not share." 
Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae at 24. 
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observance of whatever religious holiday the employee desig-
nates. The State thus commands that Sabbath religious con-
cerns automatically trump all secular and other religious in-
terests at the workplace; the statute takes no account of the 
convenience or interests of the employer or those of other 
employees who do not observe a Sabbath. The employer 
and others must adjust their affairs to the command of the 
State whenever the statute is invoked by an employee. 1 
There is no exception under the statute for special circum-
stances, such as the Friday Sabbath observer employed in an 
activity, such as school with a Monday through Friday sched-
ule; the statute provides for no special consideration if a high 
percentage of an employer's workforce asserts rights to the 
same day off; and there is no exception to take account of em-
ployers whose work schedules reflect their own religious 
practices. In addition, there is no exception when following 
the dictates of Sabbath observers would cause the employer 
substantial economic burdens or when the employer's compli-
ance would require the imposition of significant burdens on 
other employees who must work in place of the Sabbath ob-
servers.16 Finally, the statute allows for no consideration as 
to whether the employer has made reasonable accommoda-
tion proposals. This unyielding weighting in favor of Sab-
16 Section 53-303e(b) gives Sabbath observers the valuable right to des-
ignate a particular weekly day off-typically a weekend day, widely prized 
as a day off. Other employees who have strong and legitimate, but non-
religious reasons for wanting a weekend day off have no rights under the 
statute. For example, those employees who have earned the privilege 
through seniority to have weekend days off may be forced to surrender this 
privilege to the Sabbath observer; years of service and payment of "dues" 
at the workplace simply cannot compete with the Sabbath observer's abso-
lute right under the statute. Similarly, those employees who would like a 
weekend day off, because that is the only day their spouses are also not 
working, must take a back seat to the Sabbath observer. As explained 
infra, the Establishment Clause does not permit the state to coerce per-
sons' conduct in such a direct and absolute manner in order to facilitate the 
religious practices of others. 
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bath observers over all other interests contravenes a funda-
mental principle of the Religion Clauses: 
"The First Amendment ... gives no one the right to in-
sist that in pursuit of their own interests others must 
conform their conduct to his own religious necessities." 
Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F. 2d 58, 61 (CA2 
1953) (L. Hand, J.). 
The government may insist that religion be treated in a 
spirit of accommodation, but accommodation is just that-a 
reasonable balancing of all the competing interests involved, 
both secular and religious, see, e. g., United States v. Lee, 
455 u. s. 252 (1982). 
Connecticut singles out Sabbath observance and commands 
that all such observance override every other legitimate 
interest of employers and employees alike. Any conflict be-
tween Sabbath observance and other interests is resolved 
mandatorily under the statute; the State lends its power ex-
clusively to the religious practice of the demanding employee. 
This goes well beyond acknowledging religion's place as an 
aspect of our society's "diversity and pluralism," Lynch, 
465 U. S., at--, and leaves no "play in the joints," Walz, 
397 U. S., at 669, for other substantial secular and religious 
values. ( 
We conclude, therefore, that the Connecticut statute's ab-
solute mandate constitutes governmental coercion of conduct 
on behalf of particular religious a~
The Court's holdings in Sherbert and Thomas on the one 
hand, and the Connecticut statute on the other, as in so many 
cases arising under the Religion Clauses, calls for line draw-
ing. Distinguishing between cases falling next to the line on 
either side is often difficult, but lines must be drawn. See, 
e. g., United States v. Lee, supra; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 
U. S. 599 (1961). Sherbert and Thomas involved situations 
where the State was called upon to take steps to "accommo-
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date" religious observers in order to allow them the benefit of 
an unemployment insurance program open to all other unem-
ployed; the eligibility factor for that economic benefit coult 
not be made to rest on a religious conviction or practice. 17 
Under such circumstances the Religion Clauses require the 
accommodation to avoid a state-created conflict between af-
firmative governmental action and free exercise of religious 
beliefs. 18 Those holdings carried accommodation to its outer 
limits. 
Such accommodation for religious observers or religious in-
stitutions from governmental coercion has been long recog-
nized by the Court. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 
437 (1971), for example, the Court rejected an Establishment 
Clause challenge to statutory provisions exempting religious 
and conscientious objectors from the draft. The Court con-
cluded that such an exemption was "in line with 'our happy 
17 See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972), where the Court 
held that the state must exempt Amish children from compulsory school 
attendance laws in order to allow the Amish to exercise their religious be-
liefs. This did little more than states have done with respect to church-
sponsored elementary schools. All such non-public mandatory education 
must meet State standards. 
18 Sherbert explained that the Free Exercise Clause's requiring the state 
to dole out benefits to religious employees did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause because the state was merely fulfilling its "obligation of neu-
trality in the face of religious differences." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398, 409 (1963). This reasoning was expressly affirmed in Thomas v. 
Review Board, 450 U. S. 707, 720 (1981). 
As is evident from the tension inherent in the Religion Clauses, see, 
e. g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. --, ----- (1984); Wale v. Tax 
Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668-669 (1970). The state's adhering to the 
constitutional command of one Clause does not readily create a violation of 
its counterpart. This is especially true where the state's efforts draw no 
lines with respect to particular religions and where the state's actions are 
motivated for reasons wholly divorced from religious ones. In the end, it 
should come as no surprise that the Establishment Clause's concern that 
government refrain from endorsing or coercing adherence to religion is 
implicated only slightly, if at all, where the state administers an unemploy-
ment benefits program consistent with the Free Exercise Clause. 
... 
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tradition' of 'avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates 
of conscience."' !d., at 453 (quoting United States v. Macin-
tosh, 283 U. S. 605, 634 (1931) (Hughes, C. J., dissenting)). 
Similarly, as the Court held in Walz, supra, the Establish-
ment Clause did not forbid the granting of a property tax ex-
emption to all churches. The exemption "simply spar[ed] 
the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation 
levied on private profit institutions," 397 U. S., at 673, and 
avoided tensions between governmental power and religious 
institutions. See also Mueller v. Allen, supra; Braunfeld v. 
Brown, supra. 
Our prior holdings relied on a careful balancing of two 
overriding factors: the governmen~m­
ma~ee Exercise Clause to eliminate a burden cre-
ated by governmental action; moreover, the Establishment 
Clause's concern with governmental advancement or coercion 
of conduct on behalf of religion was not seriously at issue. 
Section 53-303e(b) offers a strikingly different situation. In 
enforcing the statute, Connecticut coercively burdens a host 
of others to conform their conduct in order to facilitate the 
religious activity of Sabbath observers. Far from prevent-
ing its own programs from unnecessarily burdening religious I 
exercise, the State is reaching out into the private sector to 
compel absolute deference to a certain religious practice-
this goes beyond accommodation. 
The Connecticut statute, unlike governmental actions up-
held in our holdings, co~!_:avenes ~ore __principle of the 
Establishmen Clause that the government may not compel 
private parties to con orm e1r con uct and su ordmate 
their own eg~timate interests to e religious needs of 
others. At the same time, the statute takes this impermissi-
ble step where there is no equally competing constitutional 
need of avoiding governmental coercion of religious activity. 
See, e. g., Sherbert, 374 U. S., at 406-409; Braunfeld, supra, 
at 603-604. 
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v - J.-1-/. ~ '.,1 
C
~~r~·; 
We hold that the Connecticut statut hich provides Sab-
bath observers with an absolute and u q alified right not to 
work on their Sabbath, constitutes impermissible govern-
mental coercion of private conduct on behalf of religion in 
violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut is 
affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
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ESTATE OF DONALD E. THORNTON AND 
CONNECTICUT, PETITIONERS v. 
CALDOR, INC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF CONNECTICUT 
[May -, 1985] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether a State statute 
that provides employees with the absolute right not to work 
on their chosen Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. 
I 
In early 1975, petitioner's decedent Donald E. Thornton 1 
began working for respondent Caldor, Inc., a chain of New 
England retail stores; he managed the men's and boys' cloth-
ing department in respondent's Waterbury, Connecticut, 
store. At that time, respondent's Connecticut stores were 
closed on Sundays pursuant to state law. Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§§ 53-300 to 53-303 (1975 ed.). 
In 1977, following the state legislature's revision of the 
Sunday-closing laws, 2 respondent opened its Connecticut 
'Thornton died on February 4, 1982, while his appeal was pending be-
fore the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The administrator of Thornton's 
estate has continued the suit on behalf of the decedent's estate. 
1 The state legislature revised the Sunday-closing laws in 1976 after a 
state court held that the existing laws were unconstitutionally vague. 
State v. Anony11WU8, 33 Conn. Supp. 55, 364 A. 2d 244 (C. P. 1976). The 
legislature modified the laws to permit certain classes of businesses to re-
• main open. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-302a (1976 ed.). At the same time, a 
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stores for Sunday business. In order to handle the ex-
panded store hours, respondent required its managerial 
employees to work every third or fourth Sunday. Thornton, 
a Presbyterian who observed Sunday as his Sabbath, initially 
complied with respondent's demand and worked a total of 31 
Sundays in 1977 and 1978. In October 1978, Thornton was 
transferred to a management position in respondent's Tor-
rington store; he continued to work on Sundays during the 
first part of 1979. In November 1979, however, Thornton 
informed respondent that he would no longer work on Sun-
days because he observed that day as his Sabbath; he in-
voked the protection of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b), which 
provides: 
"No person who states that a particular day of the week 
is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his em-
ployer to work on such day. An employee's refusal to 
work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his 
dismissal." 3 
new provision was added,§ 53-303e, which prohibited employment of more 
than six days in any calendar week and guaranteed employees the right not 
to .work on the Sabbath of their religious faith. See n. 3, infra. Soon 
after the revised Sunday-closing law was enacted, the Court of Common 
Pleas once again declared it unconstitutional. State v. Anonymous, 33 
Conn. Supp. 141, 366 A. 2d 200 (C. P. 1976). This decision was limited to 
the provision requiring Sunday closing, § 53-302a; the court did not con-
sider the validity of other provisions such as § 53-303e. In 1978, the state 
legislature tried its hand at enacting yet another Sunday-closing law, Pub. 
Act No. 78-329, 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts 700-702; the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut declared the statute unconstitutional. Caldor's Inc. v. Bed-
ding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 417 A. 2d 343 (1979). As had the Court of 
Common Pleas, the Connecticut Supreme Court did not address the con-
stitutionality of § 53-303e and that provision remained in effect until chal-
lenged in this action. 
• Thornton had learned of this statutory protection by consulting with 
an attorney. See J. A. 88a-90a. 
Section 53-303e was enacted as part of the 1976 revision of the Sunday-
closing laws. Apart from the six-day week and the Sabbath-observance 
provisions, see n. 2, supra, the remainder of the statute provides: 
' 
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Thornton rejected respondent's offer either to transfer him 
to a management job in a Massachusetts store that was 
closed on Sundays, or to transfer him to a nonsupervisory 
position in the Torrington store at a lower salary. 4 In 
March 1980, respondent transferred Thornton to a clerical 
position in the Torrington store; Thornton resigned two days 
later and filed a grievance with the State Board of Mediation 
and Arbitration alleging that he was discharged from his 
manager's position in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §53-
303e(b). 
Respondent defended its action on the ground that Thorn-
ton had not been "discharged" within the meaning of the stat-
ute; respondent also urged the Board to find that the statute 
violated Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution as well as 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
After holding an evidentiary hearing the Board evaluated 
the sincerity of Thornton's claim and concluded it was based 
on a sincere religious conviction; it issued a formal decision 
sustaining Thornton's grievance. The Board framed the sta-
tutory issue as follows, "[i]f a discharge for refusal to work 
Sunday hours occurred and Sunday was the Grievant's Sab-
bath . . . , " § 53-303e(b) would be violated; ·the Board held 
that respondent had violated the statute by "discharg[ing] 
Mr. Thornton as a management employee for refusing to 
"(c) Any employee, who believes that his discharge was in violation of 
subsection (a) or (b) of this section may appeal such discharge to the state 
board of mediation and arbitration. If said board finds that the employee 
was discharged in violation of said subsection (a) or (b), it may order what-
ever remedy will make the employee whole, including but not limited to 
reinstatement to his former or a comparable position. 
"(d) No employer may, as a prerequisite to employment, inquire 
whether the applicant observes any Sabbath. 
"(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall not be 
fined more than two hundred dollars." -
'The collective bargaining agreement in effect for nonsupervisory em-
ployees provided that they were not required to work on Sundays if it was 
"contrary [to the employee's] personal religious convictions." J. A. 9la. 
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work [on] Thornton's ... Sabbath." J. A. lla, 12a. 
The Board ordered respondent to reinstate Thornton with 
back pay and compensation for lost fringe benefits. 5 The 
Superior Court, in affirming that ruling, concluded that the 
statute did not offend the Establishment Clause. 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, holding the 
statute did no ave a c ear secular purpose." Caldor, Inc. 
v. Thornton~. 33~d 785, 792 (1983). 6 
By authorizing each employee to designate his own Sabbath 
as a day off, the statute evinced the "unmistakable purpose 
. . . [of] allow[ing] those persons who wish to worship on a 
particular day the freedom to do so." !d., at 349, 464 A. 2d, 
at 792. The court then held that the "primarr eff~ct" of the 
statute was to advance religion; the statute "confers its 'ben-
efit' on an explicit! religious basis. Only tliose employees 
who a e a a a are en 1 led not to work on that par-
ticular day, and may not be penalized for so doing." !d., at 
350, 464 A. 2d, at 794. The court noted that the statute re-
quired the State Mediation Board to decide which religious 
activities may be characterized as an "observance of Sab-
bath" in order to assess employees' sincerity, and concluded 
that this type of inquiry is "exactly the type of 'comprehen-
sive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance' . . . 
which creates excessive governmental entanglements be-
tween churcll' and state." !d., at 351, 464 A. 2d, at 794 
(quotingt.Cemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 619 (1971)). 
We granted certiorari, - U.S. - (1984). 7 We 
affirm. 
'The Board refused to consider respondent's constitutional challenge on 
the ground that, as a quasi-judicial body, it had no authority to pass on the 
constitutionality of state law. J. A. 9a-10a. 
• The court expressly chose not to consider whether the statute violated 
Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution. Caldar, Inc. v. Tlwrnton, 191 
Conn. 336, 346, n. 7, 464 A. 2d 785, 792, n. 7 (1983). 
'We also granted the State of Connecticut's motion to intervene as of 
right to defend the constitutionality of the state law. 
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II 
A 
Petitioner and the State of Connecticut assert that deci-
sions such as Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), and 
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U. S. 707 (1981), which recog-
nized the government's duty to take account of the special 
needs of religious observers, insulate the Connecticut statute 
from constitutional attack. In Sherbert, a Seventh-day 
Adventist lost her job because she would not work on Satur-
day, her Sabbath. Similarly, in Thomas, a Jehovah's Wit-
ness lost employment after refusing to participate in the pro-
duction of armaments, an activity contrary to the tenets of 
his faith. 
In each of these cases the Free Exercise Clause was held to 
require the State to extend unemployment benefits to these 
persons who, having lost their jobs as a result of their refusal 
to compromise their religious practices at the workplace, 
were not able to secure employment. Sherbert, 374 U. S., at 
410; Thomas, 450 U. S., at 718-719. 
The State must provide the religious employee with the 
benefits of "an otherwise available public program," avail-
able to all, id., at 716; the Free Exercise Clause prohibited 
the State from unduly burdening the employee's exercise of 
religion. In other words, the State could not exclude .the 
employee from participating in the governm~am­
receipt of unemployment compensation-because unemploy-
mentresul~~eligious beliefs. 
B 
The First Amendment's guarantee against the "establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" 
turned away from the tradition of government-supported re-
ligions long prevalent in Europe. 8 Acknowledgment and 
8 In Blackstone's words, for example, ''the civil magistrate ... is bound 
indeed to protect the established church: and, if this can be better effected, 
by admitting none but its genuine members to offices of trust and emolu-
' . 
,~ ~ , ',"f 
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~~modation 1of religion have been closely identified with 
o ~nning at the Constitutional Convention and 
notably in actions taken in the first days of the First Con-
gress. See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 
(1983). 9 Since the colonial era, our society has set aside 
Sunday as a common day of rest and religious observance. 10 
Reviewing the history of "Sunday Closing Laws" extant in 
the colonies in 1787 when the Constitution was drafted and 
debated, and when the First Amendment was adopted in 
1791, this Court recognized the "strongly religious origin of 
these laws." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 433 
(1961). 
Throughout our entire history there has been widespread 
acceptance of having one day of the· week set aside for wor-
ship and pursuits other than labor. In McGowan, the Court 
rejected the contention that the religiousovertones of laws in 
vogue since the beginning of the Republic rendered them un-
constitutional. On the contrary, the Court held expressly 
that such laws were within constitutional bounds because 
they so a · ev a secular oal-providing a uniform day of 
rest for all, notwithstanding the widespread use of the day 
for religious worship. To conclude otherwise would "give a 
constitutional interpretation of hostility to the public welfare 
rather than one of mere separation of church and State." 
I d., at 445. r--·---- . 
The background of1accommodatio!fmd acknowledgment of 
religion must be weignea,-nowever, against an equally in-
structive lesson from history: that the Establishment Clause 
ment, he is certainly at liberty to do so . ... " 4 W. Blackstone, Com-
mentaries 52*. 
'In the space of a single week in the opening sessions of the First Con-
gress in 1789, paid chaplains were authorized for each House. See Marsh 
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,- (1983). 
10 In Connecticut, for example, laws requiring businesses to close on 
Sunday, the traditional Christian day of Sabbath, date back to 1656. The 
Earliest Laws of the New Haven and Connecticut Colonies 1639-1673, at 
47 (J. Cushing ed. 1977). 
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was intended to foreclose governmental compulsion o some 
of the people to support and facilitate the religious acfvities 
of others. Clearly all forms of direct, absolute coercion were 
proscribed. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Educatw n, 330 
U. S. 1, 8-16 (1947). Justice Frankfurter, concurring in 
McGowan, observed: 
"In assuring the free exercise of religion, the Framers 
of the First Amendment were sensitive to the then re-
cent history of those persecutions and impositions of civil 
disability with which sectarian majorities in virtually all 
of the Colonies had visited deviation in the matter of con-
science. This protection of unpopular creeds, however, 
was not to be the full extent of the Amendment's guaran-
tee of freedom from governmental intrusion in matters of 
faith." 366 U. S., at 464-465 (footnotes omitted). 
The Framers' fear of governmental coercion in religious 
matters 11 stemmed from their awareness of how often in their 
own time governmental authority intruded into the religious 
sphere and led to unwanted conflict and oppression. See 
Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 431-432 (1962). Govern-
ment, Madison asserted, should not "employ Religion as an 
engine of Civil policy," 2 The Writings of James Madison 187 
(G. Hunt ed. 1901). Concurring in Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion, 397 U. S. 664, 694 (1970), Justice Harlan suggested that 
at stake 
"is preventing that kind of governmental involvement in 
religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead 
. to strife and frequently strain a political system to the 
breaking point . . . . " 
11 The Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, an aclmowledged antecedent of 
the First Amendment, proclaimed as one of its guiding principles that 
"no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship 
... nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body 
or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or 
beliefs .... " 12 Hening, Statutes of Virginia 84 (1823). 
~ 
? 
. .1--: 
~.~X · ' ~,_ 
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Government must not only guard against activity that im-
pinges on religious freedom, but it must take pains not to 
compel citizens to act in the name of any religion. Cf. 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714-717 (1977). The 
genius of the Religion Clauses preserves the Framers' 
"awareness of the historical fact that governmentally estab-
lished religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand." 
Engle, supra, at 432. Concurring in McGowan, supra, at 
460, Justice Frankfurter pointed to 
"the long colonial struggle for disestablishment [that 
was] the struggle to free all men, whatever their theo-
logical views, from state-compelled obligation to ac-
knowledge and support state-favored faiths." 
c 
This history of accommodatin all religious exercise while 
guarding against gove e a efforts to press any religion 
on the people counsels agaJnst ri~d rules under the Estab-
lishment Clause."' 1 n tlie re~eni ·erm we empfiasiZed that 
"[i]if01lr1ii0{Iern, complex society, whose traditions and con-
stitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity and 
pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in applying the 
Establishment Clause is siiii'p1isbc ana lias 6een uniformly re-
jected by this Court." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. --, 
-- (1984); see, e. g., Walz, supra, at 671. 
In setting the appropriate boundaries in Establishment 
Clause cases, the Court has referred to Lemon for a conve-
nient shorthand of ''the cum ative cr1 er1a eve ope y the 
Co'UROvermany years." 403 U. S., at 612. However, the 
Court has repeatedly rejected the conce t at "an~ sin~e 
test or criterion" pro es t e touc stone for resolving 
~ 
Establishment 'tlause cases, se , e. g., ync , supra, at 
--; ~ 1 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); id., at 
--, n. 2 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Courts must look be-
yond the rhetoric of any single approach to determine 
-.:::::· ~ - -- ~ 
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whether the values protected by the Religion Clauses have 
been offended. 
When a court considers the extent to which government 
may ~ccommodate religion,"'the focus must be on the core ___.....____ 
objectives of the Religion Clauses themselves: is the chal-
lenged action a step toward the establishment of a religion by 
or with the approval of government, or does such action sub-
stantially impair the free exercise of religion. Thus, the 
government may neither coerce or induce adherence to any 
religion, nor compel conduct to conform to a religious creed 
or practice. This ciiJ.cumscribe~e of McommodatianJul-
fills the Constitutional purpose "to promote and assure the 
fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all 
and to nurture the conditions which secure the best hope of 
attainment of that end." Abington School District v. 
Schempp, 373 U. S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring). 
III 
The challenged statute guarantees every employee, who 
"states that a particular day of the week is observed as his 
Sabbath," the right not to work on his chosen day. Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b). In the view of the legislature, a 
Sabbath observer should not be forced to choose between 
compromising a religious conviction and jeopardizing a job. 
In short, the State has decreed that a person who observes 
one day of the week as a matter of religious conviction must 
be relieved of any contract duty to work on that day, without 
regard to the burdens or inconvenience this imposes on the 
employer or fellow workers. We cannot accept the· sugges-
tion that the statute does not arm Sabbath observers with an 
absolute and unqualified right not to work on their desig-
nated Sabbath. Such a reading of§ 53-303e(b) contradicts 
the unambiguous wording of the statute and ignores the stat-
ute's construction by the Connecticut authorities entrusted 
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with this task, including the State's highest court. 12 
This case does not bear on the constitutionalit of the reti-
tle of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and its various state counterparts. In 
1972, Congress amended Title VII, which outlawed employ-
ment discrimination based on an individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin. As amended, Title VII re-
quires employers only "to reasOnaolyaccommodate''iln 
empl~ervances and practiCeSwhen so doing 
does not cause "undue hardship on the conduct of the employ-
er's business," 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e(j) and 2000e-2(a)(1). A 
number of states have comparable legislation. 13 The 
u The State Board of Mediation and Arbitration construed the statute as 
providing Thornton with the absolute ri ht ot to work on his Sabbath. 
Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, Conn. . & Med. No. 0- - Oct. 
20, 1980), J. A. lla-12a; accord, G. Fox & Co. v. Rinaldi, Conn. Bd. Arb. 
& Med. No. 8182-A-440 (Nov. 17, 1982) ("There is no question that . .. the 
employee has an absolute right to designate any day of the week as his or 
her sabbath [and that § 53-303e(b) would be violated if] the termination 
was as a result of the employee's refusal to work on her sabbath"). Fol-
lowing settled state law, see, e. g., Bruno v. Department of Consumer 
Protection, 190 Conn. 14, 18, 458 A. 2d 685, 688 (1983) (per curiam), the 
State Superior Court and the Supreme Court of Connecticut adopted the 
Board's construction of the statute, Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 
336, 340-343, 350, 464 A. 2d 785, 789-790, 794 (1983). This construction of 
the state law is, of course, binding on federal courts. E. g., Braum v. 
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 167 (1977);~na, 368 U.S. 157, 169 
(1961); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875). 
usee, e. g., Alaska Stat. § 18.80.200 (1983); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 41-1461(6), 41-1463 (1956); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1-570, 45-19-22 (1982); 
Iowa Code Ann. § 601A.6(1)(a) (West 1975); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.030(5) 
(1975); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4572(1)(A) (1979); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 
151B, §4.1A (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.C. Code Ann.§ 1-13-30(k) (Law. Co-
op. 1976); Tex. Ann. Civ. St. art. 5221k, §§ 1.01, 2.01(13), 5.01 (Vernon 
Supp. 1984); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.337 (West Supp. 1983). 
Mter the Connecticut Supreme Court invalidated § 53-303e(b), the 
Connecticut legislature enacted a statute prohibiting religious discrimina-
tion in employment that precisely tracks the language of Title VII. Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 46a-51(18). The legislature, however, did not repeal 
I 
•. 
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Connecticut statute, however, goes beyond the "accommoda-
tion" laws currently in force; the coriiniands of § 303e(b) are 
absolute and unqualified. 1• -::::::=::::: ...----. 
!n essence, the COnnecticut statute imposes on some peo-
ple an absolute duty to conform their conduct and business 
practices~ to the religious practices of others; it enforces 
observance of whatever religious holiday the employee desig-
nates. The State thus commands that Sabbath religious con-
cerns automatically trump all secular and other reli · ous in-
terests at t e wo e; e statute t es no account of the 
converue~ts of the employer or those of other 
employees who do not observe a Sabbath. The employer 
and others must adjust their affairs to the command of the 
State whenever the statute is invoked by an employee. 
There is no exception under the statute for special circum-
stances, such as the Friday Sabbath observer employed in a 
school with a Monday through Friday schedule; the statute 
provides for no special consideration if a high percentage of 
an employer's workforce asserts rights to the same day off; 
and there is no exception to take account of employers whose 
work schedules reflect their own religious practices. In ad-
dition, there is no exception when following the dictates of 
Sabbath observers would cause the employer substantial eco-
nomic burdens or when the employer's compliance would re-
quire the imposition of significant burdens on other employ-
ees who must work in place of the Sabbath observers. 15 
§ 53-303e(b), which indicates that Sabbath observers have an absolute 
right not to work on their Sabbath. 
14 The United States, as amicus curiae, acknowledges that "[i]f there is a 
constitutional defect in Section 53-303e(b), it is its absolute character-a 
character that Title VII and the parallel state statutes do not share." 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 24. 
11 Section 53-303e(b) gives Sabbath observers the valuable right to des-
ignate a particular weekly day off-typically a weekend day, widely prized 
as a day off. Other employees who have strong and legitimate, but non-
religious reasons for wanting a weekend day off have no rights under the 
statute. For example, those employees who have earned the privilege 
... 
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Finally, the statute allows for no consideration as to whether 
the employer has made reasonable accommodation proposals. 
This unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over 
all other interests contravenes a fundamental principle of the 
Religion Clauses: 
"The First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to in-
sist that in pursuit of their own interests others must 
conform their conduct to his own religious necessities." 
Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F. 2d 58, 61 (CA2 
1953) (L. Hand, J. ). 
The government may insist that religion be treated in a 
spirit of accommodation, but accommodation is just that-a 
re~ of all the competing interests involved, 
both secular aruf religious, see, e. g., United States v. Lee, 
455 u. s. 252 (1982). 
Connecticut singles out Sabbath observance and commands 
that all such observance override every other legitimate 
interest of employers and employees alike. Any conflict be-
tween Sabbath observance and other interests is resolved 
mandatorily under the statute; the State lends its power ex-
clusively to the religious practice of the demanding employee. 
This goes well beyond acknowledging religion's place as an 
aspect of our society's "diversity and pluralism," Lynch, 
465 U. S., at--, and leaves no "play in the joints," Walz, 
397 U. S., at 669, for other substantial secular and religious 
values. 
through seniority to have weekend days off may be forced to surrender this 
privilege to the Sabbath observer; years of service and payment of "dues" 
at the workplace simply cannot compete with the Sabbath observer's abso-
lute right under the statute. Similarly, those employees who would like a 
weekend day off, because that is the only day their spouses are also not 
working, must take a back seat to the Sabbath observer. AB explained 
infra, the Establishment Clause does not permit the state to coerce per-
sons' conduct in such a direct and absolute manner in order to facilitate the 
religious practices of others . 
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The question thus becomes wh~e(b) has a~ 
~ct that impermissibly advances or inhibits religion. 
Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612. The operation of this statute goes 
beyond the "benevolent neutrality" that the Religion Clauses 
require. By giving to only those people who observe a 
workfree Sabbath as a religious practice the right to desig-
nate their own particular Sabbath as a non-working day, the 
State explicitly favors one traditional religious practice. 
The Sabbath observance which § 53-303e(b) advances is a 
central practice within three readily identifiable major reli-
gions: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. 16 Members of reli-
gious groups not included within the statute's protection, 
i. e., those persons belonging to Eastern religions such as 
Buddhism and Hinduism, may conclude that only certain Sab-
bath religions have received the State's imprimatur and en-
dorsement given the statute's inflexible mandate. See Gil-
lette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437, · 450 (1971); Lynch, 
supra, at-- (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). This is not the 
"accommodation" envisioned by the Religion Clauses; 
§ 53-303e(b), by compelling others to conform their conduct 
to the Sabbath observers', virtually "confer[s] [an] imprima-
tur of state approval on [particular] religious ... practices," 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274 (1981). 
Given its absolutist character, which automatically subor-
dinates the treatment of all secular interests to those of the 
Sabbath observers, § 53-303e(b)'s primary effect is to ad-
•• The Supreme Court of Connecticut rejected the argument that the 
statute uses the term "Sabbath" to mean simply a time of rest without any 
religious significance. Instead, that court construed § 53-303e(b) as desig-
nating that day of "rest and worship . . . specifically mandated by the te-
nets of a particular religion," namely Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. 
191 Conn., at 347-348, and nn. 8, 9, 464 A. 2d, 792-793, and nn. 8, 9. Ac-
cordingly, the arguments advanced in this Court that the statute protects 
all religious groups equally and favors no particular religion are 
disingenuous. 
.. '' ,.. 
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vance a particular religious tenet, 17 and constitutes govern-
mental coercion of conduct on behalf of particular adherents, 
see, e. g., Abington School District, supra; Engle v. Vitale, 
supra. 
IV 
The Court's holdings in Sherbert and Thomas on the one 
hand, and the Connecticut statute on the other, as in so many 
cases arising under the Religion Clauses, call for line draw-
ing. Distinguishing between cases falling next to the line on 
either side is often difficult, but lines must be drawn. See, 
e. g., United States v. Lee, supra; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 
U. S. 599 (1961). Sherbert and Thomas involved situations 
where the State was called upon to take steps to "accommo-
date" religious observers in order to allow them the benefit of 
an unemployment insurance program open to all other unem-
ployed; the eligibility factor for that economic benefit could 
not be made to rest on a religious conviction or practice. 18 
Under such circumstances the Religion Clauses require the 
accommodation to avoid a state-created conflict between af-
finnative governmental action and free exercise of religious 
beliefs. 19 Those holdings carried accommodation to its outer 
limits. 
17 Our decisions make it abundantly clear that the Establishment Clause 
does not condemn all governmental efforts that may aid or advance reli-
gion. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (bus 
transportation); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968) (text-
book loans); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (property tax 
exemption); Mueller v. Allen,- U. S.- (1983) (tax deduction for tu-
ition transportation and textbook expenses). 
11 See also Wisconain v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), where the Court 
held that the state must exempt Amish children from compulsory school 
attendance laws in order to allow the Amish to exercise their religious be-
liefs. This did little more than states have done with respect to church-
sponsored elementary schools. All such non-public mandatory education 
must meet State standards. 
11 Sherbert explained that the Free Exercise Clause's requiring the state 
to dole out benefits to religious employees did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause because the state was merely fulfilling its "obligation of neu-
( 
,) 
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Such accommodation for religious observers or religious in-
stitutions from governmental coercion has been long recog-
nized by the Court. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 
437 (1971), for example, the Court rejected an Establishment 
Clause challenge to statutory provisions exempting religious 
and conscientious objectors from the draft. The Court con-
cluded that such an exemption was "in line with 'our happy 
tradition' of 'avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates 
of conscience.'" I d., at 453 (quoting United States v. M acin-
tosh, 283 U. S. 605, 634 (1931) (Hughes, C. J., dissenting)). 
Similarly, as the Court held in Walz, supra, the Establish-
ment Clause did not forbid the granting of a property tax ex-
emption to all churches. The exemption "simply spar[ed] 
the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation 
levied on private profit institutions," 397 U. S., at 673, and 
avoided tensions between governmental power and religious 
institutions. See also Mueller v. Allen, supra; Braunfeld v. 
Brown, supra. ---:-1 
Our prior ·holdings relied on ~ful bala~ of two 
1 
overriding factors: the government's adherence to the com-
mand of the Free Exercise Clause to eliminate a burden ere-
/
' ated by governmental action, and the absence of any substan-
tial Establishment Clause concern with governmental 
trality in the face of religious differences." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 
398, 409 (1963). This reasoning was expressly affinned in Thomas v. 
Review Board, 450 U. S. 707, 720 (1981). 
As is evident from the tension inherent in the Religion Clauses, see, 
e. g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465lJ. 5. ---, ... -- (1984); Walz v. Tax 
Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668-669 (1970), the state's adhering to the 
constitutional command of one Clause does not readily create a violation of 
its counterpart. This is especially true where the state's efforts draw no 
lines with respect to particular religions and where the state's actions are 
motivated for reasons wholly divorced from religious ones. In the end, it 
should come as no surprise that the Establishment Claus 's concern that 
government refrain from endorsing or rem a erence to religton is 
imp ca only slig tly, if at , w en the state admirusters an unemploy-
ment benefits p~ consistent with the Free Exercise Clause. 
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advancement or coercion of conduct on behalf of religion. 
§ 53-303e(b) offers a strikingly different situation. In en-
forcing the statute, Connecticut coercively burdens a host of 
others to conform their conduct in order to facilitate the reli-
gious activity of Sabbath observers. Far from preventing 
its own programs from unnecessarily burdening religious ex-
ercise, the State is reaching out into the private sector to 
compel absolute deference to a certain religious practice-
this goes beyond accommodation. 
The Connecticut statute, unlike governmental actions up-
held in our holdings, contravenes a core principle of the 
Establishment Clause that the government may not compel 
private parties to conform their conduct and subordinate 
their own legitimate interests to the religious needs of 
others. At the same time, the statute takes 1m erm~ssi-
ble step where ther is o equ l om etin constitutional ? 
need o av01 in governmenta coercion of reli 'ous activity. 
See, e. g. , bert, 374 . S., at -409; Braunfel , supra, 
at 603-604. 
v 
We hold that the Connecticut statute, which provides Sab-
1 bath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to 
I work on their Sabbath, is an impermissible advancement of religion and constitutes governmental coercion of private conduct on behalf of religion in violation of the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. The judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Connecticut is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
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We granted certiorari to decide whether a state statute 
that provides employees with the absolute right not to work 
on their chosen Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. 
I 
In early 1975, petitioner's decedent Donald E. Thornton 1 
began working for respondent Caldor, Inc., a chain of New 
England retail stores; he managed the men's and boys' cloth-
ing department in respondent's Waterbury, Connecticut, 
store. At that time, respondent's Connecticut stores were 
closed on Sundays pursuant to state law. Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§§ 53-300 to 53-303 (1958). 
In 1977, following the state legislature's revision of the 
Sunday-closing laws, 2 respondent opened its Connecticut 
'Thornton died on February 4, 1982, while his appeal was pending be-
fore the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The administrator of Thornton's 
estate has continued the suit on behalf of the decedent's estate. 
1 The state legislature revised the Sunday-closing laws in 1976 after a 
state court held that the existing laws were unconstitutionally vague. 
State v. Anonymous, 33 Conn. Supp. 55, 364 A. 2d 244 (Com. Pl. 1976). 
The legislature modified the laws to permit certain classes of businesses to 
remain open. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-302a (Supp. 1962-1984). At the 
same time, a new provision was added, § 53-303e, which prohibited em-
•' .· 
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stores for Sunday business. In order to handle the ex-
panded store hours, respondent required its managerial 
employees to work every third or fourth Sunday. Thornton, 
a Presbyterian who observed Sunday as his Sabbath, initially 
complied with respondent's demand and worked a total of 31 
Sundays in 1977 and 1978. In October 1978, Thornton was 
transferred to a management position in respondent's Tor-
rington store; he continued to work on Sundays during tlie 
first part of 1979. In November 1979, however, Thornton 
informed respondent that he would no longer work on Sun-
days because he observed that day as his Sabbath; he in-
voked the P,lJ?~E}~t~on of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b) (Supp. 
1962-1984),1provi(les: 
"No person who states that a particular day of the week 
is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his em-
ployer to work on such day. An employee's refusal to 
work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his 
dismissal." 3 
ployment of more than six days in any calendar week and guaranteed em-
ployees the right not to work on the Sabbath of their religious faith. See 
n. 3, infra. Soon after the revised Sunday-closing law was enacted, the 
Court of Common Pleas once again declared it unconstitutional. State v. 
Anonymous, 33 Conn. Supp. 141, 366 A. 2d 200 (1976). This decision was 
limited to the provision requiring Sunday closing, § 53-302a; the court did 
not consider the validity of other provisions such as § 53-303e. In 1978, 
the state legislature tried its hand at enacting yet another Sunday-closing 
law, Pub. Act No. 78-329, 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts 700-702; the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut declared the statute unconstitutional. Caldor's Inc. 
v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 417 A. 2d 343 (1979). As had the 
Court of Common Pleas, the Connecticut Supreme Court did not address 
the constitutionality of§ 53-303e and that provision remained in effect until 
challenged in this action. 
1 Thornton had learned of this statutory protection by consulting with 
an attorney. See App. 88a-90a. 
Section 53-303e was enacted as part of the 1976 revision of the Sunday-
closing laws. Apart from the 6-day w~k and the Sabbath-observance 
provisions, see n. 2, supra, the remainder of the statute provides: 
"(c) Any employee, who believes that his discharge was in violation of 
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Thornton rejected respondent's offer either to transfer him 
to a management job in a Massachusetts store that was 
closed on Sundays, or to transfer him to a nonsupervisory 
position in the Torrington store at a lower salary. 4 In 
March 1980, respondent transferred Thornton to a clerical 
position in the Torrington store; Thornton resigned two days 
later and filed a grievance with the State Board of Mediation 
and Arbitration alleging that he was discharged from his 
manager's position in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §53-
303e(b). 
Respondent defended its action on the ground that Thorn-
ton had not been "discharged" within the meaning of the stat-
ute; respondent also urged the Board to find that the statute 
violated Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution as well as 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
After holding an evidentiary hearing the Board evaluated 
the sincerity of Thornton's claim and concluded it was based 
on a sincere religious conviction; it issued a formal decision 
sustaining Thornton's gri~vance. The Board framed the 
statutory issue as follows, "[i]f a discharge for refusal to work 
Sunday hours occurred and Sunday was the Grievant's Sab-
bath ... ," § 53-303e(b) would be violated; the Board held 
that respondent had violated the statute by "discharg[ing] 
Mr. Thornton as a management employee for refusing to 
work ... [on] Thornton's ... Sabbath." App. lla, 12a. 
subsection (a) or (b) of this section may appeal such discharge to the state 
board of mediation and arbitration. If said board finds that the employee 
was discharged in violation of said subsection (a) or (b), it may order what-
ever remedy will make the employee whole, including but not limited to 
reinstatement to his former or a comparable position. 
"(d) No employer may, as a prerequisite to employment, inquire 
whether the applicant observes any Sabbath. 
"(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall not be 
fined more than two hundred dollars." 
• The collective bargaining agreement in effect for nonsupervisory em-
ployees provided that they were not required to work on Sundays if it was 
"contrary [to the employee's] personal religious convictions." App. 91a. 
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The Board ordered respondent to reinstate Thornton with 
backpay and compensation for lost fringe benefits. 5 The Su-
perior Court, in affirming that ruling, concluded that the 
statute did not offend the Establishment Clause. 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, holding the 
statute did not have a "clear secular purpose." Caldor, Inc. 
v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 349, 464 A. 2d 785, 793 (1983). 6 
By authorizing each employee to designate his own Sabbath 
as a day off, the statute evinced the "unmistakable purpose 
... [of] allow[ing] those persons who wish to worship on a 
particular day the freedom to do so." ld., at 349, 464 A. 2d, 
at 793. The court then held that the "primary effect" of the 
statute was to advance religion; the statute "confers its 'ben-
efit' on an explicitly religious basis. Only those employees 
who designate a Sabbath are entitled not to work on that par-
ticular day, and may not be penalized for so doing." ld., at 
350, 464 A. 2d, at 794. The court noted that the statute re-
quired the State Mediation Board to decide which religious 
activities may be characterized as an "observance of Sab-
bath" in order to assess employees' sincerity, and concluded 
that this type of inquiry is "exactly the type of 'comprehen-
sive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance' ... 
which creates excessive governmental entanglements be-
tween church and state." ld., at 351, 464 A. 2d, at 794 
(quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 619 (1971)). 
We granted certiorari, 465 U. S. -- (1984). 7 We affirm. 
'The Board refused to consider respondent's constitutional challenge on 
the ground that, as a quasi-judicial body, it had no authority to pass on the 
constitutionality of state law. Id., at 9a-10a. 
1 The court expressly chose not to consider whether the statute violated 
Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 
Conn. 336, 346, n. 7, 464 A. 2d 785, 792, n. 7 (1983). 
'We also granted the State of Connecticut's motion to intervene as of 
right to defend the constitutionality of the state law. 465 U. S. -
(1984). 
·' 
• . . 
·" . 
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II 
The First Amendment's guarantee against the "establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" 
turned away from the tradition of government-supported re-
ligions long prevalent in Europe. 8 Acknowledgment and 
accommodation of religion have been closely identified with 
our history, beginning at the Constitutional Convention and 
notably in actions taken in the first days of the First Con-
gress. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 787-788 
(1983). 9 Since the colonial era, our society has set aside 
Sunday as a common day of rest and religious observance. 10 
Reviewing the history of "Sunday Closing Laws" extant in 
the colonies in 1787 when the Constitution was drafted and 
debated, and when the First Amendment was adopted in 
1791, this Court has sustained such laws as having a valid 
secular purpose, notwithstanding the pervasive use of that 
day for religious worship. The Court acknowledged the 
"strongly religious origin of these laws." McGowan v . 
. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 433 (1961). To conclude otherwise 
would "give a constitutional interpretation of hostility to the 
public welfare rather than one of mere separation of church 
and State." I d., at 445. 
The background of accommodation and acknowledgment of 
religion must be weighed, however, against an equally in-
structive lesson from history: that the Establishment Clause 
8 In Blackstone's words, for example, "the civil magistrate ... is bound 
indeed to protect the established church: and, if this can be better effected, 
by admitting none but its genuine members to offices of trust and emolu-
ment, he is certainly at liberty to do so .... " 4 W. Blackstone, Com-
mentaries *52. 
• In the space of a single week in the opening sessions of the First Con-
gress in 1789, paid chaplains were authorized for each House. See Marsh 
v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 788 (1983). 
10 In Connecticut, for example, laws requiring businesses to close on 
Sunday, the traditional Christian day of Sabbath, date back to 1656. J. 
Cushing, The Earliest Laws of the New Haven and Connecticut Colonies 
1639-1673, p. 47 (1977). 
, 
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was intended to foreclose governmental compulsion of some 
of the people to support and facilitate the religious activities 
of others. Clearly all forms of direct, absolute coercion were 
proscribed. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U. S. 1, 8-16 (1947). Justice Frankfurter, concurring in 
McGowan, observed: 
. "In assuring the free exercise of religion, the Framers 
of the First Amendment were sensitive to the then re-
cent history of those persecutions and impositions of civil 
disability with which sectarian majorities in virtually all 
of the Colonies had visited deviation in the matter of con-
science. This protection of unpopular creeds, however, 
was not to be the full extent of the Amendment's guaran-
tee of freedom from governmental intrusion in matters of 
faith." 366 U. S., at 464-465 (footnotes omitted). 
The Framers' fear of governmental coercion in religious 
matters 11 stemmed from their awareness of how often in their 
own time governmental authority intruded into the religious 
sphere and led to unwanted conflict and oppression. See 
Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 431-432 (1962). Govern-
ment, Madison asserted, should not "employ Religion as an 
I 
engine of Civil policy," 2 Writings of James Madison 187 (G. 
Hunt ed. 1901). ' 
Government must not only guard against activity that im-
pinges on religious freedom, but it must take pains not to 
compel citizens to act in the name of any religion. Cf. 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714-717 (1977). The val-
ues of the Religion Clauses preserve the Framers' "aware-
ness of the historical fact that governmentally established re-
ligions and religious persecutions go hand in hand." Engle, 
11 The Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, an acknowledged antecedent of 
the First Amendment, proclaimed as one of its guiding principles that 
''no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship 
... nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body 
or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or 
beliefs .... " 12 W. Hening, Laws of Virginia 86 (1823). 
' 
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supra, at 432. Concurring in McGowan, supra, at 460, Jus-
tice Frankfurter pointed to 
"the long colonial struggle for disestablishment [that 
was] the struggle to free all men, whatever their theo-
logical views, from state-compelled obligation to ac-
knowledge and support state-favored faiths." 
In setting appropriate boundaries in Establishment Clause 
cases, the Court has frequently referred to our holding in 
Lemon for guidance in this sensitive area. This familiar 
three-part inquiry provides: 
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally the 
statute must not foster an excessive governmental en-
tanglement with religion." 403 U. S., at 612-613. 
Although Lemon provides no rigid, fixed formula applicable 
to all Establishment Clause cases, the criteria properly focus 
on whether the values protected by the Religion Clauses 
have been undermined. 
In considering the extent to which government may accom-
modate religion, we must answer the key question going to 
the core objectives of the Religion Clauses: is the challenged 
action a step toward the establishment of a religion by or 
with the approval of government or does such action substan-
tially impair the free exercise of religion? The government 
is neither to coerce nor induce adherence to any religion, nor 
is it to compel conduct conforming to any particular religious 
creed or practice; the Lemon criteria themselves are de-
signed generally to determine whether government has re-
spected this Constitutional tenet. This circumscribed scope 
of governmental action fulfills the Constitutional purpose "to 
promote and assure the fullest possible scope of religious lib-
erty and tolerance for all and to nurture the conditions which 
secure the best hope of attainment of that end." Abington 
I 
! 
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School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 305 (1963) (Gold-
berg, J., concurring). 
III 
Given the statute's particular operation, it is appropriate to 
consider§ 53-303e(b)'s validity under the second aspect of the 
Lemon inquiry, namely whether the statute has a primary ef 
feet that impermissibly advances or inhibits religion. Se, 
e. g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. 
756, 783, n. 39 (1973); Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612. Should 1 
statute fail to comply with any one of these criteria, 
Court need not inquire further. See, e. g., Stone v. G1 
ham, 449 U. S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam). 
The challenged statute guarantees every employee, who 
"states that a particular day of the week is observed as his 
Sabbath," the right not to work on his chosen day. Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b). In the view of the legislature, a 
Sabbath observer should not be forced to choose between 
compromising a religious conviction and jeopardizing a job. 
Here, in short, the State has decreed that a person wh<;> ob-
serves one day of the week as a matter of religious conviction 
must be relieved of any duty to work on that day, no matter 
what burden or inconvenience this imposes on the employer 
or fellow workers. Clearly the statute arms Sabbath ob-
servers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work 
on their designated Sabbath. Petitioner's reading of 
§ 53-303e(b) conflicts with the unambiguous wording of the 
statute and ignores the statute's construction by the 
Connecticut authorities entrusted with this task, including 
the State's highest court. 12 
11 The State Board of Mediation and Arbitration construed the statute as 
providing Thornton with the absolute right not to work on his Sabbath. 
Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, Conn. Bd. Med. & Arb. No. 7980-A-727 (Oct. 
20, 1980), App. lla-12a; accord, G. Fox & Co. v. Rinaldi, Conn. Bd. Med. 
& Arb. No. 8182-A-440 (Nov. 17, 1982) ("There is no question that ... the 
employee has an absolute right to designate any day of the week as his or 
her sabbath "and that § 53-303e(b) would be violated if" the termination 
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This case does not bear on the constitutionality of the reli-
gious ·accommodation provisions of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of i964 and its various state counterparts. In 
1972, Congress amended Title VII, which outlawed employ-
ment discrimination based on an individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin. As amended, Title VII re-
quires employers only "to reasonably accommodate" an 
employee's religious observances and practices when so doing 
does not cause "undue hardship on the conduct of the employ-
er's business," 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000eU) and 2000e-2(a)(l). A 
number of states have comparable legislation. 13 The Con-
necticut statute, however, goes beyond the "accommodation" 
laws currently in force; the commands of§ 53-303e(b) are ab-
solute and unqualified. 14 
was as a result of the employee's refusal to work on her sabbath"). Fol-
lowing settled state ll:\W, see, e. g., Bruno v. Department of Consumer 
Protection, 190 Conn. 14, 18, 458 A. 2d 685, 688 (1983) (per curiam), the 
State Superior Court and the Supreme Court of Connecticut adopted the 
Board's construction of the statute, Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 
336, 340-343, 350, 464 A. 2d 785, 789-790, 794 (1983). This construction of 
the state law is, of course, binding on federal courts. E. g. , Brown v. 
Ohio, 432 U. S. 161, 167 (1977); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, 169 
(1961); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875). 
11 See, e. g., Alaska Stat. § 18.80.200 (1981); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 41-1461(6), 41-1463 (1974); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1-570, 45-19-22 (2) 
(1982); Iowa Code § 601A.6(1)(a) (1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.030(5) (1983); 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. , Tit. 5, § 4572(1)(A) (1979); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. , 
ch. 151B, § 4.1A (1982); S. C. Code § 1-13-30(k) (Supp. 1984); Tex. Rev. 
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5221k, §§ 1.01, 2.01(13), 5.01 (Vernon Supp. 1984); 
Wis. Stat. § 111.337 (1981-1982). 
After the Connecticut Supreme Court invalidated § 53-303e(b), the 
Connecticut legislature enacted a statute prohibiting religious dis-
crimination in employment that precisely tracks the language of Title VII. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-51(18). The legislature, however, did not repeal 
§ 53-303e(b), which indicates that Sabbath observers have an absolute 
right not to work on their Sabbath. 
"The United States, as amicus curiae, acknowledges that "[i]fthere is a 
constitutional defect in Section 53-303e(b), it is its absolute character-a 
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In essence, the Connecticut statute imposes on employers 
and employees an absolute duty to conform their conduct and 
business practices to the religious practices of others; it en-
.. urces observance of whatever religious holiday the employee 
•ldlaterally designates. The State thus commands that Sab-
bath religious concerns automatically trump all secular and 
other religious interests at the workplace; the statute takes 
no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or 
those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath. 
The employer and others must adjust their affairs to the com-
mand of the State whenever the statute is invoked by an 
employee. 
There is no exception under the statute for special circum-
stances, such as the Friday Sabbath observer employed in an 
occupation with a Monday through Friday schedule-a school 
teacher, for example; the statute provides for no special con-
sideration if a high percentage of an employer's workforce as-
serts rights to the same Sabbath; and there is no exception to 
take account of employers whose work schedules reflect their 
own religious practices. Moreover, there is no exception 
when following the dictates of Sabbath observers would 
cause the employer substantial economic burdens or when 
the employer's compliance would require the imposition of 
significant burdens on other employees who must work in 
place of the Sabbath observers. 15 Finally, the statute allows 
character that Title VII and the parallel state statutes do not share." 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24. 
11 Section 53-303e(b) gives Sabbath observers the valuable right to des-
ignate a particular weekly day off-typically a weekend day, widely prized 
as a day off. Other employees who have strong and legitimate, but non-
religious reasons for wanting a weekend day off have no rights under the 
statute. For example, those employees who have earned the privilege 
through seniority to have weekend days off may be forced to surrender this 
privilege to the Sabbath observer; years of service and payment of "dues" 
at the workplace simply cannot compete with the Sabbath observer's abso-
lute right under the statute. Similarly, those employees who would like a 
weekend day off, because that is the only day their spouses are also not 
. ... 
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for no consideration as to whether the employer has made 
reasonable accommodation proposals. This unyielding 
weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all other inter-
es•'' •:o, l". tavenes a fundamental principle of the Religion 
Cl . ~< ses that: 
"The First Amendment ... gives no one the right to in-
sist that in pursuit of their own interests others must 
conform their conduct to his own religious necessities." 
Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F. 2d 58, 61 (CA2 
1953) (L. Hand, J.). 
Connecticut singles out Sabbath observance and commands 
that all such observance override every ather legitimate 
interest of employers and employees alike. Any conflict be-
tween Sabbath observance and other interests is resolved 
mandatorily under the statute; the State lends its power 
exclusively to the particular religious practice of the demand-
ing employee. This goes well beyond accommodation and 
acknowledging religion's place as an aspect of our society's 
"diversity and pluralism," Lynch, 465 U. S., at --, and 
leaves no "play· in the joints," Walz, 397 U. S., at 669, for 
other substantial secular and religious values. 
The Connecticut statute allocates a substantial and valu-
able benefit solely along relig;ous lines and imposes a burden 
on others who choose not to observe a Sabbath. The statute 
effectively arms Sabbath observers with the right to impose 
on others in order to practice their particular religious tenet. 
As such, the statute goes beyond having an incidental or 
remote effect of advancing religion. See, e. g., Roemer v. 
Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S. 736, 747 (1976); 
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968). On the 
contrary, the very operation of this provision makes it clear 
that § 53-303e(b) has a primary effect that impermissibly 
working, must take a back seat to the Sabbath observer. As explained 
infra, the Establishment Clause does not permit the State to coerce per-
sons' conduct in such a direct and absolute manner in order to facilitate the 
religious practices of others . 
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I 
advances a particular religious practice. Lemon, 403 U. S., 
at 612. 
I The operat.ion nf this statute goes beyond the "benevolent 
neutrality" ,, ',I, ch~ Religion Clauses require. By giving to 
only those 1.Je•)ple who observe a workfree Sabbath as a reli-
gious practice the right to designate their own particular 
Sabbath as a nonworking day, the State explicitly favors one 
traditional religious practice. The Sabbath observance 
which § 53-303e(b) advances is a central practice within three 
readily identifiable major religions: Christianity, Judaism, 
and Islam. 16 Members of religious groups not included 
within the statute's protection, i. e., those persons belonging 
to Eastern religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism may, 
not unreasonably, conclude that only certain Sabbath reli-
gions have received the State's imprimatur and endorsement 
given the statute's inflexible mandate. See Gillette v. 
United States, 401 U. S. 437, 450 (1971); Lynch, supra, at 
--(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). This is not the "accommo-
dation" envisioned by the Religion Clauses; § 53-303e(b), by 
compelling others to conform their conduct to the Sabbath 
observers', virtually "confer[s] [an] imprimatur of state ap-
proval on [particular] religi'ous ... practices," Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274 (1981). 
! 
Given its absolutist terms, which automatically subordi-
nate the treatment of all secular concerns to those of the Sab-
bath observers, § 53-303e(b), by coercing conduct on behalf of 
particular religious adherents, see, e. g., Abington School 
•• The Supreme Court of Connecticut rejected the argument that the 
statute uses the tenn "Sabbath" to mean simply a time of rest without any 
religious significance. Instead, that court construed § 53-303e(b) as desig-
nating that day of "rest and worship . . . specifically mandated by the te-
nets of a particular religion," namely Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. 
191 Conn., at 347-348, and nn. 8, 9, 464 A. 2d, 792-793, and nn. 8, 9. 
Accordingly, the arguments advanced in this Court that the statute pro-
tects all religious groups equally and favors no particular religion are 
disingenuous. 
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District, supra; Engle v. Vitale, supra, has the primary ef-
fect of advancing a particular religious tenet. 17 
rv 
Petitioner and the cace of Connecticut assert that deci-
sions such as Sherben v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), and 
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U. S. 707 (1981), which recog-
nized the government's duty to take account of the special 
needs of religious observers, insulate the Connecticut statute 
from constitutional attack. In Sherbert, a Seventh-day 
Adventist lost her job because she would not work on Satur-
day, her Sabbath. Similarly, in Thomas, a Jehovah's Wit-
ness lost employment after refusing to participate in the pro-
duction of armaments, an activity contrary to the tenets of 
his faith. 
In each of these cases the Free Exercise Clause was held to 
require the State to extend unemployment benefits to these 
persons who, having lost their jobs as a result of their refusal 
to compromise their religious practices at the workplace, 
were not able to secure employment. Sherbert, supra, at 
410; Thomas, 450 U. S., at 718-719. 
The State must provide the religious employee with the 
benefits of "an otherwise available public program," avail-
able to all, id., at 716; the Free Exercise Clause prohibited 
the State from unduly burdening the employee's exercise of 
religion. In other words, the State could not exclude the 
employee from participating in the government program-
receipt of unemployment compensation-because unemploy-
ment resulted from the employee's religious beliefs. 
The Court's holdings in Sherbert and Thomas on the one 
hand, and the Connecticut statute on the other, as in so many 
17 Our decisions make it abundantly clear that the Establishment Clause 
does not condemn all governmental action that has the effect of aiding reli-
gion. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (bus 
transportation); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968) (text-
book loans); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (property tax ex-
emption); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983) (tax deduction for tuition 
transportation and textbook expenses). 
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cases arising under the Religion Clauses, call for line draw-
ing. Distinguishing between cases falling next to the line on 
either side is often difficult, bnt. lin"'~ must be drawn. See, 
e. g., United States v. Lee, st '? ·ounfeld v. Brown, 366 
; u. s. 599 (1961). : .. 
~ ~ccommodation for religious observers or religious in-
stitutimis from governmental coercion has been long recog-
nized by the Court. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 
437 (1971), for example, the Court rejected an Establishment 
Clause challenge to statutory provisions exempting religious 
and conscientious objectors from the draft. The Court con-
cluded that such an exemption was "in line with 'our happy 
tradition' of 'avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates 
of conscience."' !d., at 453 (quoting United States v. Macin-
tosh, 283 U. S. 605, 634 (1931) (Hughes, C. J., dissenting)). 
Similarly, as the Court held in Walz, the Establishment 
Clause did not forbid the granting of a property tax exemp-
tion to all churches. That tax exemption "simply spar[ed] 
the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation 
levied on private profit institutions," 397 U.S., at 673, and ~ 
avoided tensions between g<?vernmental power and religious J 
institutions. In that sense it indeed aided all religions. See -
also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983); Braunfeld v. -;;;/)AA . .f /f'u. 0# 
Brown, supra. !fN _ ·- y V '~ f 
I 
As we have noted earlier, § 53-303e(b) offers a striking!~ p ~~, · J ()./J 
different situation. In enforcing the statute, Connecticut C( ~~ 1A_, 
ercively burdens a host of others to conform their conduct . lL(J.f~ -
order to facilitate the religious activity of Sabbath observer~. 
Far from preventing its own programs from unnecessarily 
burdening religious exercise, the State is reaching out into 
the private sector to compel absolute deference to a certain 
I 
religious practice-this goes beyond accommodation and con-
stitutes an impermissible advancement of a particular reli-
gious practice. 
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v 
We hold that the Connecticut statute, which provides Sab-
bath observers with an absolute and UD"""~ l:t:d right not to 
work on their Sabbath, violates the l~ · . rnent Clause 
of the First Amendment. The judgr t !. .1t of the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
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CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opm10n of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether a state statute 
that provides employees with the absolute right not to work 
on their chosen Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. 
I 
In early 1975, petitioner's decedent Donald E. Thornton 1 
began working for respondent Caldor, Inc., a chain of New 
England retail stores; he managed the men's and boys' cloth-
ing department in respondent's Waterbury, Connecticut, 
store. At that time, respondent's Connecticut stores were 
closed on Sundays pursuant to state law. Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§§ 53-300 to 53-303 (1958). 
In 1977, following the state legislature's revision of the 
Sunday-closing laws, 2 respondent opened its Connecticut 
1 Thornton died on February 4, 1982, while his appeal was pending be-
fore the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The administrator of Thornton's 
estate has continued the suit on behalf of the decedent's estate. 
'The state legislature revised the Sunday-closing laws in 1976 after a 
state court held that the existing laws were unconstitutionally vague. 
State v. Anonymous, 33 Conn. Supp. 55, 364 A. 2d 244 (Com. Pl. 1976). 
The legislature modified the laws to permit certain classes of businesses to 
remain open. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-302a (Supp. 1962-1984). At the 
same time, a new provision was added, § 53-303e, which prohibited em-
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stores for Sunday business. In order to handle the ex-
panded store hours, respondent required its managerial 
employees to work every third or fourth Sunday. Thornton, 
a Presbyterian who observed Sunday as his Sabbath, initia'· · 
complied with respondent's demand and worked a total of 
Sundays in 1977 and 1978. In October 1978, Thornton \\~d 
transferred to a management position in respondent's Tor-
rington store; he continued to work on Sundays during tlie 
first part of 1979. In November 1979, however, Thornton 
informed respondent that he would no longer work on Sun-
days because he observed that day as his Sabbath; he in-
voked the protection of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b) (Supp. 
1962-1984), provides: 
"No person who states that a particular day of the week 
is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his em-
ployer to work on such day. An employee's refusal to 
work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his 
dismissal." 3 
ployment of more than six days in any calendar week and guaranteed em-
ployees the right not to work on the Sabbath of their religious faith. See 
n. 3, infra. Soon after the revised Sunday-closing law was enacted, the 
Court of Common Pleas once again declared it unconstitutional. State v. 
Anony11WU8, 33 Conn. Supp. 141, 366 A. 2d 200 (1976). This decision was 
limited to the provision requiring Sunday closing, § 53-302a; the court did 
not consider the validity of other provisions such as § 53-303e. In 1978, 
the state legislature tried its hand at enacting yet another Sunday-closing 
law, Pub. Act No. 78-329, 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts 700-702; the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut declared the statute unconstitutional. Caldor's Inc. 
v. Bedding Barn, Inc. , 177 Conn. 304, 417 A. 2d 343 (1979). As had the 
Court of Common Pleas, the Connecticut Supreme Court did not address 
the constitutionality of§ 53-303e and that provision remained in effect until 
challenged in this action. 
1 Thornton had learned of this statutory protection by consulting with 
an attorney. See App. 88a-90a. 
Section 53-303e was enacted as part of the 1976 revision of the Sunday-
closing laws. Apart from the 6-day w~k and the Sabbath-observance 
provisions, see n. 2, supra, the remainder of the statute provides: 
"(c) Any employee, who believes that his discharge was in violation of 
• 'I 
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Thornton rejected respondent's offer either to transfer him 
to a management job in a Massachusetts store that was 
closed on Sundays, or to transfer him to a nonsupervisory 
position in the Torrington store at a lower salary. 4 In 
March 1980, respondent transferred Thornton to a clerical 
position in the Torrington store; Thornton resigned two days 
later and filed a grievance with the State Board of Mediation 
and Arbitration alleging that he was discharged from his 
manager's position in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §53-
303e(b). 
Respondent defended its action on the ground that Thorn-
ton had not been "discharged" within the meaning of the stat-
ute; respondent also urged the Board to find that the statute 
violated Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution as well as 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
After holding an evidentiary hearing the Board evaluated 
the sincerity of Thornton's claim and concluded it was based 
on a sincere religious conviction; it issued a formal decision 
sustaining Thornton's gri~vance. The Board framed the 
statutory issue as follows, "[i]f a discharge for refusal to work 
Sunday hours occurred and Sunday was the Grievant's Sab-
bath . . . , " § 53-303e(b) would be violated; the Board held 
that respondent had violated the statute by "discharg[ing] 
Mr. Thornton as a management employee for refusing to 
work ... [on] Thornton's ... Sabbath." App. lla, 12a. 
subsection (a) or (b) of this section may appeal such discharge to the state 
board of mediation and arbitration. If said board finds that the employee 
was discharged in violation of said subsection (a) or (b), it may order what-
ever remedy will make the employee whole, including but not limited to 
reinstatement to his former or a comparable position. 
"(d) No employer may, as a prerequisite to employment, inquire 
whether the applicant observes any Sabbath. 
"(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall not be 
fined more than two hundred dollars." 
4 The collective bargaining agreement in effect for nonsupervisory em-
ployees provided that they were not required to work on Sundays if it was 
"contrary [to the employee's] personal religious convictions." App. 91a. 
'·· 
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The Board ordered respondent to reinstate Thornton with 
backpay and compensation for lost fringe benefits. 5 The Su-
perior Court, in affirming that ruling, concluded that the 
statute did not offend the Establishment Clause. 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, holding the 
statute did not have a "clear secular purpose." Caldor, Inc. 
v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 349, 464 A. 2d 785, 793 (1983). 6 
By authorizing each employee to designate his own Sabbath 
as a day off, the statute evinced the "unmistakable purpose 
... [of] allow[ing] those persons who wish to worship on a 
particular day the freedom to do so." ld., at 349, 464 A. 2d, 
at 793. The court then held that the "primary effect" of the 
statute was to advance religion; the statute "confers its 'ben-
efit' on an explicitly religious basis. Only those employees 
who designate a Sabbath are entitled not to work on that par-
ticular day, and may not be penalized for so doing." ld., at 
350, 464 A. 2d, at 794. The court noted that the statute re-
quired the State Mediation Board to decide which religious 
activities may be characterized as an "observance of Sab-
bath" in order to assess employees' sincerity, and concluded 
that this type of inquiry is "exactly the type of 'comprehen-
sive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance' ... 
which creates excessive governmental entanglements be-
tween church and state." ld., at 351, 464 A. 2d, at 794 
(quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 619 (1971)). 
We granted certiorari, 465 U. S. -- (1984). 7 We affirm. 
'The Board refused to consider respondent's constitutional challenge on 
the ground that, as a quasi-judicial body, it had no authority to pass on the 
constitutionality of state law. /d., at 9a-10a. 
• The court expressly chose not to consider whether the statute violated 
Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 
Conn. 336, 346, n. 7, 464 A. 2d 785, 792, n. 7 (1983). 
7 We also granted the State of Connecticut's motion to intervene as of 
right to defend the constitutionality of the state law. 465 U. S. -
(1984). 
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II 
The First Amendment's guarantee against the "establish- · 
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" 
turned away from the tradition of government-supported re-
ligions long prevalent in Europe. 8 Acknowledgment and 
accommodation of religion have been closely identified with 
our history, beginning at the Constitutional Convention and 
notably in actions taken in the first days of the First Con-
gress. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 787-788 
(1983). 9 Since the colonial era, our society has set aside 
Sunday as a common day of rest and religious observance. 10 
Reviewing the history of "Sunday Closing_ Laws" extant in 
the colonies in 1787 when the Constitution was drafted and 
debated, and when the First Amendment was adopted in 
1791, this Court has sustained such laws as having ~id ·L-1~ 
secular ...Q.urtf.?se, notwithstanding the pervasive use of that /' 
day for re gious worship. The Court acknowledged the 
"strongly religious origin of these laws." McGowan v . 
. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 433 (1961). To conclude otherwise 
would "give a constitutional interpretation of hostility to the 
public welfare rather than one of mere separation of church 
and State." I d., at 445. 
The background of accommodation and acknowledgment of 
religion must be weighed, however, against an equally in-
structive lesson from history: that the Establishment Clause 
8 In Blackstone's words, for example, "the civil magistrate . . . is bound 
indeed to protect the established church: and, if this can be better effected, 
by admitting none but its genuine members to offices of trust and emolu-
ment, he is certainly at liberty to do so . . . . " 4 W. Blackstone, Com-
mentaries *52. 
• In the space of a single week in the opening sessions of the First Con-
gress in 1789, paid chaplains were authorized for each House. See Marsh 
v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 788 (1983). 
10 In Connecticut, for example, laws requiring businesses to close on 
Sunday, the traditional Christian day of Sabbath, date back to 1656. J. 
Cushing, The Earliest Laws of the New Haven and Connecticut Colonies 
1639-1673, p. 47 (1977). 
•• 1 . 
. 
' 
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was intended to foreclose governmental compulsion of some 
of the people to support and facilitate the religious activities 
of others. Clearly all forms of direct, absolute coercion were 
proscribed. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U. S. 1, 8-16 (1947). Justice Frankfurter, concurring in 
McGowan, observed: 
. "In assuring the free exercise of religion, the Framers 
of the First Amendment were sensitive to the then re-
cent history of those persecutions and impositions of civil 
disability with which sectarian majorities in virtually all 
of the Colonies had visited deviation in the matter of con-
science. This protection of unpopular creeds, however, 
was not to be the full extent of the Amendment's guaran-
tee of freedom from governmental intrusion in matters of 
faith." 366 U. S., at 464-465 (footnotes omitted). 
The Framers' fear of governmental coercion in religious 
matters 11 stemmed from their awareness of how often in their 
own time governmental authority intruded into the religious 
sphere and led to unwanted conflict and oppression. See 
Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 431-432 (1962). Govern-
ment, Madison asserted, should not "employ Religion as an 
/
. engine of Civil policy," 2 Writings of James Madison 187 (G. 
Hunt ed. 1901). ' 
Government must not only guard against activity that im-
pinges on religious freedom, but it must take pains not to 
compel citizens to act in the name of any religion. Cf. 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714-717 (1977). The val-
ues of the Religion Clauses preserve the Framers' "aware-
ness of the historical fact that governmentally established re-
ligions and religious persecutions go hand in hand." Engle, 
"The Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, an aclmowledged antecedent of 
the First Amendment, proclaimed as one of its guiding principles that 
"no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship 
... nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body 
or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or 
beliefs .... " 12 W. Hening, Laws of Virginia 86 (1823) . 
J 
j 
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supra, at 432. Concurring in McGowan, supra, at 460, Jus-
tice Frankfurter pointed to 
"the long colonial struggle for disestablishment [that 
was] the struggle to free all men, whatever their theo-
logical views, from state-compelled obligation to ac-
knowledge and support state-favored faiths." 
In setting appropriate boundaries in Establishment Clause 
cases, the Court has frequently referred to our holding in 
Lemon for guidance in this sensitive area. This familiar 
three-part inquiry provides: 
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally the 
statute must not foster an excessive governmental en-
tanglement with religion." 403 U. S., at 612-613. 
Although Lemon provides no rigid, fixed ~ rmula applicable 
to all Establishment Clause cases, the criteria proper y focus 
on whether the values protected by the Religion Clauses 
have been undermined. 
In considering the extent to which government may accom-
modate reli~on, we must answer th ey question om- to 
the core objectives of the Religion Clauses: 1s e challenged 
action a step toward the establishment of a religion by or 
with the approval of gove ent o oes sue ac 10n su stan-
tially impair the free exercise of religion? The government 
is neither to coerce nor induce adherence to any religion, nor 
is it to compel conduct conformin~ religious 
creed or practice; the Lemon criteria themselves are de-
signed generally to determine whether government has re-
spected this Constitutional tenet. This circumscribed scope 
of governmental action fulfills the Constitutional purpose "to 
promote and assure the fullest possible scope of religious lib-
erty and tolerance for all and to nurture the conditions which 
secure the best hope of attainment of that end." Abington 
I 
) 
J 
j 
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School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 305 (1963) (Gold-
berg, J., concurring). 
III 
Given the statute's particular operation, it is appropriate to 
consider§ 53-303e(b)'s validity under the second aspect of the 
Lemon inquiry, namely whether the statute has a primary ef-
fect that impermissibly advances or inhibits religion. See, 
e. g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 
756, 783, n. 39 (1973); Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612. Should the 
statute fail to comply with any one of these criteria, the 
Court need not inquire further. See, e. g., Stone v. Gra-
ham, 449 U. S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam). 
The challenged statute guarantees every employee, who 
"states that a particular day of the week is observed as his 
Sabbath," the right not to work on his chosen day. Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b). In the view of the legislature, a 
Sabbath observer should not be forced to choose between 
compromising a religious conviction and jeopardizing a job. 
Here, in short, the State has decreed that a person who ob-
serves one day of the week as .a matter of religious conviction 
must be relieved of any duty to work on that day, no matter 
what burden or inconvenience this imposes on the employer 
or fellow workers. Clearly the statute arms Sabbath ob- } 
servers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work 
on their designated Sabbath. Petitioner's reading of 
§ 53-303e(b) conflicts with the unambiguous wording of the 
statute and ignores the statute's construction by the 
Connecticut authorities entrusted with this task, including 
the State's highest court. 12 
11 The State Board of Mediation and Arbitration construed the statute as 
providing Thornton with the absolute right not to work on his Sabbath. 
Caldor, Inc. v. Tlurrnton, Conn. Bd. Med. & Arb. No. 7980-A-727 (Oct. 
20, 1980), App. lla-12a; accord, G. Fox & Co. v. Rinaldi, Conn. Bd. Med. 
& Arb. No. 8182-A-440 (Nov. 17, 1982) ("There is no question that ... the 
employee has an absolute right to designate any day of the week as his or 
her sabbath "and that § 53-303e(b) would be violated if" the termination 
i 
I 
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This case does not bear on the constitutionality of the reli-
gious ·accommodation provisions of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of i964 and its various state counterparts. In 
1972, Congress amended Title VII, which outlawed employ-
ment discrimination based on an individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin. As amended, Title VII re-
quires employers only "to reasonably accommodate" an 
employee's religious observances and practices when so doing 
does not cause "undue hardship on the conduct of the employ-
er's business," 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000eU) and 2000e-2(a)(l). A 
number of states have comparable legislation. 13 The Con-
necticut statute, however, goes beyond the "accommodation" 
laws currently in force; the commands of§ 53-303e(b) are ab-
solute and unqualified. 14 
was as a result of the employee's refusal to work on her sabbath"). Fol-
lowing settled state 11:\W, see, e. g., Bruno v. Department of Consumer 
Protection, 190 Conn. 14, 18, 458 A. 2d 685, 688 (1983) (per curiam), the 
State Superior Court and the Supreme Court of Connecticut adopted the 
Board's construction of the statute, Caldor, Inc. v. Tlwrnton, 191 Conn. 
336, 340-343, 350, 464 A. 2d 785, 789-790, 794 (1983). This construction of 
the state Jaw is, of course, binding on federal courts. E. g., Brown v. 
Ohio, 432 U. S. 161, 167 (1977); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, 169 
(1961); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875). 
'1 See, e. g., Alaska Stat. § 18.80.200 (1981); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 41-1461(6), 41-1463 (1974); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1-570, 45-19-22 (2) 
(1982); Iowa Code § 601A.6(1)(a) (1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.030(5) (1983); 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 5, § 4572(1)(A) (1979); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., 
ch. 151B, § 4.1A (1982); S. C. Code § 1-13-30(k) (Supp. 1984); Tex. Rev. 
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5221k, §§ 1.01, 2.01(13), 5.01 (Vernon Supp. 1984); 
Wis. Stat. § 111.337 (1981-1982). 
After the Connecticut Supreme Court invalidated § 53-303e(b), the 
Connecticut legislature enacted a statute prohibiting religious dis-
crimination in employment that precisely tracks the language of Title VII. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-51(18). The legislature, however, did not repeal 
§ 53-303e(b), which indicates that Sabbath observers have an absolute 
right not to work on their Sabbath. 
,. The United States, as amicus curiae, acknowledges that "[i]f there is a 
constitutional defect in Section 53-303e(b), it is its absolute character-a 
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In essence, the Connecticut statute imposes on employers 
and employees an absolute duty to conform their conduct and 
business practices to the religious practices of others; it en-
forces observance of whatever religious holiday the employee 
unilaterally designates. The State thus commands that Sab-
bath religious concerns automatically trump all secular and 
other religious interests at the workplace; the statute takes 
no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or 
those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath. 
The employer and others must adjust their affairs to the com-
mand of the State whenever the statute is invoked by an 
employee. 
There is no exception under the statute for special circum-
stances, such as the Friday Sabbath observer employed in an 
occupation with a Monday through Friday schedule-a school 
teacher, for example; the statute provides for no special con-
sideration if a high percentage of an employer's workforce as-
serts rights to the same Sabbath; and there is no exception to 
take account of employers whose work schedules reflect their 
own religious practices. Moreover, there is no exception 
when following the dictates of Sabbath observers would 
cause the employer substantial economic burdens or when 
the employer's compliance would require the imposition of 
significant burdens on other employees who must work in 
place of the Sabbath observers. 15 Finally, the statute allows 
character that Title VII and the parallel state statutes do not share." 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24. 
11 Section 53-303e(b) gives Sabbath observers the valuable right to des-
ignate a particular weekly day off-typically a weekend day, widely prized 
as a day off. Other employees who have strong and legitimate, but non-
religious reasons for wanting a weekend day off have no rights under the 
statute. For example, those employees who have earned the privilege 
through seniority to have weekend days off may be forced to surrender this 
privilege to the Sabbath observer; years of service and payment of "dues" 
at the workplace simply cannot compete with the Sabbath observer's abso-
lute right under the statute. Similarly, those employees who would like a 
weekend day off, because that is the only day their spouses are also not 
J 
I 
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for no consideration as to whether the employer has made 
reasonable accommodation proposals. This unyielding 
weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all other inter-
ts contravenes a fundamental principle of the Religion 
<..;iauses that: 
"The First Amendment ... gives no one the right to in-
sist that in pursuit of their own interests others must 
conform their conduct to his own religious necessities." 
Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F. 2d 58, 61 (CA2 
1953) (L. Hand, J.). 
Connecticut singles out Sabbath observance and commands 
that all such observance override every uther legitimate 
interest of employers and employees alike. Any conflict be-
tween Sabbath observance and other interests is resolved 
mandatorily under the statute; the State lends its power 
exclusively to the particular religious practice of the demand-
ing employee. This goes well beyond accommodation and 
acknowledging religion's place as an aspect of our society's 
"diversity and pluralism," Lynch, 465 U. S., at --, and 
leaves no "play·in the joints," Walz, 397 U.S., at 669, for 
other substantial secular and religious values. 
The Connecticut statute allocates a substantial and valu-
able benefit solely along reli~ous lines and imposes a burden 
on others who choose not to observe a Sabbath. The statute 
effectively arms Sabbath observers with the right to impose 
on others in order to practice their particular religious tenet. 
As such, the statute goes beyond having an incidental or 
remote effect of advancing religion. See, e. g., Roemer v. 
Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S. 736, 747 (1976); 
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968). On the 
contrary, the very operation of this provision makes it clear 
that § 53-303e(b) has a primary effe.ct that impermissibly 
,----------working, must take a back seat to the Sabbath observer. As explained 
infra, the Establishment Clause does not permit the State to coerce per-
sons' conduct in such a direct and absolute manner in order to facilitate the 
religious practices of others. 
' ' 
12 ESTATE 0 
I advances a p~rtlcular religious Dr~ctice. Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612. 
I The operation of this statute goes beyond the "benevolent 
neutrRrt~ '' )1at the Religion Clauses require. By giving to 
only hose people who observe a workfree Sabbath as a reli-
gious practice the right to designate their own particular 
Sabbath as a nonworking day, the State explicitly favors one 
traditional religious practice. The Sabbath observance 
which§ 53-303e(b) advances is a central practice within three 
readily identifiable major religions: Christianity, Judaism, 
and Islam. 16 Members of religious groups not included 
within the statute's protection, i. e., those persons belonging 
to Eastern religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism may, 
not unreasonably, conclude that only certain Sabbath reli-
gions have received the State's imprimatur and endorsement 
given the statute's inflexible mandate. See Gillette v. 
United States, 401 U. S. 437, 450 (1971); Lynch, supra, at 
--(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). This is not the "accommo-
dation" envisioned by the Religion Clauses; § 53-303e(b), by 
compelling others to conform their conduct to the Sabbath 
observers', virtually "confer[s] [an] imprimatur of state ap-
proval on [particular] religtous ... practices," Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274 (1981). 
! 
Given its absolutist terms, which automatically subordi-
nate the treatment of all secular concerns to those of the Sab-
bath observers, § 53-303e(b), by coercing conduct on behalf of 
particular religious adherents, see, e. g., Abington School 
1
' The Supreme Court of Connecticut rejected the argument that the 
statute uses the tenn "Sabbath" to mean simply a time of rest without any 
religious significance. Instead, that court construed § 53-303e(b) as desig-
nating that day of ''rest and worship ... specifically mandated by the te-
nets of a particular religion," namely Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. 
191 Conn., at 347-348, and nn. 8, 9, 464 A. 2d, 792-793, and nn. 8, 9. 
Accordingly, the arguments advanced in this Court that the statute pro-
tects all religious groups equally and favors no particular religion are 
disingenuous. 
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District, supra; Engle v. Vitale, supra, has the primary ef-
fect of advancing a particular religious tenet. 17 
IV 
Petitioner · l j the State of Connecticut assert that deci-
sions such as Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), and 
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U. S. 707 (1981), which recog-
nized the government's duty to take account of the special 
needs of religious observers, insulate the Connecticut statute 
frQm constitutional attack. In Sherbert, a Seventh-day 
Adventist lost her job because she would not work on Satur-
day, her Sabbath. Similarly, in Thomas, a Jehovah's Wit-
ness lost employment after refusing to participate in the pro-
duction of armaments, an activity contrary to the tenets of 
his faith. 
In each of these cases the Free Exercise Clause was held to 
require the State to extend unemployment benefits to these 
persons who, having lost their jobs as a result of their refusal 
to compromise their religious practices at the workplace, 
were not able to secure employment. Sherbert, supra, at 
410; Thomas, 450 U. S., at 718-719. 
The State must provide the religious employee with the 
benefits of "an otherwise available public program," avail-
able to all, id., at 716; the Free Exercise Clause prohibited 
the State from unduly burdening the employee's exercise of 
religion. In other words, the State could not exclude the 
employee from participating in the government program-
receipt of unemployment compensation-because unemploy-
ment resulted from the employee's religious beliefs. 
The Court's holdings in Sherbert and Thomas on the one 
hand, and the Connecticut statute on the other, as in so many 
17 Our decisions make it abundantly clear that the Establishment Clause 
does not condemn all governmental action that has the effect of aiding reli-
gion. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Educatian, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (bus 
transportation); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968) (text-
book loans); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (property tax ex-
emption); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983) (tax deduction for tuition 
transportation and textbook expenses). 
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cases arising under the Religion Clauses, call for line draw-
ing. Distinguishing between cases falling next to the line on 
either side is often difficult . but lines must be drawn. See, 
e. g., United States v.. Jra; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 
1 v. s. 599 (1961). 
~ ~ccommodation for religious observers or religious in-
stitutions from governmental coercion has been long recog-
nized by the Court. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 
437 (1971), for example, the Court rejected an Establishment 
Clause challenge to statutory provisions exempting religious 
and conscientious objectors from the draft. The Court con-
cluded that such an exemption was "in line with 'our happy 
tradition' of 'avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates 
of conscience."' I d., at 453 (quoting United States v. M acin-
tosh, 283 U. S. 605, 634 (1931) (Hughes, C. J., dissenting)). 
Similarly, as the Court held in Walz, the Establishment 
Clause did not forbid the granting of a property tax exemp-
tion to all churches. That tax exemption "simply spar[ed] 
the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation 
levied on private profit institutions," 397 U. S., at 673, and 
avoided tensions between g~vernmental power and religious 
institutions. In that sense it indeed aided all religions. See 
also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983); Braunfeld v. 
Braum, supra. 
I 
As we have noted earlier, § 53-303e(b) offers a strikingly 
different situation. In enforcing the statute, Connecticut co-
ercively burdens a host of others to conform their conduct in 
order to facilitate the religious activity of Sabbath observers. 
Far from preventing its own programs from unnecessarily 
burdening religious exercise, the State is reaching out into 
the private sector to compel absolute deference to a certain 
I 
religious practice-this goes beyond accommodation and con-
stitutes an impermissible advancement of a particular reli-
gious practice. 
.. . 
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v 
W~ hold that the Connecticut statute, which provides Sab-
bath observers with an absolute ·n.,rl 1mqualified right not to 
work on their Sabbath, violate~ r., ':.'>tablishment Clause 
of the First Amendment. Th,, judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut is affirmed. 
It is so ordered . 
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment. . 
I join Parts I and III of the opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
and the Court's judgment that Connecticut General Statute 
§ 53-303e(b) violates the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. Both THE ' CHIEF JuSTICE and JUSTICE 
BRENNAN apply the test enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971) and conclude that the Connecti-
cut sabbath law has a primary effect that impermissably ad-
vances religion. In my view, whether the statute has an im-
permissible effect turns on whether it conveys a message of 
endorsement of the Sabbath observance. Although I would 
prefer to let the Connecticut courts address this issue in the 
first instance,* the Court chooses to reach and apply the "ef-
*A remand on this issue might also clarify an issue on which there is 
some disagreement in the briefs. The Court reads the Connecticut Su-
preme Court's opinion as holding that § 53-303e(b) confers an "absolute" 
right not to work on one's Sabbath. As I read the record, however, the 
situation is somewhat more complex. The Arbitration Board apparently 
assumed that the statute imposed an absolute accommodation require-
ment. App. 12a. In part because it thought itself required to defer to the 
statutory interpretation of the Arbitration Board, and in part because the 
parties submitted to the factual and legal determinations of the arbitrators 
without restriction, the Connecticut Supreme Court considered itself 
bound as a matter of state law by the Arbitration Board's interpretation of 
the statute. 484 A. 2d 785, 790 (1983). The Connecticut Supreme Court 
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, 
fects" prong of the Lemon test. I agree with,._ their( ~ L J.~ 
conclusion. 
All employees, regardless of their religious orientation, 
would value the benefit which this Connecticut statute be-
stows upon Sabbath observers-the right to select the day of 
the week in which to refrain from labor. Yet Connecticut re-
quires private employers to confer this valued and desirable 
benefit only on those employees who adhere to a particular 
religious belief. The statute singles out Sabbath observers 
for special and, as the Court concludes, absolute protection 
without according similar accommodation to ethical and reli-
gious beliefs and practices of other private employees. 
There can be little doubt that Mr. Thornton's co-workers and 
the public at large will perceive this statutory scheme pre-
cisely as THE CHIEF JUSTICE does today: 
"The State . . . commands that Sabbath religious con-
cerns automatically trump all secular and other religious 
interests at the workplace; the statute takes no account 
of the convenience or interests of the employer or those 
of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath. The 
employer and others must adjust their affairs to the com-
mand of the State whenever the statute is invoked by an 
employee." Ante, at 1~. 
The message conveyed is one of endorsement of a particular 
religious belief, to the detriment of those who do not share it. 
then struck down the statute, not on the grounds that it imposed an "abso-
lute" accommodation requirement, but because it apparently viewed any 
accommodation of Sabbath observances as violating all three prongs of the 
Lemon test. As a result of this peculiar procedural posture, the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court has never held that § 53-303e(b) generally imposes an 
absolute accommodation requirement, but has rather held only that these 
parties cannot challenge the Arbitration Board's legal conclusion to that ef-
fect. It is conceivable that the Connecticut Supreme Court, when faced 
with a restricted submission to the Arbitration Board in a case where rea-
sonable accommodation is infeasible, would interpret the statute as requir-
ing only reasonable accommodation. 
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As such, the Connecticut statute has the effect of advancing 
religion, and cannot withstand Establishment Clause 
scrutiny. 
Although I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that Connecti-
cut cannot cure this infirmity in its statute by labeling it an 
"accommodation" of the free exercise of religion, I do not join 
the "accommodation" analysis contained in Parts II and IV of 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE's opinion. As the opinion concurring in 
the judgment in Wallace v. Jaffree, --U.S.--,--
(1985) explained, "one can plausibly assert that government 
pursues free exercise clause values when it lifts a govern-
ment imposed burden on the free exercise of religion." 
Connecticut's statute requires private employers to defer to 
religious practices of employees. Accordingly, it does not 
lift a government-imposed burden, and cannot be properly 
viewed as an accommodation statute. I agree with those 
portions of JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion that embrace this 
analysis. See ante at --. 
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As such, the Connecticut statute has the effect of advancing 
religion, and cannot withstand Establishment Clause 
scrutiny. 
Although I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that Connecti-
cut cannot cure this infirmity in its statute by labeling it an 
"accommodation" of the free exercise of religion, I do not join 
the "accommodation" analysis contained in Parts II and IV of 
THE CHIEF JusTICE's opinion. As the opinion concurring in 
the judgment in Wallace v. J affree, -- U. S. --, --
(1985) explained, "one can plausibly assert that government 
pursues free exercise clause values when it lifts a govern-
ment imposed burden on the free exercise of religion." 
Connecticut's statute requires private employers to defer to 
religious practices of employees. Accordingly, it does not 
lift a government-imposed burden, and cannot be properly 
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The Court applies the test enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971) and concludes that Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b) has a primary effect that impermissi-
bly advances religion. I agree, and I join the Court's opinion 
and judgment. In my view, the Connecticut Sabbath law 
has an impermissible effect because it conveys a message of 
endorsement of the Sabbath observance. 
All employees, regardless of their religious orientation, 
would value the benefit which the statute bestows on Sab-
bath observers-the right to select the day of the week in 
which to refrain from labor. Yet Connecticut requires pri-
vate employers to confer this valued and desirable benefit 
only on those employees who adhere to a particular religious 
belief. The statute singles out Sabbath observers for special 
and, as the Court concludes, absolute protection without ac-
cording similar accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs 
and practices of other private employees. There can be little 
doubt that an objective observer or the public at large would 
perceive this statutory scheme precisely as the Court does 
today. Ante, at -- [slip opinion at 6-7]. The message 
conveyed is one of endorsement of a particular religious be-
lief, to the detriment of those who do not share it. As such, 
the Connecticut statute has the effect of advancing religion, 
and cannot withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny. 
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perceive this statutory scheme precisely as the Court does 
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I do not read the Court's opinion as suggesting that the re-
ligious accommodation provisions of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act are similarly invalid. These provisions preclude 
employment discrimination based on a person's religion and 
require private employers to reasonably accommodate the re-
ligious practices of employees unless to so would cause undue 
hardship to the employer's business. 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e(j) 
and 2000e-2(a)(1). Like the Connecticut Sabbath law, Title 
VII attempts to lift a burden on religious practice that is im-
posed by private employers, and hence it is not the sort of 
accommodation statute specifically contemplated by the Free 
Exercise Clause. See Wallace v. J affree, -- U. S. --, 
-- (1985) (opinion concurring in the judgment). The provi-
sions of Title VII must therefore manifest a valid secular pur-
pose and effect to be valid under the Establishment Clause. 
In my view, a statute outlawing employment discrimination 
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin has the 
valid secular purpose of assuring employment opportunity to 
all groups in our pluralistic society. See Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 90, n. 4 (1977) (MAR-
SHALL, J., dissenting). Since Title VII calls for reasonable 
rather than absolute accommodation and extends that re-
quirement to all religious beliefs and practices rather than 
protecting only the Sabbath observance, I believe an objec-
tive observer would perceive it as an anti-discrimination law 
rather than an endorsement of religion or a particula.r reli-
gious practice. 
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the "effects" prong of the Lemon test, and hence, that the 
judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court should be 
affirmed. 
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First Amendment. I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN that the 
three-pronged test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602, 
612-613 (1971), and our Establishment Clause cases provide 
the proper framework for analysis of this case, rather 
than our cases involving the Free Exercise Clause. I 
would hold simply and briefly that the Connecticut statute 
violates the "effects" prong of the Lemon test, and hence, 
that the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court should 
be affirmed. 
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